Critically examine the circumstances that facilitated the success of the Turks.
In the early 13th century, northwestern India witnessed the beginnings of Turkish rule in the form of the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate. However, it took the Turks about two centuries to lay the foundations of Turkish rule in India, beginning with the invasions of Mahmud Ghazni in the early 11th century. He invaded India seventeen times but never established a political kingdom in India. His looting of temples enabled him to organize an efficient army required for the establishment of a strong Turko-Persian empire in Central Asia. Later he did annex a part of Punjab but the intention was to use it as a stepping-stone for further raids in India. Then there were invasions by Muhammad Ghori in the 12th century, who did annex Indian territories but saw then as a part of the larger Ghurid Empire in Central Asia. But all these invasions did prepare the ground for the establishment of a separate Turkish kingdom in India. And in this pursuit, the Turks faced a stiff resistance from the Rajput kings and local chieftains. However the fact remains that the Turks were successful in conquering parts of India.
Various theories have been advanced and various explanations have been attempted to explain the successful Turkish conquest of northern India. However, before going into the details of these, it is important to mention the source material that has been used by historians in this context. Unfortunately, there is paucity of sources in this regard. Moreover, of the three contemporary chroniclers – Hasan Nizami, Mihhajus Siraj and Fakhr-i-Mudabbir – the first two say nothing about the causes of Turkish successes in India though they have described the campaigns. It is strange that for them neither strategy nor tactics nor any other military explanation had any relevance: ‘Almighty God gave victory to Islam’. On the other hand, the available Rajput baric literature over-exaggerates the achievements of the Rajput chieftains who entered into conflict with the Turks. Anyway, the most useful source remains Fakhr-i-Mudabbir’s ‘Adab ul-Harb’, which gives a fair deal of idea about the military organization of, and strategies adopted by the Turks and the Rajputs.
Western historians of the 19th century like Elphinstone, Lanepool and Vincent smith, undermining the resistance offered by the Rajputs, argue that the Indians were basically non-violent and peace-loving people, while the Turks loved fighting. The Turks were barbaric and military adventurers. Thus the Turkish success can be attributed to this difference in the attitude of the Rajputs and the Turks towards war. This argument however, does not hold water. K.A. Nizami points out that the Rajput was, in no way, inferior to the Turk in courage and spirit of sacrifice. Infact Rajput heroism and chivalry were proverbial. The assertion that the Indians were defeated on account of their non-violent attitude towards political problems is contradicted by the history of the contemporary Rajput kingdoms. Far from being despised, war was the prevailing madness, and the Rajput states were constantly quarrelling with each other.
Jadunath Sarkar’s analysis of the causes of the ‘Muslim’ success is as follows: ‘Islam gave to its followers three characteristics which no other religion has inspired so successfully, and which imparted to natural soldiers like the Arabs, Pathans and Turks, a wonderful military efficiency. These were: Firstly, a complete equality and social solidarity, as regards legal status and religious privileges. Thus all distinctions of caste and race were swept away and the sect was knit together like the members of one vast family of brothers. Secondly, fatalism, springing from an absolute reliance on god and the belief that what Allah wills must triumph over every human effort. This bred contempt of death in fighting. Thirdly, freedom from drunkenness – wine drinking was a sin according to the Quran and a crime punishable by the state in Muslim countries. On the other hand, wine drinking was the ruin of the Rajputs, Marathas, and other Hindu soldiers, and made them incapable of far-sighted military planning, conducting surprise attacks, or even guarding their own camps with proper precaution.’
Reacting to Sarkar’s analysis, Habib and Nizami say that it would be unhistorical to seek an explanation of this Turkish success in the religious zeal of the ‘Mussalmans’. The religious zeal of the early Arab conquerors was no longer an inspiring motive in the lives of the people. In fact many of the Turkish tribes who came to India during this period, were not fully converted to Islam, while many of their leaders had only a very superficial knowledge of the faith. Moreover, Turkish armies also consisted of non-Muslim contingents. Habib and Nizami, however, admit that this does not eliminate the possibility of religious sentiments, in however crude a form they might have been, being aroused when the Turks came fact to face with people and institutions having polytheistic and idolatrous forms. They add that this could only have been a mere ‘passing mood’ and not a ‘permanent objective’ or inspiring motive of their campaigns.
Regarding Sarkar’s first argument, it should be pointed out that by the 11th and 12th centuries, a lot of divisions had emerged within the Islamic world, and Turkish armies were affected by this. There were several sectarian and ethnic differences in the Turkish forces. As against the second argument, as mentioned earlier, the Rajputs were as chivalrous as the Turks and they too welcomed death on the battlefield to defeat. Thirdly, there are certainly injunctions in the Quran on intoxication, but its form is not clearly defined. Wine drinking was as prevalent in the Turkish forces as in the Rajput armies. Moreover, it should also be kept in mind that there was a lot of different between what the Quran preached and what was actually followed.
The nationalist historians like Lala Lajpat Rai and R.C. Majumdar say that thee Rajputs were defeated due to the absence of unity, loyalty and patriotism. They argue that the Rajputs failed to put up a cohesive, united resistance against the Turks. For example, Jaichand didn’t assist Prithviraj in his struggle against the Turks. The nationalist historians stress the fact that Indians didn’t unify due to lack of a feeling of patriotism and of loyalty to their country.
However, these views of the nationalist historians have been widely criticised. Concepts like unity and patriotism cannot be applied to the medieval period, as ‘India’ as a nation did not exist then. The Rajputs did not see themselves as one nation, but as several distinct states. The loyalties of the Rajputs were confined to the territorial limits of their state – it didn’t extend beyond this, so it would be unrealistic to expect a ‘united’ resistance from them. It should also be pointed out that the nationalist historians, writing against the background of the Indian struggle for independence, tried to emphasize the results of a lack on unity. Even the Turks themselves were divided, as there were several clans within the community. The majority of Turkish army men were mercenaries, who were motivated purely by the gains of raids and plundering, and as such did not possess any notion of ‘loyalty’.
In contrast, more recent historians like K.A. Nizami and Mohammad Habib assert that the caste system was basically responsible for the defeat of the Rajputs, along with the insular outlook of the Indians. According to them, “the real cause of the defeat of the Indians lay in their social system and the invidious cast distinctions, which rendered the whole military organization rickety and weak. Caste taboos and discriminations killed all sense of unity – social or political. Even religion was the monopoly of a particular section, and the majority of the Indian people were never allowed a glimpse of the inside of a high-caste Indian temple. Thus for the bulk of the Indian people there was hardly anything which could evoke patriotic responses in them, when faced with the Ghaznavid or Ghurid invasions. They watched with sullen indifference the fate of the Indian ruling classes. The towns, consequently, fell like ripe fruits. Only the forts put up some resistance, but they became helpless when the enemy controlled the countryside. Had the Indian ruling classes succeeded in enlisting the support of the masses for their defence plans, these forts and fortresses would have served as a fortified base of a very dynamic character by linking up all their striking force to a single state-centre. But under the existing social circumstances, the forts became a futile defence and could not protect even their own areas.”
Habib and Nizami add that the caste system played havoc with the military efficiency of the Rajput states. Since fighting was the profession of a small group, recruitment was confined to particular tribes or castes. The bulk of the population was thus excluded from military training. The idea of physical contact causing ritual pollution made division of labour amongst soldiers impossible, and the same person had to perform all sorts of work, from fighting to fetching water. In addition, the Indians possessed and insular outlook and did not look beyond themselves. For instance, the brahmanas would not pass down the knowledge they possessed. Travel by sea was ritually prohibited, and thus there was little contact with the outside world and the developments taking place there.
The arguments given by Habib and Nizami can be questioned on several grounds. Firstly, while the Indian caste system was rigid, there is also contradictory evidence of mobility within it. For example, the Narada-smriti mentions that in times of crisis, even the Shudras can be recruited to the armies. Therefore the success of the Turks cannot be attributed solely to caste divisions. As regards the argument on the insular outlook of Indians, again there is ample evidence to suggest that there was much interactions going on between India and the outside world, such as in the form of trade; and as Nizami himself points out, the Muslim saints and mystics peacefully penetrated the country and settled at a number of important places while the extension of Turkish political influence was stoutly resisted by the Rajputs. Thus there was interaction on various grounds.
The more palatable argument for Turkish success given by Habib and Nizami, and Irfan Habib, is regarding the military aspect. They point out that from the purely military point of view, the Indian armies had not kept themselves informed of developments in warfare in Central Asia. There were basic differences in the principles on which the Indian and Turkish forces were organized, maintained and fought in the battlefield. According to Habib and Nizami, mobility was the keynote of Turkish military organization at this time. This mobility was tied to a well-equipped cavalry. Indian military strategy gave greater importance to weight than to mobility. The Rajputs believed in ‘crushing’ rather than moving rapidly and striking. Huge and unwieldy phalanxes of armies headed by elephants with gorgeous trappings were bound to be signally beaten when faced with a swift and easy moving cavalry, which could attach the flanks and the rear of the enemy forces. Further, as R.C. Smail remarks, “After their mobility, the second tactical characteristic of the Turks was their archery.” They used the bow from the saddle and shot without dismounting (swaran-i-muqatala). As a result they were able to combine their archery with tactical uses of their mobility.
Simon Digby does not agree that the military weakness of the Rajputs was a cause for Turkish success. Mounted combat, he says, was not unfamiliar to the Indians. Records of battles such as the Battle of Tarain show that they were formidable cavalrymen. The horse was an important element in Rajput culture as well – this is shown in the coinage of north Indian rulers. Further, the Muslim rulers were as eager as the Rajputs to deploy elephants. Digby suggests that the Sultans of Delhi continuously won battles because of their control of military supplies was superior to that of the Hindu rajas, and they could hence employ greater numbers of horses and elephants.
Having surveyed the controversy regarding the reasons for the success of the Turkish forces, it is important to arrive at a conclusion. The most important factor was no doubt their military superiority over the Rajputs, though in a broad sense. They possessed knowledge of the latest tactics, the art of warfare, and the knowledge of stirrups [even if the Indians knew the use of the stirrups, its use was not as extensive as by the Turks]. As Nizami points out, a careful study of the Adab ul-Harb reveals that the Turks knew how to organise and employ their army as one coordinated unit, with unity of purpose and of organization. Whereas the Rajput armies mainly consisted of feudal levies raised by different Rajput leaders, trained under different conditions and employed on different terms – lacking unity of purpose, and fighting for individual glory. Another great advantage of the Turks over their Indian opponents was the unitary organization of their state. The Turkish polity was a centralised one, based on atleast a theoretical egalitarianism. The Turkish resources were at the disposal of a singe mind; the strength of Hindustan, as Habib says, was divided among a multitude of factious Rais, sub-Rais, local chiefs and village headmen, between whom anything approaching sensible cooperation was impossible. The feudal vassals whole militia formed a major part of the Rajput army, sometimes refused to provide contingents or simply couldn’t do so in time. This definitely affected the military strength of the Rajputs. On the other hand, the Turkish Ghulam (slave) system gave rigorous training to the army men. The Turkish army was composed of heterogeneous material, but strict discipline, years of comradeship in arms, the memory of past victories and hopes for future spoils and plunder, had welded Indians, Afghans, Turks and Persians together. Training had created confidence, which lead to success. One must also take account of the ‘Ghazi spirit’. On the one hand, this was a sociological-religious ideology, which gave Turkish slaves and army men a new reason to live and die. It gave them a motive and opportunity not only for a successful career, but also for religious merit. On the other, it gave him a political reason and justification for making raids and looting & plundering, while legitimising (in the Islamic world) his acquisition of war booty.
Therefore several factors worked together to contribute to Turkish success. While the Turkish superiority on several grounds should not be exaggerated, the resistance of the Rajputs also cannot be undermined. In any case, the success of the Turks northern India did not mean simply the substitution on one ruling class by another. It led to some very vital changes in various spheres of life – social, religious, political and economic.
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Bibliography
K.A. Nizami Some Aspects Of Religion And Politics In India During The Thirteenth Century
Mohammad Habib And K.A. Nizami A Comprehensive History Of India, Volume V, Part I
Mohammad Habib Sultan Mahmud Of Ghazni
A.B.M. Habibullah Foundation Of The Muslim Rule In India