- Bring out the salient features of Zia-ud-din Barani’s theory of history and examine the value of his works as a source of information for the Sultanate period.
- Ziauddin Barani is generally considered the most important historian of the period of the Delhi Sultanate, his works being our chief source of information for much of the 13th and 14th centuries. Discussions of the period between the reign of Balban and that of Firuz Shah Tughlaq among modern-day historians have thus understandably tended to center around interpretations of Barani’s work. Much debate has also concentrated on his conception of the role and function of history, as laid out both in his narrative account of the Sultanate, dedicated to Firozshah Tughluq, Tarikh-i-firuzshahi (1357) and a more didactic work, the Fatawa-i-jahandari (Political Theory of Delhi Sultanate) written around the same. Both books are complementary.
Tarikh-i-Firozshahi – he picks up the narrative from where Minhaj leaves it, i.e., 1266, and continues till 1308 – 6th regnal year of Firozshah Tughuq. It is divided into several chapters, each dealing with a specific ruler. Not a year-by-year account (annalistic) account. Each chapter begins with a list of the nobles, qazis, scholars, military commanders etc. which precedes the narrative. This is followed by his own assessment of the period. Each chapter was sub-divided into various sections which deal with significant events. Fatawa-i-jahandari – style and narrative of each book is different. It is concerned with notions of political authority and governance. The style – he uses the figure of Mahmud of Ghazni giving advice to his sons on state organization, political governance etc. But they were actually Barani’s views. Ghazni was used because he was the first Sultan.
As one might expect, Barani’s history is largely the history of Delhi’s ruling circles, with which he himself was closely associated. His father was naib to Jalaluddin Khilji’s son, his uncle had been kotwal of Delhiunder Alauddin Khilji, and his maternal grandfather had been an important functionary under Balban. Barani himself was the nadim or confidante of Muhammad bin Tughlaq in 1334 and 1351, a fact that offered him rare insight into the complexities of the ways in which power functioned. However, in the period after Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s death, Barani fell out of royal favour and was apparently imprisoned for a while, and spent the rest of his life in relative misery. It was during this time that he wrote his tarikh-I-firuzshahi, a work gifted to Sultan Firuz Shah Tughlaq, and thus full of eulogy, perhaps as an attempt to re-establish some influence.
One of the reasons for Barani’s enduring appeal is the novelty of his conception of history. Prior to this period, the writing of history in India had been largely a narrative exercise, confined to chronicles and annals. Barani, in sharp contrast with this, developed and articulated a history that was conscious of its own importance, of the role and function it had to play in society, and the interests – religious and secular – that it was bound up with.History was conceived of by Barani as a science and as a guide to practical action. In his work he lists seven benefits conferred by the study of history upon its readers. Prominent among these are the strengthening of reason and judgment through the study of others experiences, the cultivation of patience and resignation, the reinforcement through empirical knowledge and analysis of Islam, the Shariya, Hadis, a knowledge of good and evil, and an adherence to the truth. Peter Hardy sees these formulations as indicative of the assigning of a didactic religious role to history. Irfan Habib points out that such an interpretation is problematic as there can be no disputing the weight that Barani places upon history.
– had high regard for history
– learn lessons for future decisions
Two functionsof history, as Barani conceives it, stand out from his accounts. One striving for truth – the idea that history requires scrupulous attention to the fact and details without fear or favour. The other function, in a sense, contradicts the idea that history has to be geared to serve the interests of the ruling classes. The tension between political expediency and truth for truth’s sake informs all of Barani’s work. In a sense, ironically, his most strident proclamations of the truth-value of history can be located within the context of this expediency. Barani did, of necessity, praise Firuz shah Tughlaq to the skies since he expected favours of him.
Barani’s main concerns, as already pointed out are with the ruling classes. His min audience is the ruling class. History serves their interests; further, a proper history cannot waste itself upon the deeds of the mean and low born. There is nothing particularly novel about this assertion. No medieval historian seriously disputed its validity. What is striking is Barani’s grasp of the ambiguities and complexities within the nature of power, something accentuated by his particularly close links with the ruling classes.
Power, nobility, despotism
Power, according to Barani, does not flow from God, but is the product of a historical process. In the Fatwa -I- jahandari, written in the form of advice imparted by Mehmud Ghaznavi to his sons and to the ‘kings of Islam’, it is stated that ‘only the first four khalifas of the Islamic world were ‘rightly guided’’; following them, kingship lost its legitimacy. It was neither the result of pure heredity, nor of proper and judicious appointment by predecessors, nor ratified by the Muslim community. Thus, according to Barani, this inherently arbitrary kingly power can only be justified through able administration. The ideal of hereditary power having been stamped out at its base, no glory inheres in kingship. On the contrary, Barani asserts that kings need to demonstrate their worthiness in order to legitimize their authority – use of force.
Central to Barani’s perception of a successful ruling class is the growth of a despotic monarchy where the Sultan wielded effective power, the ‘terror of absolute authority’. However, for him this exercise of terror is ambiguous. As with many other issues, he grasps the central contradiction within the exercise of royal power, that effective control requires terror, but terror destabilizes power at its base. This is substantiated by Barani’s reading of the career of the Sultans.
Balban’s frequent atrocities on the ruling class are lamented (predictably his harshness to ordinary people is glossed over). However, this cruelty is the inevitable accompaniment of power, and necessary in the context of the need to re-establish imperial authority after it had dwindled prior to Balban’s accession. Jalaluddin Khilji on the other hand presents a picture of a humane and compassionate Sultan, but one whose benevolence opened up the path for fatal treason. While Alauddin Khilji’s exceptional efficiency in administration, market control and military campaigns is lauded, Barani also points to the moral and physical costs of the Sultan’s extreme ruthlessness, as also to the fact that this eroded the basis of his power, leading to popular discontent. This dialectic between power and instability reaches its zenith under Muhammad bin Tughlaq, whom Barani, as nadim, knew intimately. The Sultan completed his predecessors’ conquests, centralized power and accumulated wealth. However, the growth of his despotism was paralleled by extreme cruelty, brutality and a consuming ambition, a process ending only with his death.
The history of the Sultanate, as seen by Barani, also consists in the growing changes and instability in the composition of the ruling classes; a point Irfan Habib puts great emphasis on. Habib points out that Barani’s distinction between highborn (sharif) and lowborn (razil) derived not from status-by-birth, but from the conquest of the passage of time. Thus, the Turkish slaves who took over the Sultanate following Iltutmish’s death began as upstarts but became acceptable once established as ‘insiders’. Barani is also influenced by the fact that while a high-class person like him was leading a life of poverty and deprived of position under FST, the court consisted of diverse Muslims, especially Indian converts, who had been promoted by MBT. So he resents them.
Barani’s outline of the history of the subversion of the ruling class demonstrates his consciousness of another major contradiction, between the desirability of a closed hereditary clique and the importance of loyalty and competence. Increasing administrative failures up to 1295 culminated finally in Alauddin’s coup, and the complete destruction of the existing nobility. While he abhors the influx of clerks and slaves into Alauddin’s nobility, Barani realizes that the expansion of the empire could not have been achieved by a corrupt and sluggish hereditary nobility. The ‘plebianization’ of the nobility that Barani perceives under Alauddin Khilji reaches its zenith inevitably under the reign of Muammad bin Tughlaq, when barbers, cooks, and wine-distillers and similar representatives of the lowborn flooded the nobility. But while he inveighs against this, as Habib points out, Barani remains unprovoked by the increase in the foreign and Hindu components of the nobility.
Religion
A major issue of contention with reference to Barani’s ideological positions is his treatment of religion. In his preface, Barani mentions ilm-i-tarikh (the knowledge of history) and ilm-i-hadith (the knowledge of Hadiz). Peter Hardy ties up the religious and political aspects of Barani’s philosophy, and attributes an essentially theological view of history to him. It does appear that religion was very important for Barani, as borne out by his constant proclamation of authority. However, Hardy’s assertions have been disputed by, among others, KA Nizami and Irfan Habib. They suggest that what he probably meant was application of the techniques of analysis and investigation to history, as was done during the compilation of the Hadith.
Barani draws a distinction between dindari (matters of religion) and jahandari(matters of governance). Habib suggests that while Barani uses theological idioms, his conception of statecraft ultimately realized the impracticability of a literal reading of the Shariyat in the Indian context, which would have meant unwarranted suppression and cruelty. Alauddin’s agrarian policy, which impoverished village khuts and muqaddams, is seen as counter-productive because it alienated the largely Hindu rural aristocracy. Barani also desists from criticizing Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s tolerance towards Hindus, which suggests he realized the necessity of an accommodation. Hence, Barani’s orthodoxies are actually realized best in not religious but class terms, his fear of the influx of lowborn Muslims into the aristocracy being a case in point.
Another dilemma faced by Barani was that while he belonged to the religious orthodoxy and wanted the shariah to be implemented, he recognized that this was not possible in a predominantly Hindu state. E.g. Iltutmish – ‘salt in dish’ story. This causes frustration. But in one statement he says that in case of conflict between the shariah or zawabit (state law), the latter will prevail.
Economic dimensions
Barani’s prime merit as a historian and as an analyst of society lies, as Irfan Habib argues, in his understanding of the economic dimensionsof the Delhi Sultanate. His perceptive account of Alauddin’s economic policy remains the basis for much of our knowledge of the medieval economy in this period. Barani appears to have grasped the nature of the Sultanate as an urban political mechanism based on the exploitation of a large agrarian producing society. A closer look at Barani’s account of Alauddin’s market regulations will help clarify this.
Alauddin, according to Barani, extracted a large surplus through collection of half the grain as tax and the levy of other taxes, thus reducing the income of the rural aristocracy and enabling large supplies of grain to Delhi. Using this mechanism, he was able to lower the prices of grain in the Delhi market. However, remarkably, Barani understands that low prices did not constitute a sign of public welfare. Low prices meant low wages and were also a response to extremely low purchasing power. Ruthless and intense surplus extraction produced a highly impoverished cultivating group. The surplus derived from the countryside fed towns in period of scarcity, but more to the point, it was used to sustain a large army. Alauddin’s reforms, as Barani says, were of great benefit to the urban mercantile classes – of which, interestingly Hindus constituted a major segment.
The relations between the Sultanate and the rural aristocracy in this period though, appear to have been far more complex. This class, again largely comprising Hindus facilitated the squeezing of surplus from the cultivators. In an ideal situation, therefore, their suppression would not have been desirable. But Barani realizes that this was not an ideal situation, in that the Sultanate’s power rested to a large extent on the support of the rural aristocracy. Therefore, he welcomes Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq’s concessions to this class, and bemoans Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s reversals of this: an arbitrary increase in taxation that led to an uprising of the khuts and muqaddams, groups of village headmen. Alauddin’s success is thus explained in terms of the efficiency of his exploitation of the agrarian countryside, and Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s failure is understood in terms of the counterproductive excesses of his agrarian policy. Firuz Shah Tughlaq’s reign is celebrated on account of the prosperity of khuts and muqaddams. Implicit in this prosperity, of course, as Irfan Habib points out, was the possibility of the serious contestation of Sultanate power by rural potentates. However, it should be remembered that even if he realized this, Barani could not have elaborated upon it, writing as he was out of necessity as the Sultan’s eulogist.
Barani’s History – Characteristics – Value as historian
Barani’s writings on the Delhi Sultanate represent a remarkable historiographical achievement, one that through its contradictions and tensions establishes a unique sense of history, and is of much value to the contemporary historian.
1) His work gives us an insight into the ways in which religion, ideology, and history were bound up with the interests of the dominant social groups.
2) In essence, Barani’s history is the history of the Sultanate ruling class, and the tensions, conflicts and functions of this class are anatomized in detail. Seems to capture the spirit of the time.
– ulema – shariah
– Iltutmish – promote non-Turkish nobility, tension with Turkish nobility.
3) Individuals in Barani’s work, unlike that of most medieval historians, are always related to their social environment, and explanations rather than bald accounts of their lives are sought to be provided – in societal terms.
4) Further, his accent on the contradictory elements in socio-political processes, for instance, the growth of despotic power, facilitated both very sophisticated analyses of specific situations and a conscious, nuanced conceptualization of history.
5) Empirically too, Barani’s accounts are of value for the historian. His proximity to the ruling elite provided for an exceptionally close glimpse into the way royal strategies were plotted, and what went into the making of royal decisions. – personal witness
6) Even more striking is his grasp of the economic conditions that prevailed in his times. His understanding of these enabled an acute and nuanced analysis of the economic policies of the Sultans, especially of Alauddin Khilji’s regulations.
7) covers a large period of history
8) analytical, critical style, not just political narrative.
9) judgemental – has views on everything
e.g. Balban was dubbed as ideal ruler whom everyone should emulate; MBT, AK – evil Sultans, extreme; Ghiyassudin Tughluq – moderate and Barani was upholder of moderation. Couldn’t understand extreme policies of MBT.
10) Barani’s work also attempts to legitimize institutions that emerged in the course of the political life of the Sultanate, but were un-Islamic in nature, on grounds of necessity.
e.g. SIYASAT – use of force – In Islamic law, there is no provision for death penalty, except under 3 circumstances – murder, adultery, and if a person renounces Islam and then attacks Islam itself. However, a political reality of the medieval times was the use of this to eliminate rivals and gain power. E.g. Balban
Problems
Barani’s work is evidently not free from attributes that might, if looked at holistically, be called defects.
1) Although his work is not theological in character, the compulsions of tradition often forced him to use religious idioms as explanatory devices.
2) More seriously, the quest for truth in his writings, however genuine, is bound up with the demands of expediency. His eulogy of Firuz Shah for instance, cannot be seen either as the literal truth or as a reflection of his own feelings. There are contradictory pulls and tendencies in his work. However, if looked at from another point of view, the contradictions within Barani’s philosophy provide a fascinating glimpse into the complexities of the ways in which scholars and thinkers of the Sultanate related to their lives, and into the assumptions, prejudices and dogmas they based their thought on.
3) Barani’s own biases and prejudices and accents make his work more valuable and more fascinating that any purportedly ‘objective’ accounts of the times, and because of his commitment to a certain vision of the truth demonstrates how value-laden claims to historical objectivity often are. E.g. FST
4) writes by memory- therefore chronological order problem, e.g. MBT
In his factual accounts, his analysis of situations and his philosophy of history, Barani remains a very major benchmark and referent in medieval Indian history.
- order depends on impression made on his mind by events.
Scholars – see tupur tute
Bibliography
- Irfan Habib – Barani’s Theory of the History of the Delhi Sultanate (article)
- Peter Hardy – Historians of Medieval India
- Mohibul Hasan (ed.) – Historians of Medieval India.