- Discuss the early reforms introduced by the Meiji Regime. What light do they throw on the nature of the Meiji Restoration?
The rule of the Tokugawa Shgunate lasted in Japan from 1603 and 1868. The Tokugawa Shogunate had come to power in 1603, after a period of complete feudal anarchy. This period represented an extremely rigid social structure, isolationist policies and a traditional belief system. Most policies were geared towards freezing society into a conservative feudal mould. This attitude probably stemmed from the traditional form of governance and social norms and maybe an insecurity regarding power and the Tokugawa hold over it. In many respects Japan before 1868 was similar to China, especially in terms of its insular attitude, emphasis on indigenous traditions and perception of the west. However both were to follow very different paths in the coming times, something in which the Meiji Restoration played a crucial role.
With the nineteenth century Japanese society, polity and economy witnessed many changes, conflicts and transformations. Society in the Tokugawa period was stable but definitely not stagnant or static. By the first half of the nineteenth century the Shogunate began to face a series of crises. The forces which were to bring about its eventual downfall began to develop sometime in this period. The Tokugawa government began to be perceived as incapable and incompetent in dealing with what was known as ‘Naiyu Gaikan’ or troubles from within and without. The internal crisis in combination with external pressures, led to the downfall of the Shogunate.
The defeat of the Tokugawa bakufan gave impetus to the demand for the return of the monarch to actual power and the beginning of ‘Meiji Ishin’ or the Meiji restoration. It is significant that this has been called a ‘restoration’ and not a revolution or a movement. The term ‘Ishin’, in addition to change connotes renewal and new beginnings of all things. The rebels did not claim to bring any new concepts but were only bringing back power to the Emperor – Emperor Meiji. Symbolic of the aspirations which were to be fulfilled, imperial oracles had proclaimed that the young emperor’s reign would take the name Meiji, the era of ‘Enlightened Rule’.
The ‘restoration’ of the young emperor Meiji in 1867-68 was a little more than a coup d’etat. A relatively small band of insurgents had toppled the Tukugawa bakufu. They stated their intent to restore direct imperial rule, but this was not likely to occur. Political contenders at that time feared that the rebels from Satsuma and Choshu would simply form a new bakufu and use the name of the emperor to rule from a narrow base of power. If we compare the situation of 1869 in any aspect – political, economic, social, cultural – to that of just a decade later, the changes are breathtaking and fully merit the term revolution.
The leaders of the new Meiji government in 1868 were thrilled at the ease and speed with which they overcame the Tokugawa. The young Samurais of the Satsum and Choshu clans came to wield power, and in the process of reconstruction were significantly helped by the merchants. Propelled by the fear of foreign or domestic resistance and discontent with the old regime, they generated an ambitious agenda, through a process of trial and error, aiming to build a new sort of national power. These Samurai believed in a traditional revival of the imperial system while a radically new approach with regard to economy, society and polity would be followed.
The alternatives facing the new government were either to maintain feudalism, shifting the hegemony from the Tokugawa to some other clan or coalition of clans or to establish a centralized state machinery in all parts of the country. Both, the foundation upon which the new government rested, the merchant capitalist class, and its leadership supplied by the lower samurai and the former clan bureaucrats, were factors which guaranteed that the government would tread the second road leading toward the modern nation-state. Right from the start the new regime resolutely set about uprooting the old concepts of government.
The fundamental document of the Meiji Restoration, the Imperial Oath of March14, 1868 was an expression, in terms familiar and acceptable to all, of the anti-feudal aspirations of the masses of the people throughout the land, envisaging as it did the need for consulting public opinion and the administration of affairs for the benefit of the nation and the encouragement of foreign knowledge.
As the new regime’s legitimacy increased over time, additional long-range goals were articulated. One frequently proclaimed aim was to safeguard Japan’s national sovereignty and prevent further foreign encroachment. Perhaps the most oft-stated motive was the simply expressed, boldly unequivocal determination to become a great and respected country, equal to the most advanced nations in the world. These overarching motives of national independence and future greatness inspired a host of complementary missions: to revise the unequal treaties and remove Japan from semi-colonial status, to foster national unity, and to sweep away the problems of the past in order to build strength and wealth. The goals of the early reforms in the Meiji period can be encompassed in the slogan of building a ‘rich country, strong army’ known as fukoku kyohei in Japan.
Japanese economic modernization stands out as the only historical instance of transformative ‘modern’ processes initiated and completed by a sovereign Asian country, and it was modernization that was responsible for Japan’s transformation from a potential economic colony to an independent economy that not only stood on its own, but over time outstripped most of her European competitors.
The period from the Meiji Restoration till around 1885 can be seen as a period of transition. Let us now examine the significant changes that the Meiji Restoration brought about in the areas of society, economy, polity, military, education etc. in order to promote the ultimate central goal of promoting industrialization in Japan.
One of the more pressing matters for those who had driven the Tokugawa Shogunate from power was to create a centralized political structure that would permit them to exercise authority effectively throughout the country. Soon after, in 1868 the Constitution known as the Seitaisho was promulgated, according to which all authority was vested in the Dajokan or the Grand Council of State. The Dajokan proved to be a very efficient form of revolutionary government; it wore the badge of tradition while concentrating all power in the hands of a small number of men who could implement their policies through their own ministries.
This system persisted until 1885 when the Meiji leaders inaugurated a cabinet system moulded explicitly along European lines. At the head of the government was a Prime Minister. He presided over a cabinet that ran the bureaucratic agencies – the several ministries – of the Japanese state. In the early years the ministerial staff was recruited mainly by personal connections from the rank of Satsuma and Choshu samurai and their allies. In 1887 it began a system of Civil Service examinations. From this point on, performance in this examination became the primary qualification for service in the prestigious ranks of the ministries of the imperial state.
By 1868, almost immediately after the restorationist coup, top leaders of the new provisional government such as Kido Koin of Choshu and Saigo Takamori of Satsuma decided that the politically fragmented system of domains had to be overhauled. The objective was to set up a centralized state structure geared towards modernizing Japan in an effective manner. One of the first things to be done was to end the system of ‘Daimyos’ and ‘Samurai’. The men at the centre sought to extend their authority over nearly 280 still-independent daimyo domains. In 1869 the imperial government announced that it would accept the return of registers from all daimyo. In one move the government deprived the daimyo of their traditional autonomy and substantially increased its ability to control administrative policy, although it permitted the lords to stay on as ‘imperial governors’. As the patrons of many of the coup planners, these men were guaranteed respect and a voice in the new order if they wished. In fact, they were all quickly reappointed as domain governors with handsome salaries. Nonetheless, the ‘return of lands’ established the principle that all lands and people were subject to the Emperor’s rule.
In 1871 in a short, simply worded edict the domains especially those of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen, were done away with and in their place 302 prefectures (soon reduced to 72 and later to 48) and three administrative cities, each under the jurisdiction of a new governor appointed by a Dajokan, were created. The central government would now collect taxes from the domain lands. The daimyo were ordered to move to Tokyo, and domain armies were also disbanded. The idea was to end administrative localism.
This decree was accompanied by a large payoff to the daimyo themselves. They were granted permanent yearly salaries equivalent to roughly 10 percent of their former domain’s annual tax revenue. Daimyo were simultaneously relieved of all the costs of governing. The responsibility for paying samurai stipends, immediately accounted for almost one-third of the central government’s expenditures. Later in 1873, the Dajokan offered to give fixed-term interest-bearing government bonds to ex-samurai who surrendered their stipends, and three years later it made the exchange obligatory for all. In aggregate the, annual interest payments on the bonds came to just half the amount paid as stipends, and inflation steadily reduced the cost of future bond redemptions.
But the Meiji leaders realized that these reforms were mostly makeshift. These leaders were willing to create representative political bodies – probably influenced by their success in the west. The whole Samurai class had come to be well-educated and wanted a degree of participation in the government. 1873 onwards, the emergence of political interest groups and parties demanding people’s rights gained strength. However, it was not before 1886 that actual work of drafting a constitution and its supporting legislation got underway.
The fiscal burdens associated with the conduct of administration, stipendiary payments, and military reform required a stable and predictable revenue base. Tax rates were varied greatly by region and it was necessary to standardize collection procedures and to equalize the tax burden in order to have the stability and peace that was crucial to the modernization of the country.
In 1872 a law was enacted which swept away the prohibition against the sale in perpetuity in land, the government policy of buying up common lands, the freedom of occupation and in the choice of crop testify to the revolutionary victory of the right to private ownership in land. On July 28, 1873 the Land Tax Reform Law was introduced designed by Okubo Toshimichi. According to this law, the government gave certificates of ownership to individuals who farmed specific plots of land and assigned a monetary value to the holdings. The tax rate was fixed at 3 percent of the land’s value to be paid annually in cash by the legal owner. With this system government revenues were stabilized the Meiji tax receipts were made roughly equivalent to the total land taxes collected before 1868. The commutation of the land tax into a money tax collected on a national uniform scale indicates a new tax relationship, namely the impersonal cash nexus between government and governed replacing the old irregular tax collected in kind according to the crop. While standardizing the tax rate brought welcome reductions to some, at the same time it increased the burdens on others leading to widespread discontent and opposition. In some regions, recalcitrant peasants objected violently to plans to dismiss local officials, revise the taxation system, and conscript an army. In the end the Meiji regime changed its policy, cutting the land tax by nearly 20 percent in 1877, and dispatching its police forces to quell protests where necessary.
It is curious that such major and fundamental changes could come about with minimum violence and resistance. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the Daimyos who had assisted in the downfall of the Tokugawas were determined to ensure the success of the regime. And most Daimyos also realized that resistance would only cause civil strife which they wanted to avoid. At the same time majority of the Daimyos were in debt and welcomed the idea of shifting this burden to the government. Another factor in favour of the new government was that the payment of stipends was free of any political obligations and as such served as pensions. This was a comfortable economic settlement which made the transition easier.
Even before the samurai had been fully dispossessed, the Meiji leaders decided they had to renovate the military from the bottom up. In April 1871 the government created an imperial guard of just under ten thousand samurai recruited from the restoration forces. The conservative military leadership’s ascendancy was however short-lived. In 1873 the government decreed a system of uniform conscription. Beginning at the age of twenty, all males were obliged to give three years of active service and four years on reserve status. Like the French model, the 1873 decree noted several exemptions, for household heads, criminals, the physically unfit, students and teachers in many prescribed schools, and government officials. It also allowed people to buy their way out for a huge fee of 270 yen. Japan’s army passed its first major test when it put down a large samurai rebellion in 1877. The navy was built up in the 1880s and 1890s. By the mid-1890s Japan’s military was strong enough to move from the task of keeping order at home to that of imposing its will overseas.
The idea was to establish a modern army based on universal conscription, inspired by the Prussian and French conscript armies. Also conscription could mobilize the energies of the people behind the state and forge ties of loyalty between the government and its citizenry. Socially, the conscription was another step in disfranchising the samurai estate and creating a society based on equality of opportunity, and militarily it vastly strengthened the regime’s authority by creating a force capable of providing internal security. The military reforms did create a problem of the status of the old samurai. While they had also been offered a financial settlement like the Daimyos, their bonds paid far less interest and restless and dissatisfaction began to grow in this class as well. However the disturbances caused by them were not serious enough to cause any kind of disruption.
The influence of western ideas was crucial in the period of early reforms. By the 1870s the Meiji oligarchs had begun to search for ideas and prototypes that might guide their efforts to achieve the Meiji dream of national independence, treaty revision, equality with the west and domestic peace and prosperity. Many Meiji leaders looked to the west for lessons about how to organize political institutions, create economic wealth, and foster social harmony. Others were fascinated by the political vitality, military invincibility, and science and technology of western nations. The intense interest in the west shared by the nation’s leaders some of its most influential private citizens begot an era of ‘bunmei kaika’, which literally means civilization and enlightenment.
Western ideas had been entering Japan since the time of the Shogunate, which had sent seven missions to the United States and Europe till 1868. The representatives of the state in these missions investigated the institutions and cultures of the nations they visited, adding to Japan’s fund of knowledge about the west and doing much to modify the popular image of Americans and Europeans as uncivilized barbarians. The floodgates to western knowledge opened wide in 1868. Within a decade several hundred Japanese were studying in the United States and Europe, and an even greater number of foreigners, many in the employ of the national and prefectural governments, lived in Japan instructing the Japanese in the finer points of western political administration, medical practices, legal philosophies, technological advances, and education systems. Increasingly, international expositions provided another avenue for learning about the wonders of the outside world. The recency of western advance suggested that Japan should be able to bridge the gap between itself and the advanced nations of the west if the country’s leaders acted wisely and judiciously to acquire foreign industry, technology and learning.
Parallel to its program of military reform, the Meiji government instituted a new system of education. Influenced by western ideas and bunmei kaika, educational reforms were undertaken and as a first step, in 1871 a department of education was set up. In 1872 it declared four years of elementary education to be compulsory for all children, boys and girls. The focus was now on the promotion of self-reliance. Observation of European and American societies convinced leaders such as Kido Koin that mass schooling, like mass conscription, was a fundamental source of the economic and military power of the west. Their initial models were primarily American and French, and the 1872 decree established a system of elementary and middle schools and national universities. At the outset the government announced that schools were to encourage practical learning as well as independent thinking. The Japanese students who were sent abroad to acquire western training came to replace the old-style Confucian scholars as new intellectual elite. The overhaul of the education system was one way by which the government tried to create an atmosphere favourable to the acceptance of the fundamental and profound changes that were taking place.
The elementary schools were to be financed by a ten percent local surcharge to the national property tax. In the 1870s angry taxpayers reacted to compulsory schooling as they had to the draft and rioted. The passive resistance of simply not going to school was widespread. But eventually as with serving in the military, attending school became a well-accepted obligation of the emperor’s subjects. By the end of the nineteenth century rates of elementary school attendance reached 90 percent or more.
Among the other implications of the fundamental changes in the early Meiji period were great social changes. The dominance of the Daimyo and Samurai classes in the social sphere was challenged. The earlier four classes of samurai, peasant, artisan and merchant were done away with. There were no hindrances to social mobility. Privileges were withdrawn and all came to be seen as equal by the state. By 1876, less than a decade after the restoration coup, the economic privileges of the samurai were wiped out entirely. The coup leaders expropriated an entire social class, the semi-autocratic elite from which they came. In 1869 the large number of samurai ranks were reduced to two, upper samurai (shizoku) and lower samurai (sotsu). In 1872 a large portion of the lower samurai were reclassified as commoners (heimin), although they retained their stipends for a moment. It should still be remembered however that in spite of all these changes, there was a definite continuity as the leading bureaucrats and administrators continued to be from the old dominant classes, including those clans who had assisted in the ouster of the Tokugawa Shogunate.
All the reforms introduced by the Meiji government were geared towards the establishment of a strong industrial base for Japan. The Meiji leaders, especially those who had traveled abroad were profoundly impressed with the energies unleashed by industrial capitalism. Economic strength appeared to be the base that supported the military superstructure of the European states. Motivated by such a view of western learning and industry, government leaders took numerous steps to realize the foremost Meiji slogan of building a “rich country, strong army” (fukoku kyohei). Some initiatives were indirect measures to build the infrastructure of an industrial economy. Others were direct measures to construct and operate mines and factories as government projects.
An important reason why the Japanese government attempted to modernize so fast was the perceived threat from the west. Japan had the Chinese example to see and did not want to turn into a colony. It is in this context that one can understand the preoccupation with fukoku kyohei or strong army and rich country. Industrial development was also urgent because foreign exchange was being drained out due to unfavourable tariff terms with the west. The only way to combat this was to modernize domestic industry so that it could compete with the high quality and low priced Western goods.
This early phase of Meiji rule was marked by government attempts to appease the feudal classes and accumulate capital from agricultural sources, and the land reforms and new taxation policies can be viewed in this context. Through the land reforms, there was a simultaneous growth in landlordism and tenant farming, leading to increase in exploitation. Payment of taxes was also made individual rather than collective, and this had a harmful effect on the cohesive nature of village life and especially affected the poor peasants. Since agriculture was to be the main source of revenue to finance industrialization, policies to improve agricultural production were also encouraged. Students were sent abroad to study new agricultural techniques, and new innovations in irrigation etc. were attempted to be introduced. An indirect effect of the changes in agriculture was the large-scale dispossession of peasantry which helped to provide a large floating population which could contribute as labour in the new industries. Another factor contributing to industrial labour was the ruin of the handicrafts sector due to excessive imports.
In the course of appeasing the old classes, the state also created opportunities for capital investment. Through the 1871 settlement, the Daimyos gained in monetary terms and were therefore encouraged to invest in new sectors such as banking and commercial enterprises. The Daimyos came to become the commercial magnates. In the 1870s, many Daimyos also took loans from the Chonin against government guarantee. These loans could be repaid as government bonds. By encouraging the accumulation of capital in this manner, the government was encouraging the creation of a class of buyers.
The appeasement of the Samurai was not easy as they had not gotten a very lucrative economic settlement after their dispossession. The government decided to take over their debts as well and in addition small loans were also offered to the Samurai. New areas for cultivation in Japan were explored such as Hokaido and many Samurai were encouraged to settle down in these areas. A number of Satsuma Choshu clans were desirous of getting high positions in the police, army and bureaucracy and the Daimyos helped them a great deal in this regard. EH Norman also notes that while the Samurai as a class disappeared they occupied positions in various sectors, leading to a system seeped in Samurai ethos.
The restrictive and monopolistic nature of private capital in Japan in the initial years of the Meiji regime, made it incapable of sustaining the proposed industrial program of such a magnitude. Commercial capital was also monopolized by a few rich traders, moneylenders and bankers. Therefore the initiative could not be expected from private hands and it was clear that the initial push would have to come from the state.
The state had to transformation of commercial and mercantile capital to industrial capital. To this end a number of measures were undertaken. The settlement of Daimyo and Samurai claims through interest bearing government bonds and encouragement of investment in banks, stocks and industries helped to transform the character of feudal stipends. Small savings were also encouraged and it has been suggested that the systematic inflationary policy of the state leading to redistribution of income also helped in capital accumulation.
State capitalism was undertaken with the help of Daimyos and by merchant houses like the House of Mitsui. In Japan the government provided a favourable environment for economic growth and the removal of feudal restrictions on trade within the country and on individual activities, by assuring internal stability and by providing sound currency, adequate banking facilities, a reasonable tax system and efficient government services.
The monetary system inherited from the Tokugawa period was not conducive to modernization. Different currencies were issued by local governments. Depending on the area, the values of commodities were expressed either in terms of silver or gold. The government needed to bring uniformity in the monetary system and had to have central control to facilitate economic growth. The monetary reform of 1871 intended to achieve all these. A uniform standard currency was established for the country and only the central government had the right to issue money. The decimal system with a yen as the basic unit was adopted.
The Bank of Japan was created with the monopoly to issue notes. This helped in the centralization of capital accumulation. The gold standard was also adopted. A banking system on American lines was adopted to provide loans and as many as 100 national banks were set up in the initial decades of the Meijji regime. Soon it seems the government began to make direct borrowings from these banks. These banks were dominated by the already wealthy houses such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. This banking arrangement brought them close to government interests leading to the forging of a crucial alliance between the two. The emergence of the future Zaibatsu class can be traced to this relationship.
In the creation of a new industrial base, basic infrastructural development was essential. Transport, communication and energy were crucial in this regard. The government took the lead in building a railroad network. The first line connected Tokyo to Yokohama and was completed in 1872. The government also encouraged private investment in railroads. Many former daimyo and high-ranking samurai pooled their pensions to join wealthy commoners in a railroad investment boom in the 1880s that helped bring a modern stock market into existence. By 1890 Japan boasted fourteen hundred miles of railroad, about 40 percent owned and operated by the government, the rest in private hands. Railways and steamships were important in promoting economic growth. The markets were enlarged and local specialization was encouraged due to the progress in transportation.
The government also took the lead in the development of a communication network. It built telegraph lines beginning in 1869, and in 1871 it opened a postal system modeled on British practices. By 1885 there were over 5000 post offices all over Japan. Telegraph lines handling about 30 lakh messages a year were also laid linking all parts of Japan. It also encouraged the founding of Joint Stock Companies among private investors.
Beyond the projects of infrastructure building, the Meiji government played an unusually direct role in building and operating industrial enterprises. Government leaders realized that private investors lacked the initiative and knowledge to run modern factories. They were also convinced that foreign investment was dangerous and was consequently discouraged.
As a result the first modern industrial enterprises in Japan were financed largely from domestic sources, especially from the national treasury and drawing on funds from the agrarian sector. Initially the government leaders were particularly interested in developing the strategic industries on which modern military power depended, but non-strategic industries soon followed. In the 1870s, the state financed and ran a number of so-called model enterprises: shipyards, coal and copper mines, engineering works, arsenals, and cotton-spinning, silk-reeling, glass, sugar, and even beer factories – about two dozen large enterprises in total.
Although the future economic development of Japan was already jeopardized by the unequal treaties negotiated by the bakufu whereby Japan’s tariff autonomy was forfeited for half a century, these leaders did their utmost to avoid further entanglement in the meshes of foreign capital. Therefore in spite of the anaemia of domestic capital, which was almost entirely derived from the agricultural sector, they resisted the temptation to seek heavy foreign loans which might well have compromised the nation’s economic independence. From the Restoration until the end of the century only two foreign loans were contracted. The first was of 1,000,000 pounds at nine percent floated in London in 1870 to help in the construction of the first railway from Yokohama to Tokyo. The second was also floated in London in 1873, a loan of 2,400,000 pounds with interest at seven percent, and was intended to help the government meet the cash needs for pension commutation and capitalization. The first loan was repaid in 1881, and the second in 1897.
Although it was reluctant to use foreign money for these projects, it was for a time quite anxious to import foreign people as consultants and managers. At great expense in the 1870s the new government engaged several thousand ‘hired foreigners’ (oyatoi gaijin) from over twenty years. This term suggested that the foreigners brought no value beyond detailed technical expertise. These technicians and experts offered important advice in a wide range of economic and social endeavours. They were handsomely paid and most received salaries at the level of top officials in the Japanese government. Later Japanese students began to be sent abroad for training and soon the foreign experts were ousted leading to independence even in the sphere of expertise.
The various measures initiated by the government led to a sudden rise in expenditures. This led to an increase in the printing of currency notes which in turn led to inflation. In 1881, Matsukata became the Finance Minister. He followed a policy of deflation and helped the economy on the path to growth.
Economic historians disagree over the importance of the government’s role in orchestrating economic development in Japan. Some stress that the total investment in state enterprises was far less than in the military; that the government built only twenty or so factories, a few mines, a telegraph system, and some rail lines; and that none of these turned a profit. Indeed most of the ‘model factories’ lost money.
The culmination point of this initial phase of development under Meiji rule was 1881, when a wholesale transfer or sale of industries set up by the government was undertaken on easy and favourable terms. Initially this was limited to light industries and not strategic. These light industries were mostly bought by the same large financial houses that had earlier cooperated with the government in the banking sector. With the concentration of industries in these hands, there was soon a merger of banking and industrial capital. However it would not be fair to say that all capital was just concentrated in these hands. In fact it seems that this concentration was a result of the sale and did not precede it.
The reason for this sale seems to be that the government now felt the need to concentrate almost entirely on strategic and military industries. At the same time by selling these industries to their banking allies, the government was strengthening its own support base as well. The most plausible factor leading to this sale, however, seems to be financial. Inflation and disruption of trade coupled with the sluggish growth of these industries necessitated urgent fiscal measures, and a sale of the light industries provided the immediate solution. It should however be noted that even after the sale government interference was not reduced and commercial and industrial enterprises continued to run under government guidance and supervision.
The sale was successful because the initial investment in all these units had already been made by the government. The state also offered low tax incentives, subsidies, loans as well as cheap transportation. Initially the sale was limited to cotton, cement, glass etc, but the few more successful ventures, primarily coal and metal mines, were sold later in the decade at more competitive prices.
In this period, through government policies, a first generation of managers and engineers had been trained. A small industrial wage labour force had been created. These state enterprises constituted an important launching pad for further growth. The state activities were also important because they generated faith, both within the government and outside it, in the potential and the importance of the state’s role in supporting economic development.
The Meiji Restoration and its implications are of immense significance to the history of Japan since it managed to create a class of entrepreneurs and industrialize a largely agrarian state in a relatively short period of time. However the success of Meiji restoration is undermined by the continuation of feudal elements and power in the hands of only the aristocracy. There was no significant transformation from below. Power remained confined to the elites of Japanese society. Even supposedly newer classes like the zaibatsu were only versions of the older Chonin and Ronin who were patronized by the Meiji regime. Equality as a principle existed only legally and on paper and was never successful in establishing an egalitarian society from the established hierarchical form. The Meiji Restoration however still remains one of the most remarkable cases of state initiated and controlled modernization in Asia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Andrew Gordon – A Modern History of Japan, From Tokugawa Times to the Present
- H. Norman – Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State
- James L. McClain – Japan: A Modern History
- G. Beasley – The Modern History of Japan
- John K. Fairbank – East Asia, Tradition and Transformation