Reforms In The Early Meiji Period (1868-1880) – China & Japan – History DU Notes

The Meiji Period (1868-1912) brought about the rapid modernization of Japanese economic, political and social institutions, which resulted in Japan attaining the status of the leading country in Asia and a world economic and political power by the 20^th century. During the first half of the Meiji Period, from 1868 to 1880, the Meiji leaders instituted numerous reforms to achieve domestic stability, promote industrialization, improve education and establish an effective government structure, including the promulgation of a Constitution in 1889.

The Meiji Restoration was a little more than a coup d’etat. A relatively small band of insurgents had toppled the Tokugawa bakufu and stated their intent to restore direct imperial rule, but this was not likely to occur. Political contenders at that time feared that the rebels from Satsuma and Choshu would simply form a new bakufu and use the name of the emperor to rule from a narrow base of power. The alternatives facing the new government were either to maintain feudalism, shifting the hegemony from the Tokugawa to some other clan, or form a coalition of clans or to establish a centralized state. The foundations upon which the new government rested, the merchant capitalist class, the lower samurai and the former clan bureaucrats, were factors which guaranteed that the government would chose to centralize its authority in order to form a modern nation-state. Right from the start, the new regime resolutely set about uprooting the old concepts of government.

The new government anxiously looked to consolidate its power in early 1868. The important statement of their strategy and aims was the Charter Oath or the Five-article Oath, issued in the name of the Emperor on March 14, 1868. It was an expression of the anti-feudal aspirations of the people, envisaging the need for consulting public opinion and the administration of affairs for the benefit of the nation and the encouragement of foreign knowledge. The text of the Charter Oath was as follows:

“By this oath we set up as our main aim the establishment of the national weal on a broad basis and the framing of a constitution and laws.

1. Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the administration of affairs of state
3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall each be allowed to pursue their own calling so that there may be no discontent
4. Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just laws of Nature.
5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule.”

Implicit in the Charter Oath was an end to exclusive political rule by the bakufu and a move towards more democratic participation in government. As the new regime’s legitimacy increased over time, additional long-range goals were articulated apart from the Charter Oath. One frequently proclaimed aim was to safeguard Japan’s national sovereignty and prevent further foreign encroachment. Another oft-stated motive was the simply expressed, boldly unequivocal determination to become a great and respected country, equal to the most advanced nations in the world. These overarching motives of national independence and future greatness inspired a host of complementary missions – to revise the unequal treaties and remove Japan from semi-colonial status, to foster national unity, and to sweep away the problems of the past in order to build strength and wealth. The goals of the early reforms in the Meiji period can be encompassed in the slogan of building a ‘rich country, strong army’ (fukoku kyohei) in Japan.

However, first it was important to create a centralized political structure that would permit the new leaders to exercise authority effectively throughout the country. So, in 1868, the eleven-article Constitution known as the Seitaisho was promulgated, according to which all authority was vested in the Dajokan or the Grand Council of State. The Dajokan proved to be a very efficient form of revolutionary government; it wore the badge of tradition while concentrating all power in the hands of a small number of men who could implement their policies through their own ministries. In 1871 the Council was replaced by a tripartite set of ministries of the Centre, Left and Right, further subdivided into various functional ministries (Finance, Foreign Affairs, Public Works and Home Affairs). In 1885 this system was changed when the Meiji leaders inaugurated a cabinet system along European lines. At the head of the government was a Prime Minister, who presided over the several ministries. In the early years, the ministerial staff was recruited mainly by personal connections from the rank of Satsuma and Choshu samurai and their allies. In 1887, a system of Civil Service examinations began to fill in the ranks of the ministries of the state.

By 1868, top leaders of the new provisional government such as Kido Koin of Choshu and Saigo Takamori of Satsuma decided that the politically fragmented system of domains had to be overhauled. The objective was to set up a centralized state structure geared towards modernizing Japan in an effective manner. For this, the centre had to extend its authority over nearly 280 still-independent daimyo domains. The first step in this regard was taken in 1869, when the government announced that it would accept the return of registers from all daimyo (Hanseki-hokan). By this, the government deprived the daimyo of their traditional autonomy and substantially increased its ability to control administrative policy, although it permitted the lords to stay on as ‘imperial governors’ with handsome salaries. As the patrons of many of the coup planners, however, these men were guaranteed respect and a voice in the new order if they wished. Nonetheless, the ‘return of lands’ established the principle that all lands and people were subject to the Emperor’s rule.

Having bought off potential opposition leaders and built support in key domains with their measures, in August 1871, by an imperial edict, the domains were abolished and in their place 302 prefectures or ken (soon reduced to 72 and later to 48) and 3 administrative cities (fu), each under the jurisdiction of a new governor appointed by a Dajokan, were created. The idea was to end administrative localism. The central government would now collect taxes from the domain lands. The daimyo were ordered to move to Tokyo and domain armies were also disbanded.

The abolition of the domains was accompanied by a large payoff to the daimyo themselves. They were granted permanent yearly salaries equivalent to roughly 10% of their former domain’s annual tax revenue. The daimyo were simultaneously relieved of all the costs of governing. The government assumed the responsibility for paying samurai stipends, which immediately accounted for almost one-third of the central government’s expenditures. Later in 1873, the Dajokan offered to give fixed-term interest-bearing government bonds to ex-samurai who surrendered their stipends, and three years later it made the exchange obligatory for all.

The daimyo and the great bulk of the samurai in all the domains, including those who had engineered the restoration, were scarcely prepared to see their domains swallowed up into a new and more centralized form of government, but this is pre­cisely what the new leaders achieved in an amazingly short time, and with great enhancement of their own power. This surprising turn of events was possible only because of three factors – the leaders saw clearly the need for a fully centralized government if Japan were successfully to resist the West; they were themselves already in control of the domains whose mili­tary power underlay the imperial government; and the other domains had no basis for unified action and, although unclear as to what was happening, were eager not to be left out in the great reshuffle of political power that was obviously underway.

But the Meiji leaders realized that these reforms were mostly makeshift. The whole samurai class had come to be well-educated and wanted a degree of participation in the government. Thus, 1873 onwards, the emergence of political interest groups and parties demanding people’s rights gained strength. However, it was not before 1886 that actual work of drafting a constitution and its supporting legislation got underway. Finally, in 1889, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (the Meiji Constitution) was drafted. This was to last as the fundamental law until 1947.

Among the other implications of the fundamental changes in the early Meiji period were great social changes. The dominance of the daimyo and samurai classes in the social sphere was challenged. The earlier four classes of samurai, peasant, artisan and merchant were done away with. There were no hindrances to social mobility. Privileges were withdrawn and all came to be seen as equal by the state. Class re­strictions on professional fields of activity were abolished in 1869 and the next year commoners were permitted to assume family names.

The samurai were still distinguished from commoners, but their separate classification carried no legal privileges. Some of the abler samurai became officials in the new government, but most lost their functional positions in society when the domains were abolished and the military was turned from a closed class profession into a mass conscript system. Their pride was further hurt when they lost their distinctive badge of prestige. In 1871 they were permitted to discard the long and short swords they traditionally wore, and in 1876 they were ordered to do so. Another serious blow was their loss of economic privilege. Even before 1868 most had eked out only an impoverished existence on their small stipends. In 1873, the government offered the poorer samurai the option of a final lump-sum payment, and in 1876 it commuted all samurai stipends into government bonds. On average, the samurai received only 264 yen apiece, roughly half the value of their already reduced stipends. Further loss of status came in 1869, when the large number of samurai ranks were reduced to two, upper samurai (shizoku) and lower samurai (sotsu). In 1872 a large portion of the lower samurai were reclassified as commoners (heimin), although they retained their stipends for a moment. It should still be remembered however that in spite of all these changes, there was a definite continuity as the leading bureaucrats and administrators continued to be from the old dominant classes, including those clans who had assisted in the ouster of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

These swift social and economic changes naturally were not accomplished without considerable turmoil. Some capable and enterprising persons were able to find enticing new opportunities, but most people found it difficult to adjust. A large proportion of the big urban merchant firms, accustomed to privileged patronage from the Shogunate and domains, went bankrupt. Many peasants were bitterly opposed to the fixed monetary tax and to conscription, which was defined as a “blood tax”. Peasant uprisings, which had doubled in number during the troubled last years of the Shogunate, became even more frequent after 1868, rising to a crescendo in 1873 follow­ing the conscription law. But disaffection among former samurai was, of course, a much more serious threat and a matter of far greater concern to the new leaders than urban unrest or peasant disturbances. They made special efforts to settle indigent samurai on new lands as farmers or to absorb them into the government, the military, and the new industries.

However, the violence and resistance was much less as compared to other European nations. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the daimyo who had assisted in the downfall of the Tokugawas were determined to ensure the success of the regime. And most daimyo also realized that resistance would only cause civil strife, which they wanted to avoid. At the same time, the majority of the daimyo was in debt and welcomed the idea of shifting this burden to the government. Another factor in favour of the new government was that the payment of stipends was free of any political obligations and as such served as pensions. This was a comfortable economic settlement, which made the transition easier.

The influence of Western ideas was crucial in the period of early reforms. Western ideas had been entering Japan since the time of the Shogunate, which had sent seven missions to the United States and Europe till 1868. After 1868, however, the floodgates to Western knowledge opened wide. Within a decade, several hundred Japanese were studying in the United States and Europe and an even greater number of foreigners lived in Japan as experts on political administration, medical practices, legal philosophies, technological advances and the education system. By the 1870s the Meiji oligarchs had begun to search for ideas and prototypes that might guide their efforts to achieve the Meiji dream of national independence and domestic peace and prosperity. Many Meiji leaders looked to the West for lessons about how to organize political institutions, create economic wealth, and foster social harmony. Others were fascinated by the political vitality, military invincibility and science and technology of Western nations. The intense interest in the West shared by the nation’s leaders some of its most influential private citizens begot an era of ‘bunmei kaika’, which literally means civilization and enlightenment.

The influence of this was seen most in the area of education, where the Meiji government instituted a new system of education influenced by Western ideas and bunmei kaika. This was one way in which the government tried to create an atmosphere favourable to the acceptance of the fundamental and profound changes that were taking place. The new leaders clearly saw that an organized, system of educa­tion was a fundamental aspect of a modernized society and as early as 1871 created a Ministry of Education to develop such a system. The Confucian-oriented domain schools for the samurai and the so-called “temple schools”, where commoners learned to read and write, all withered away. The only exceptions were the Shogunal schools. The disappearance of most of the earlier schools left the government free to develop a new and modernized system of education. It never had to contend with the entrenched relationship between religion and education that existed in most Western countries. It was thus able to put into practice Western concepts of a uniform, government-operated educational system more fully than was possible in much of the West itself in the 19^th century.

The focus was now on the promotion of self-reliance. Observation of European and American societies convinced leaders such as Kido Koin that mass schooling, like mass conscription, was a fundamental source of the economic and military power of the West. At the outset the government announced that schools were to encourage practical learning as well as independent thinking. Under the influence of men like Fukuzawa, Mori Arinori (1847-1889) the centralized French system was some­what decentralized and remodeled along American lines.

The Ministry of Education, which had been set up in 1871, at first adopted a highly centralized system of education along French lines. Sixteen months of schooling were made compulsory for children of both sexes. Compulsory education was extended to three years in 1880 and to six years in 1907. The elementary schools were to be financed by a 10% local surcharge to the national property tax. However, in the 1870s, angry taxpayers reacted to this compulsory schooling and rioted. The passive resistance of simply not going to school was widespread and as late as 1886, only 46 per cent of the children of statutory school age were in school. But eventually, as with serving in the military, attending school became a well-accepted obligation of the Emperor’s subjects. By the end of the 19^th century, rates of elementary school attendance reached 90% or more and by 1905 the figure had risen to 95%.

Liberalization of education was also fostered by the rapid development of a great number of private schools founded by missionaries. Such Christian schools were particularly important in the field of secondary educa­tion for girls, which was somewhat neglected by the government. There were also many secular private schools many of which became in time distinguished universities.

A shift back toward a more centralized, authoritarian educational system came in the 1880’s and reached its height in 1890 with the Imperial Rescript on Education. This brief document, which made only passing reference to education itself, showed the revived influence of Confucian ideology in its stress on harmony and loyalty to the throne. Its central concept of mass indoctrination through formal education was an entirely modern emphasis. Part of the new educational policy was a desirable return to Japanese and Chinese literature, history, and thought, to balance the hitherto almost exclusive concern with Western subjects. Other aspects of the new policy were an increasing emphasis on indoctrination in educa­tion, standardization of the curriculum, and increased government control over private educational institutions, especially at the lower levels. The government school system was expanded and their prestige over the private schools was enhancement. As a result, private elementary and secondary schools shrank to relative insignificance.

The Confucian “University” in Edo, the medical school, and the language pro­grams at the Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books were united in 1869 into a single government institution. The non-Western aspects of the cur­riculum were dropped in 1871, and in 1877 the school was renamed Tokyo University, under which name it has remained ever since the pinnacle of the Japanese educational system. The Tokyo University was reorganized into a genuine multi-faculty university in 1886 and became the principal training center for future government officials. Until 1893 its graduates were accepted directly into government service without examination. Other govern­ment universities, thereafter known as Imperial Universities, were added— Kyoto in 1897, Tohoku (in Sendai) in 1907, Kyushu (in Fukuoka) in 1910, Hokkaido (in Sapporo) in 1918, and others later.

The unchallenged prestige of the govern­ment institutions, which had the lowest tuition rates, made Japanese education more egalitarian than schools of Western countries. The system was open to all who had the desire and ability to make use of it and became the chief device for selecting the leaders of the nation. As a result, a society which had only shortly before been organized along strictly hereditary feudal lines became within a generation or two less class-bound than England or many other European countries. The system, however, had serious drawbacks too. It was so carefully tailored to fit the needs of the state, as these were envisioned by its leaders, that it did not adequately meet all the educational needs of Japanese society as it developed. Women’s higher education, for example, grew up largely outside the official educational structure, and the rapid growth of private universities showed that there was a greater demand in Japanese society for higher education than that deemed adequate by the government. There was also a cramping conformity and a possibility of uniform indoctrination that were to prove extremely damaging to Japan in the long run.

The leaders in Tokyo saw clearly that military strength was a crucial factor not only for the central government’s control over the nation, but also in the effort to defend Japan from the West. At the time of its victory over the Shogunate, the new government had only a few small volunteer units under its direct control and had been forced to rely on the support of domain armies, principally those of Choshu and Satsuma. A much larger and more centrally controlled military was an obvious necessity. So, in 1871 the government formed an Imperial Force of ten thousand men drawn from the domain armies of Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa, trained along French lines. Then, in 1872, it divided the Ministry of Military Affairs into army and navy ministries. The new navy was made up of ships from the Shogunate fleet and from the various domains but was largely officered by men from Satsuma, who were to dominate it for the next several decades. Meanwhile the new army came under the leadership of men from Choshu, particularly Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922).

The most important military innovation, however, came with the issuance on January 10, 1873, of a conscription law, carefully prepared by Yamagata, who soon thereafter became Army Minister. Beginning at the age of twenty, all men, regardless of social background, were made liable for three years of active military service followed by four in the reserves. Like the French model, there were some exemptions, for household heads, criminals, the physically unfit, students and teachers in many prescribed schools, and government officials. It also allowed people to buy their way out for a huge fee of 270 yen. The idea was to establish a modern army based on universal conscription, inspired by the Prussian and French conscript armies. Also conscription could mobilize the energies of the people behind the state and forge ties of loyalty between the government and its citizenry. Socially, the conscription was another step in disfranchising the samurai estate and creating a society based on equality of opportunity, and militarily it vastly strengthened the regime’s authority by creating a force capable of providing internal security. Thus, by the mid-1890s Japan’s military was strong enough to move from the task of keeping order at home to that of imposing its will overseas.

In 1878, the Imperial Army General Staff Office, created after the Prussian model of the Generalstab, was established directly under the Emperor and was given broad powers for military planning and strategy. An Imperial Rescript of 1882 called for unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor by the new armed forces and asserted that commands from superior officers were equivalent to commands from the emperor himself. Top-ranking military leaders were given direct access to the Emperor and the authority to transmit his pronouncements directly to the troops. The sympathetic relationship between conscripts and officers, particularly junior officers who were drawn mostly from the peasantry, tended to draw the military closer to the people. In time, most people came to look more for guidance in national matters to military commanders than to political leaders.

The Japanese reformed their legal institutions along Occidental lines, to win acceptance with the West. Legal renovation was also fundamental to technological modernization and was necessitated by the abolition of the old class structure and other great changes taking place.

Western concepts of individual rather than family ownership of property were adopted, although for purposes of formal registration of the popula­tion, the law continued to recognize the old extended family, or “house”, consisting of a patriarch and those of his descendants and collateral relatives who had not legally established a new “house”. Concepts of legal rights, as opposed to the traditional emphasis on social obligation, came to permeate the new laws. The structure and procedures of the courts were made to conform to those of the West, and torture as an accepted legal practice was abolished in 1876. But some innovations, such as the prohibition of prostitu­tion and mixed bathing, which were adopted simply to placate Western prejudices, proved ineffective and were subsequently abandoned.

Most of the legal reforms ware instituted piecemeal and a thorough re-codification of the laws proved a difficult and slow task. Drafts, drawn up largely under French influence, were submitted in 1881 and again in 1888. A complete code, revised largely on the basis of German legal precedent, finally went into effect in 1896.

To conclude, The historical legacy from Tokugawa society did not permit a social transformation from taking place from below through democratic or mass revolutionary process, but only from above autocratically. The new structure was built from the top downwards, upon the ruins of the old. However, the Meiji government was able to achieve a remarkable degree of success in a relatively short span of time. In fact, Japanese modernization stands out as the only historical instance of transformative ‘modern’ processes initiated and completed by a sovereign Asian country. It laid the foundation for the further development of Japan, especially anticipating the trends in the political and economic spheres of life.