1. “For Western historians the Taiping movement was nothing more than a peasant insurrection. For Communists it was nothing less than a full-fledged revolution.” Elucidate and comment on the nature of the Taiping Movement.

    China in the mid 19th century was confronted by a series of crises, especially in the period following the Opium wars. Reactions to the western assault on China’s complacent sense of superiority and security were varied and could be seen at two levels – official and popular. The Taiping was one such movement, which manifested popular discontent at a time when China was reeling under the effects of the defeat in the Opium wars. The burden of the Unequal treaties, which China was saddled with, was shifted to the peasantry and discontent among them was building up. The attention which the Taiping movement attracted in the 1850s and 1860s all over the world was unprecedented.

    The Taiping movement, which rocked the Manchu dynasty during 1850-1864 covered 16 of the 18 provinces of China and 600 cities. Karl Marx called it a ‘formidable revolution’ and indeed the movement challenged not only Manchu authority but also the traditional Chinese Confucian beliefs that were the foundation of its authority. What made the Taiping different from earlier movements and even other contemporary movements such as the rebellions of Miao, Lolo, Nien or Moselm, was its concrete ideology and solid programme which went beyond simple displacement of Manchu authority. It aimed to bring about a complete reconstruction in all spheres of life – political, economic, social and religious. In the course of its struggle, it formed a whole set of political, economic military educational and socio-cultural institutions and even founded its own state power, which struggled for a considerable period against that of the Manchu dynasty, whose rule it managed to shake to the very foundations.

    In essence, as put by Jean Chesneaux, the Taiping Movement was a “social crusade, expressing the poor peasants desire for equality, a national campaign against the foreign dynasty occupying the throne in Peking and the modernist trend that developed in response to the challenge presented by the west through the Opium wars.

    Traditional Chinese belief subscribed to the Confucian theory that internal disturbance, be it political or even natural disasters and external disturbances like foreign invasions occurred only when an existing power was declining. For these disturbances then manifested themselves in the withdrawal of the Mandate of Heaven. The Dynastic Cycle theory has often been invoked by western historians to understand and explain the outbreak of the Taiping movement. But the Dynastic Cycle theory cannot be seen as its sole cause and the movement had some specific causes which gave it a peculiar character, just like the Opium wars. It is in fact more correct to say that the Taiping was a cause of Manchu dynastic decline rather than vice versa.

    There were a number of internal factors which precipitated the Taiping movement. Among these was the staggering rise in China’s population. The 150 years of peace and prosperity under the Manchus saw an increase in the population (200% between 1741 and 1850) while there was no corresponding rise in arable land (only 35% between 1661 and 1833). There was also the rise in commodity prices, the virtual exhaustion of the supply of new land, the ruin of small landholders by fragmentation of inheritance leading to tremendous debt and tenancy among the peasantry. By the second half of the 19th century, 60% of the people in China had no land. This in turn led to concentration of land in the hands of the ruling elite, and the consequent displacement of the peasantry from the rural areas, providing ready material for the movement.

    The stagnation, inefficiency, corruption and demoralization in the Manchu administration along with the humiliation of defeat in the First Opium War, also led to a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the Manchus. One can also point to the increasingly aggressive Christian conversions and preaching, ethnic rivalries, and the series of natural calamites, such as the famines in Henan in 1847, in the middle Yangtze basin in 1849 and in Hunan around 1850, as causes or contributory factors for the Taiping movement. Politico-military factors added to the growing feeling of insecurity and discontent. The bureaucratic machine had become so corrupt and inefficient that the public works deteriorated. In 1852-3 for example, neglected dykes caused the Huanghe to burst its banks in the region of Kaifeng. The river changed course to flow into the sea north of the Shandong peninsula, 800 kilometers from its mouth, and vast areas were devastated.

    Another major factor was the effects of the Opium wars. The First Opium War and its subsequent treaties increased problems, with looting by the foreign invaders, a heavy war indemnity, worsening of opium smuggling and a massive influx of foreign goods. The crisis was accentuated by the currency and fiscal problem created by the impact of the west. Throughout the 19th century foreign imports, especially opium kept on increasing, causing a huge outflow of silver from China. This in turn resulted in a change in the internal value of silver to copper from 1:2 to 1:3. This aggravated the financial problems of the Chinese peasantry, whose taxes and rents were calculated in silver but whose income was based on devalued copper. Also the unequal treaties including clauses of heavy indemnities dictated by the foreign powers only added to the tax burden that had become unbearable.

    Another important effect of the Opium wars was a shift in the trading centre from Canton to Shanghai, leaving thousands unemployed in Canton. Former transportation workers connected with the shipment of tea and silk were thrown out of work. In this region a distinction grew between the ‘natives’ (original settlers) and the ‘guest settlers’ known as the Hakka who had migrated from central China during the 12th and 13th centuries. The original settlers looked down upon the Hakka community which was on the whole more independent, daring and prone to action than the natives. It was here as Immanuel Hsu points out, that potential revolutionary leaders recruited their followers.

    It was in this background that the Taiping movement took place. The movement originated in GuangXi in South China. It is interesting that it was from the Hakka community that the leader of the great rebel empire, Hong Xiuquan (1813-1861) emerged. He came from a poor family in eastern Kwantung, but his interaction with the Protestant missionaries, his subsequent illness, and religious experience convinced him that he was a new messiah. Around 1845 his followers established the Society of God Worshippers, which attracted all manner of disaffected persons – Hakkas, Triad Society (a secret society) members, pirates and homeless peasants.

    Hong Xiuquan envisioned himself as the youngerbrother of Jesus Christ, thereby lending divinity to his own authority. He formulated a doctrine that was a blend of Christian as well as traditional Chinese ideals, with aspects of Buddhist and Taoist beliefs. The religious base of the organization lent it a ‘fanatical zeal’. At the beginning of 1851, Hong also proclaimed the Taiping state, Taiping Tiangguo, the Heavenly Kingdom of Treat Peace and called himself the Heavenly King. Soon Nanking was also captured and declared the Heavenly capital. The Taiping Kingdom was visualized as a theocracy in which religion, civil and military administration, culture and society in general were all interwoven. The capital was called the Heavenly Capital, the leader the Heavenly King, the palace the Heavenly Palace, and his treasury the sacred Treasury.

    The basic document of the state was called “The Land System of the Heavenly Kingdom”, which was written during the march to Nanking. It spelled out not only the land system, but also the military, civil, financial, judicial, and educational institutions. The family, according to this document was to remain the basic unit of organization. Groups of 25 families each headed by a sergeant were to be the building blocks of society. The Taiping established a regime in which no one possessed any property of his own. Land was classified according to fertility and was to be allotted according to population. It belonged to everyone and was cultivated for everyone. Each family was allotted a plot whose size depended on the age of the members. All adults (including women) were to receive equally productive shares. The land itself and all its fruits were state property or more precisely, God’s property to be managed and allotted by the state. All surplus products beyond one’s needs had to be surrendered to the public storehouse. It was stated that the economic goal of the system was the equal enjoyment of God’s material blessings. The necessary conditions for this were abolition of private landownership and state manipulation of the labour force.

    The social ideals of the Taipings were egalitarian directly conflicting with the Confucian hierarchical system. Equality was also professed between men and women, and even foreigners were not seen as inferior ‘barbarians’. The officials in the Taiping hierarchy were also largely elected. Apparently they were also recruited by a competitive examination of the traditional Chinese type, in which the Confucian texts were replaced by the sacred Taiping texts. The Taipings also replaced the traditional lunar calendar with a calendar based on the solar system, which resembled the western version except that a year consisted of 366 days and the month 30 and 31 days alternately. The puritanical spirit in the early period of the Taipings is seen in the prohibition of opium smoking, the use of tobacco and wine, prostitution, foot-binding, sale of slaves, gambling and polygamy.

    Many terms have been used to describe the Taiping movement, ranging from ‘nothing less than a complete revolution’, to ‘a typical traditional rebellion’. These terms clearly indicate the great deal of controversy surrounding the nature of this movement. The two opposing schools of thought are those represented by the Western scholars, and those represented by the Chinese communist historians. These two standpoints differ not only in their interpretation of the movement as a rebellion or revolution, but also of other aspects of the nature of the movement, such as whether or not it was a peasant movement and anti-feudal, anti-foreign and anti-imperialist or anti-imperialist and pro-foreign, its uniqueness vis-à-vis all other peasant rebellions, and whether or not it can be considered a precursor to the Communist Revolution.

    Among the most important aspects of the controversy on the nature of the Taiping is the question of whether it can be called a ‘rebellion’ or ‘revolution’. It is first of all essential to understand what exactly these terms mean in the modern context. A rebellion can be described as an armed struggle, aimed at dethroning a particular dynasty, and substituting another in its place, without attempting to change the existing social, political, and economic order. A revolution on the other hand symbolizes a mass movement having a concrete ideology and common aims, striving for fundamental change in the social, political and economic order. Its basic aim goes beyond the overthrow of a particular dynasty and its substitution by another.

    To Western scholars such as Vincent Shih, Barrington Moore Jr., George Taylor, JK Fairbank and others, the Taiping movement appears to be a ‘typical traditional rebellion’ that was bound to fail. According to them for any movement, to be called a revolution it must be successful in its aims. Barrington Moore Jr. argues that the Taiping movement did not alter the basic structure of society and therefore cannot be called a revolution. In this case however, even after the Taiping movement, the Manchus, the prevailing socio-political order and the traditional Confucian system continued. Vincent Shih notes that “Certain ideals were borrowed from Christianity and the West which held a genuine possibility of bringing a real revolution but these ideals were diluted due to the mixing of native Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhist principles.” This view is criticized by Tan Chung, who points out that there is no evidence to show that the existence of native cultural aspirations in the Taiping ideology diluted its revolutionary character; and to say that only Western ideas can form a revolution is not correct.

    The second school of thought comprises mainly of Chinese communist historians such as Holl Wailu, Li Tianyu, Wu Shimo, Tan Chung and Jean Chesneaux. While accepting its shortcomings, they call the Taiping ‘nothing less than a full-fledged revolution’ and a ‘precursor to the Communist Revolution of 1949’, appreciating its revolutionary character. These scholars lay emphasis on the theoretical aspect of the Taipings’ aims and policies and refer to many new and unique measures suggested by the Taipings, such as the land reforms, equality between sexes, trade policy etc., and assert that even if not fully implemented, their suggestion indicates the revolutionary nature of the movement. Thus, the varied nature of the movement and the fact that it was more broad-based than all previous peasant rebellions are cited as justification for the term ‘revolution’. The various positive impacts of the movement are emphasized. In fact some of its negative effects are seen in a positive light, such as the development of regionalism due to the decentralization of power to the provincial authorities during the movement to deal with it more effectively. The originality of the Taiping Revolution lay in the unprecedented blend of modernist impulses with traditional themes.

    Some scholars avoid joining either the Western or the Communist schools of thought. Prominent among them is Ssu Yu Teng, according to whom “the first half of the Taiping rebellion”, lasting from 1851 to 1856, was “a proletarian revolutionary movement to overthrow the Manchu regime and replace it by a new rationalist government with a radical economic, social, and cultural programme.” This was followed by the “internal dissension of 1856”, after which “the later part of the Taiping Rebellion resembled more a traditional Chinese ‘peasant’ insurrection than a modern revolution.” However Tan Chung points out that it is difficult to conceive of the Taiping movement’s degeneration into a traditional rebellion in the second stage, once it had reached a certain level of revolution far ahead of a peasant rebellion in the first stage. Also, Teng’s does not include in his study a consideration of the Taipings’ attempt to build an egalitarian society and its failure is regarded as a contributing factor for downgrading it.

    Another important aspect of the nature of the Taiping is the question of its ‘peasant’ and anti-feudal identity. Historians such as Chesneaux and Tan Chung strongly feel that it was a peasant revolution. They believe that the peasants dominated the movement and it was among other things, a social crusade expressing the poor peasants’ desire for equality and the primitive rural collectivism of the Taiping social organization was linked with the utopian tradition of Chinese peasant movements. The Taiping movement is thus seen as both a revolution and a peasant movement. George E. Taylor gives primacy to economic factors, and argues that the Taiping movement must be considered an agrarian movement. Kang goes further and calls it a revolt by poor farmers, unemployed miners, vagabonds, charcoal workers, and scholars; i.e. all belonged to the displaced peasantry.

    Vincent Shih however rejects the description of the Taiping as a ‘peasant revolution’. Firstly, he points out, the Taiping leaders did not identify themselves with the interests of the peasantry. Secondly, they did not reflect peasant consciousness. He says that while the Taiping leaders may have had a wide appeal for the poor peasants and landless labourers, they did “not attempt to do away with the landlords and give the land to the tillers and at times even sided with the landlord much as the Ching regime had done before.”

    Franz Michael too points out that that while in terms of stated goals the Taiping was a profound social revolution, in reality and contrary to stated ideology, “in the hierarchy of rank which the Taipings established and in which constant promotion and demotion was to be based on merit and demerit in action, the lowest demotion was to the status of husbandsman – the worker in the field and the lowest rung in their hierarchy.” Michael too seems to ignore that it was the peasants who dominated the high-ups of their hierarchical structure, which was formed for military efficiency. Tan Chung points out that obviously, at the base of this military formation was the peasant population but it should not be confused with social hierarchy. The closely guarded supremacy of the old brethren developed into a general pattern of preference for the Kwangsi men. It persisted in the movement and expanded. Strangely, Michael thinks that the Taiping did not fight for the peasants’ well being as their counterparts did in the Holy Roman Empire and in modern Germany. Tan Chung however believes that this is an unfair comparison. In deng guijan (equalizing the distinguished and the humble), juntian (equalizing land ownership properties) mian liang (exemption from grain tribute/taxation), the Chinese were way ahead according to Tan Chung.

    Kang C too points out that the social dynamics of the movement and the constituent section was poor farmers, unemployed miners, vagabonds, charcoal workers and scholars forced into agriculture due to lack of remuneration in their fields and constituted the ‘displaced peasantry’. These he says were the chief architects of the movement and their mobilization was targeted against the feudal order from the very beginning. Private ownership was sought to be abolished and a new basis of state power was laid out. Although the land programme could never be carried out, they shook the basis of the feudal system. In the areas controlled by the Taiping, there was a reduction in taxes up to 50%. This debate however is not resolvable and while the existence of a radical peasant programme cannot be denied, it is also seen that the peasant had the notion of the benevolent absolutism of the king and the radicalism may or may not have translated into action.

    There are a few other factors that can be considered with regard to the anti-feudal character of the Taiping movement. Firstly their land reforms, which no matter how limitedly applied, were highly anti-feudal; besides the fact that in some Taiping areas, tenants actually stopped paying rents. Secondly, the fleeing of a large number of landlords in fear of the Taiping onslaught led to their large landholdings falling into the peasants’ hands, along with many temple lands. Thirdly, decrees were passed to attack the feudal elite, such as orders to surrender grains, precious stones and metals, etc. to the Taiping storehouses. Lastly, the fact remains that most of the Taiping leaders, and almost all of the mass following, were drawn from peasant stock, though not exclusively.

    When looking at the nature of the Taiping we also cannot ignore its anti-establishment nature. The emperor of China according to the Taiping proclamation was a keen supporter of the feudal system. Thus, the emperor who had hitherto been seen as a born sage was now called ‘The Monster King of Hell’. They believed that for thousands of years the spirit of the people had been tortured and persecuted. Confucius, who had been the supreme teacher of China, was decried by the Taiping followers. They gathered the courage to call the Four Classics and the Five Great Books of Confucius books of sorcery and feudal ideas. Thus, in many ways the Taiping can be called a cultural revolution, as the later revolutions in China targeted these very things.

    Another debate on the nature of the Taiping movement, is regarding its anti-imperialist character. This is an extremely complex question if one looks at the ideological aspects of the Taiping foreign outlook. While they were far removed from the concept of Sino-centrism, foreigners were still called dependents. One can reasonably say that while being anti-imperialist, the Taipings were definitely not xenophobic, and were in fact quite pro-foreign. They were fascinated by various aspects of foreign thought, and welcomed foreigners to learn from them whatever was positive; they wanted reform in Chinese polity, society and economy through this learning from the West. The Taipings propagated free trade and welcomed foreign missionaries with great zeal and had great admiration for western technology and as we have seen they even borrowed certain tenets from Christianity. They welcomed the positive aspects of western influence such as education and science. It is a sign of maturity of the Taiping movement, that in spite of such strong positive influences, they could still oppose western goods and the competition they posed. Thus, it is remarkable that this openness did not succumb to an ‘acceptance of imperial activity’. They continued to oppose western intrusion and free trade never meant exploitation to them. Hence they condemned the westerners just as much as they accepted their positive points. This surface cordiality however had a lot of contradictions beneath it. The Taiping always sought to extend the idea of egalitarianism in the sphere of international relations. Behind the openness towards the west lay a certain desire to become like that and emulate it.

    For an unbiased and sound assessment of the Taiping movement we need to do a thorough analysis of four basic aspects of the movement — its objectives, their implementation, participation in the movement and its result or legacy.

    As we have noted above, the Taipings had definite aims and a definite ideology. Irrespective of its implementation, it envisioned not only an overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, but also the establishment of a new socio-economic and religious order. Egalitarianism was its core principle and was reflected in its social as well as economic programmes.

    With regard to implementation however we see that the Taiping ideology was not by and large actualized. The entire Taiping system was too complex, and the programmes had a utopian character. Furthermore they required stability and peace to be implemented; neither of which the Taipings had. As time passed, the effectiveness of the programmes also became doubtful. Differences in aspirations, motives and ideology between the original nucleus of the leadership, and the mass base of the movement worsened the situation.

    The Land Programme was implemented in limited areas, mostly in southern provinces such as Kwangsi and in the Taiping capital of Nanking. Implementation was difficult in the prevailing conditions of shifting boundaries and frequent clashes. No rent was taken from the peasants in these areas and tax payments were cut by 50%. There is evidence of landlords from the lower Yangtze valley area fleeing to Shanghai when their precious metal and surplus was confiscated. However, the newly acquired land was not redistributed and the Taiping leaders amassed great wealth. The landlords’ lands were not always confiscated in Taiping zones. Furthermore, the Taiping leaders started accumulating land and themselves often became the new landlords. The preaching of chastity was accompanied by the keeping of concubines by many of the leaders. The emancipation of women was however truly achieved and women enjoyed the same economic and political opportunities as men. The military organization too included women. Women also occupied bureaucratic posts, were horseback riders and were no longer subjected to an inferior social status. Prohibition of opium was also effectively carried out. The issue of participation in the Taiping movement is largely linked to the question of its peasant or ‘anti-feudal’ identity. It should be noted though that while the popular base of the Taiping movement was the peasantry, the Taiping leadership especially was definitely not exclusively peasant in character.

    Lastly, we also need to consider the legacy or result of the Taiping movement. In the immediate sense, despite its limited achievements, the Taiping movement was a failure. The impressive military organization of the Taipings was unable to dislodge the Manchus. The leadership factionalized, particularly after 1856, weakening the impact of the movement. Ironically, Manchu power was replaced by the Taipings, which was provincial not centralized, and definitely not authoritarian. The Taiping leaders also lost popular support on ideological grounds. The anti-Manchu appeal of the Taiping was cause was compromised by its Christian ideology. Egalitarian principles as well as the destruction of ancient temples resulted in the loss of support of the traditional orthodoxy.

    In the long run the movement hastened the process of dynastic political disintegration. The physical damage was tremendous – hundreds of towns and cites were destroyed, and between 20 and 40 million people were killed. Power gravitated into the hands of local strong men, particularly provincial governors, leading to the rise of regionalism in later years. The movement affected China economically also. It prevented tax collection in many of the richest provinces. New taxes had to be devised to pay the expenses of suppression; of these, likin, the internal transit tax levied on commodities in china was the most important.

    The most important influence of the Taiping movement is cultural. The Taiping movement remained highly popular in Chinese tradition. Survivors of the “Great Peace” enjoyed considerable prestige among the peasants and kept its memory alive. For example, Sun Yat-Sen was greatly stirred as a child by the stories of his uncle, who had belonged to the Taiping. The movement initiated a century of rebellions and revolutions. The political, economic, social and cultural reforms it attempted were models for later attempts of the Chinese Imperial administration, and even the Communist Revolution.

    This brings us to the question of whether or not the Taiping was a precursor to the Communist movement of the 20th century. The links of the Taipings with the later communist movement were acknowledged by Mao Tse Tung who always ‘felt indebted to the Taiping’ as they truly represented a revolutionary programme. Certain points within the Taiping can be made in this regard. Both the Taiping and the Communists were modernists in nature. Sudden impact of the west and scientific, technological and social advances had their influence on the ideology of the Taipings. In the same way, the Communists provided a modern and practical philosophy with which to reject “both the traditions of the Chinese past and the Western domination of the present.”

    The Taiping presented a coherent programme of agrarian communism and the Maoist programme of collective ownership can be seen as owing its origins to this. Secondly, the principles of social egalitarianism also included equality of the sexes, was also something that Mao espoused. Thirdly, both were anti-imperialist in nature. Fourthly, there is the fact that Mao was seeking to build a historical trajectory for building communism in a primarily agrarian country and so the conception of such a link with the Taiping can be seen as a deliberate attempt to construct a history of the movement, since Mao wanted to break away from the models of communism that had been spread in other parts of the world.

    However there are other aspects that one cannot ignore and then one sees the basic difference that the Taiping have from the communists. The land programme of the Taiping for instance, resembled that of the communists insofar as ownership was collective. But the basic unit they expound was the family and not the community. Secondly, land distribution was sought to be equalized, but no mention of land redistribution was made. The third thing that distances the Taiping from the communist movement is that Marxism envisions a classless society and ultimately a stateless society too. The Taipings on the other hand never distanced themselves from the concept of absolute benevolent rule. The opposition to monarchy was not only limited, but also superficial.

    Another difference between the Communist Chinese historians’ and the western scholarly appraisals of the Taiping movement was in their different spiritual outlooks. Communist scholars have argued that like the revolution that transformed China even the Taiping did not possess any religion and instead they believed in a classless utopia. Though the Communists might try to downplay the importance of religion, scholars like Jen Yu-Wen talk deeply about the religious nature and the Christian ground of Taiping idealism, while others like Fan Wenlan speak of the Protestant link to the Opium wars and the Taiping. Hence, even though the 1949 revolution and its pioneer Mao denied the existence of God, the Taipings did not think so. One can point out that the Taipings had several such aspects that ran contrary to the Maoist revolutionary programme.

    In conclusion, one can say that both the terms of a full-fledged revolution and a mere rebellion are too extreme. It should be noted that both the Chinese communist historians and western scholars agree on the unique character of the Taiping movement and its failure. The difference between the two lies in their approach. Advocates of its revolutionary character focus on its programmes and policies, while those who see it as a peasant insurrection emphasize its lack of implementation and leadership. The Taiping movement dared for the first time to challenge and attack a system which had prevailed in China for centuries. More than any other rebellion of their day, they addressed themselves directly to the crisis of the times and offered concrete measures for resolving it. Their vision of a new system of property relations, a new mechanism of local control, and a new relationship between the individual and the state was an authentic response to the distinctive problems of the late imperial age. And so to reduce the Taiping historiography to questions of dynastic decline and revolution or rebellion debates does not do justice to the Taiping and the background from which it emerged.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    • John K. Fairbank – East Asia
    • Jean Chesneaux – China from the Opium Wars to 1911 Revolution
    • Peking Foreign Languages Press – The Taiping Revolution
    • Tan Chung – Triton and Dragon
    • Franz Michael and GE Taylor – Far East and the Modern World
    • Y. Teng – Taiping Rebellion and the Western Powers