Muhamamd Bin Tughluq’s Projects

Muhammad bin Tughluq (1324-51) was the second ruler of the Tughluq dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate. His reign marked a watershed in the history of the Sultanate as during his reign, the Sultanate reached its peak in terms of territorial and political expansion. It was also during his reign itself that the decline of the empire set in. Among the several measures taken by him, special focus had been placed on his five ‘projects’ by both contemporary and modern historians. However, before we look at these, it is essential to look at the sources for his period, because a study of his measures is seriously affected by the way in which he is portrayed in these sources.

The main contemporary works for this period include Barani’s Tarikh-i-Firozshahi and Fatawa-i-Jahandari; Isami’s Futuhus Salatin; and Ibn Battuta’s Rehla. Other sources which discuss his measures are Afif’s Tarikh-i-Firozshahi; Yahiya bin Sirhindi’s Tarikh-i-Mubarakshahi; and mystic Sira literature. There is also a four-page supposed fragmentary autobiography or memoir of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Scholars like Mahdi Husain have argued for its authenticity. However, most Medieval Indian historians such as M. Habib and K. A. Nizami believe that it was a fabrication since it finds no mention in any other contemporary work and the style is similar to a later-day work. All available sources have their own limitations and biases, which must be understood first.

Barani presents a very confused account of the life of Muhammad bin Tughluq. In certain circumstances, he is extremely critical of his policies, while at others he bestows lavish praise on him for his generosity. This is a reflection of the dilemma that Barani faced while presenting Muhammad bin Tughluq. On one hand, Muhammad bin Tughluq was his patron, and during his reign Barani reached the peak of career in terms of political status and economic privileges. However, after the death of Muhammad bin Tughluq, he lost his position and was imprisoned due to a misunderstanding. As a result, when he began writing his works, he felt nostalgic about Muhammad bin Tughluq’s period. On the other hand, he blamed him for his policy of Indianization and the changes in the composition of the nobility, which he felt were responsible for his rapid decline. He believed in moderation and so also criticized the Sultan’s drastic policies. Thus there is a lack of consistency in the manner in which Muhammad bin Tughluq has been portrayed in Barani’s works.

Isami presents Muhammad bin Tughluq as a wicked and evil ruler. There are personal reasons for his grievances against the Sultan. When Muhammad bin Tughluq established his capital at Daulatabad, a number of residents of Delhi were asked to move, among them Isami’s family. His grandfather, who he was very close to, died in the course of this long journey. Moreover, Ghiyasuddin Tughluq had confiscated his family property at an early age and thus he held a grudge against the dynasty. Also, in the latter part of Muhammad bin Tughluq’s reign, he joined the court of Alauddin Bahman Shah, who later rebelled and established the independent Bahmani kingdom in the Deccan. Thus, in order to justify this and legitimize the breaking away of the Bahmani kingdom, he portrayed Muhammad bin Tughluq in a negative light. Yet his account is useful as it is from the perspective of a person based in the Deccan, not in Delhi.

Ibn Battuta was a Moroccan traveler who came to India several years after Muhammad bin Tughluq’s reign, when there was already an air of hostility against the policies of the Sultan. His account was coloured by Muhammad bin Tughluq’s unpopularity among the Sufis and the ulema. Ibn Battuta was also imprisoned for a brief period during Muhammad bin Tughluq’s reign. Thus his account, already a secondary source, also suffers from prejudices against Muhammad bin Tughluq.

It is this context that we can understand the five major projects Muhammad bin Tughluq launched during his reign. These were – the establishment of a capital at Deogir; the introduction of token currency; the Khurasan expedition; the Qarachil expedition; and the Doab experiment, associated with the agrarian land reforms introduced by him. 

One of the most grossly misunderstood steps taken by Muhammad bin Tughluq was his so-called transfer of capital to Deogir, which was renamed Daulatabad; and the alleged ordering of a mass transfer of the people from Delhi to the new capital. Barani places this project in 1326-27. However, it appears from Isami that the Sultan issued orders for the exodus to Deogiri prior to the introduction of token currency. Numismatic evidence shows that the token currency was introduced in 1329-30. The change of capital may, therefore, be placed in 1328-29.

Different motives have been ascribed by the contemporary historians to Muhammad bin Tughluq for his Deccan experiment. Ibn Battuta said the shift stemmed from the fact that the residents of Delhi used to throw abusive letters at the palace. The Sultan could not bear the hostility of the people and asked them to move. However, this does not explain why the Sultan, in such an atmosphere of hatred, would ask the same people to move to Deogir, instead of leaving them behind. He also mentions that the Sultan made arrangements for the journey, and paid compensation to the emigrants. Such actions would not have been carried out had it been the intention of the Sultan to punish the people. Moreover, the Sultan was known to be ruthless, and so could have punished the people in Delhi itself. Thus, the incident of throwing letters, if at all true, must have been a reaction, and not the cause, of the exodus.

Isami also gives a similar reason to explain the experiment. He says that since the Sultan was suspicious (badguman) of the people (khalq) of Delhi, he thought of driving them out in the direction of the Deccan in order to break their power. However, there are similar problems with this also. Isami’s narrative is biased as he attempts to show that a deep animosity existed between the Sultan and the people. Also, Muhammad bin Tughluq himself spent very little time in Daulatabad, staying most of the time in Delhi itself. 

Barani comes closer to the real motive when he says that the Sultan made Devagiri his darul mulk (capital) to make it an administrative centre as he had annexed most of the Deccan by this time, and because he thought that it was more centrally situated. But, apart from the geographical inaccuracy of this statement, it must be pointed out that if Deogir could not be controlled from Delhi, then neither could Delhi be controlled from Deogir. Moreover, it would leave the administrative centre in the north in a weak position, making the whole of northern India susceptible to invasions.

Mahdi Husain believes that economic and administrative factors such as central location and communication difficulties prompted the shift. He also points to the diminishing fear of the Mongol campaigns. Conversely, it has been argued that the capital was shifted to escape Mongol invasions. However, the last serious Mongol invasion took place in 1306. Some scholars point to the coming of the Chagatai chief Tarmashirin to India in 1328 as an invasion, as mentioned in the accounts of Ferishta and Sirhindi. However, Barani does not refer to this, while according to Ibn Battuta, there were friendly relations between Muhammad bin Tughluq and Tarmashirin. On a study of the Central Asian sources, we find that Tarmashirin had come to India to seek military and financial assistance as he was involved in constant conflict with the Ilkhanis, another Mongol tribe. This is what has been referred to by the sources when they say that Muhammad bin Tughluq bought peace from Tarmashirin. Thus, since the Mongols were no longer a serious threat, this could not have been the reason for the shift of capital.

Gardner Brown looks at the economic factors behind the move. According to him, with the accession of Muhammad bin Tughluq, the centre of gravity of the empire had shifted from the North to the South. Punjab and Delhi had lost their importance due to Mongol devastations over 100 years. Thus, when Muhammad bin Tughluq embarked upon his Deccan experiment, he simply acted as an agent of certain economic forces, which were actively operating in the country and demanded the transfer of the capital to a region economically more prosperous to sustain the structure of an all-India empire. But this cannot be accepted as the economy of the region had not declined and Punjab continued to be important.

Mohammad Habib said that Muhammad bin Tughluq decided to shift his capital to enable more direct control over the Deccan. Peter Jackson suggests that the aim was to convert Delhi into a military encampment. He further argues that this depopulation of Delhi could be linked to the Khurasan project and the need to reduce the grain consumption of Delhi. However, the real reason seems to have been political exigencies and the need to achieve political and administrative unity by integrating the northern and southern regions of the empire. Since the days of Alauddin Khalji, Deogir had been the base of operations in the Deccan. Once the Deccan had been conquered, it was essential to consolidate and build a support base, to cope effectively and instantaneously with all situations that arose in that region. This can also be linked to Muhammad bin Tughluq’s policy of asking the Sufis to move to Daulatabad. Thus he wanted a second capital in the south so that he could administer it more effectively.

The Deccan scheme was neither a haphazard impulsive plunge nor an eccentric craze for novelty, but a well-thought-out solution of a problem which had troubled all the Sultans of Delhi. It appears that the idea was conceived at least two years before it was actually executed. It was implemented gradually, with due consideration for the convenience of the people. Facilities of travel were provided and huge expenditure was incurred to make the journey comfortable. Trees were planted on both sides of the roads and at a distance of every two miles, rest houses were constructed. In Daulatabad itself, elaborate preparations were made to welcome the emigrants. Free board and lodging were provided to the new arrivals and the Sultan also purchased houses for them.

The impression of a mass exodus given by contemporary historians is also incorrect. Barani gives an exaggerated account of the destruction of Delhi. But this reflects his own perception, as, for Barani, Delhi was nothing but the dwellings of the elite. When they moved, the whole Delhi seemed depopulated to him. Ibn Battuta talks of the depopulation of Delhi on the basis of rumours, but when he actually describes Delhi on his arrival, barely 4-5 years after the exodus, he talks of its splendor and population, as if no disaster had overtaken it. Thus it seems clear that only the aristocracy, the ulema and the Sufis were asked to move. The mystics had to be transported for the purpose of preaching and propaganda. They provided the initial Muslim support base and presented a more humane face of Islam. The general Hindu public was not affected. Two Sanskrit inscriptions, dated 1327 and 1328, show that the Hindus of Delhi lived peacefully all this time. The words ‘buzurgan-i-dilli’ (leading men of Delhi) in Muhammad Bulaq’s Matlub-ul-Talibin (an Arab account) used with regard to those who were forced to leave Delhi should also be noted. Moreover, at the very time of the shift, Muhammad was engaged in new construction projects within the Delhi region – in 1326-27, he built a new fortress, Adilabad, and linked the old city of Delhi to Siri with walls that enclosed an area known as Jahanpanah. It is hard to reconcile this extensive programme with the notion that the entire Delhi city had been abandoned. Thus, Delhi continued to be prosperous.

It is a misconception that the project brought about the transfer of the capital to Daulatabad. In fact, it was established as the second administrative city of the empire. This is borne out by a 14th century Arab account of Al-Qalqashandi, who mentions that the empire had two capitals – Delhi and Devagiri or Qubbatul Islam. Also, coins minted around this time indicate Delhi as Takhtgah-i-Delhi and Daulatabad as Takhtgah-i-Daulatabad (takhtgah refers to the seat of the crown). Thus, Delhi always continued as a capital – an administrative centre, a minting centre, and a military centre.

The movement led to a strong reaction from the people, who were weaned away from their homes and suffered great hardships during the long journey in the extreme summer. Also, the project aimed at greater centralization by the state which now attempted to control social groups that were earlier considered outside their purview. This was opposed by the Sufis, who believed in the concept of walayat (spiritual dominion over a territory) of their organization (silsila). Their areas of work were determined by their spiritual masters (pirs), who assigned ‘spiritual territories’ to them to carry on moral and spiritual education of the people. When the Sultan sought to move them from one place to another, they interpreted it as a serious interference in their khanqah-life. Their resistance to the move was interpreted by the Sultan as rebellion, and he forced many of them to migrate. The accounts of his punishments of all people who disobeyed his orders, as given by contemporary writers, may be highly exaggerated, but they represent the general unpopularity of this measure.

Viewed as an administrative act, the measure was a failure and was eventually abandoned by 1335-36, when the Sultan granted permission to those who wished to return to Delhi. Its immediate effect was widespread resentment against the Sultan. However, in the long-term, the Deccan experiment succeeded in breaking the barriers that separated the North from the South. Muslim culture also spread there and many Muslim monuments came up in the Deccan. Also, Muslim strength in the Deccan increased, and when the disintegration of the Delhi Sultanate began, the Bahamani kingdom arose with Daulatabad as its capital.

The second experiment of Muhammad bin Tughluq was the introduction of token currency around 1329-30. It was a system in which the face value of a coin is more than its intrinsic value, i.e., the metal it is made of. In those days, a silver coin was known as a tanka, and a copper coin was known as a jital. The Sultan issued token currency in place of the silver coin. This token coin was distinguished from the ordinary currency in several ways. The metal used for it was copper (mis) according to Barani, but Ferishta says it was brass or bronze (biranj). It seems to have been made of an alloy of copper and perhaps a bit of silver. Also, unlike other coins, it had Arabic as well as Persian super-inscriptions, and special care was taken to make them clear and legible. The inscription in Persian ran – ‘Muhr shud tanka, ra’ij dar ruzgar-i banda-i ummidwar Muhammad Tughluq’, which means ‘Minted tanka, current during the days of Muhammad (bin) Tughluq, who hopes for Divine favour’. The word ‘current’ makes it clear that the coin owed its value to the personality of the Sultan. The Arabic inscriptions were – ‘He who obeys the Sultan, obeys God’; and ‘Obey God, obey the prophet and those in authority amongst you’. This was an appeal to the religious sentiments of the people to accept and honour the token currency.

The experiment in token currency was not new in Asia. Under Qublai Khan (1260-94) of China and Kaikhatu Khan of Iran (1293), attempts at introducing a token currency had been made. The Iranian experiment had failed; the Chinese venture had succeeded. Thus, Muhammad may have wanted to repeat the Chinese success. Isami once again ascribes the project to the Sultan’s aim to harass the people. Barani gives the cause as financial stringency. He says that the Sultan’s projects and his lavish gifts had depleted the treasury. Thus, it was a device to meet this financial crisis. This is only partially true. That he was not bankrupt can be seen from the fact that when the experiment failed, he promptly redeemed in silver and gold the token base coins his own mint had manufactured.

From several sources available for this period we can infer that there was a global shortage of silver at this time. In India, there is a gradual decrease in the weight of the silver tanka (from 175 grains of rice to 140) and a corresponding increase in the weight of the gold coin (from 172 to 200 grains). The need for token currency thus, was a correctly conceived idea to face this problem. During the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq, the demand for silver became much greater, but the supply decreased. The problem was aggravated on account of the establishment of new mints in the extensive empire, and the enormous expenditure incurred on military expeditions and the Deccan experiment. However, most contemporary writers failed to understand this, and thus severely criticized this policy.

The basic conditions of success for token currency are that firstly, it must be accepted by the government in taxes and other payments by the people. Secondly, the process of manufacture of the token currency should be kept a secret, to prevent forgery. Thirdly, an extensive police organization is needed for its implementation and very harsh punishments have to be meted out to unauthorized persons who manufacture the token currency. There should be state supervision to prevent the entry of forged coins in the market. However, though the scheme, on the whole, was quite good and statesmanlike, it failed despite the emperor’s good intentions due to bad execution. Loopholes appeared in the system and according to Barani, “the house of every Hindu became a mint”. He suggests that the scheme failed owing to the widespread forgery by Hindu chiefs and their agents, who accordingly used them to pay the land tax. Edward Thomas has pointed out that no effort was made to guard the process of manufacture. The royal mint worked with precisely the same tools as the ordinary workmen, and the metal used was universally available. There was no special machinery to mark the difference of the fabric of the royal mint and the handiwork of the moderately-skilled artisan. There was also no check upon the authenticity of the copper token, and no limit on the power of production by the masses at large.

  1. Habib says that the project did not succeed because the public failed Muhammad bin Tughluq. For true currency, the people had tested the purity of gold and silver through certain procedures. However, the same checks were not done for token currency. Consequently, many of the forged coins got mixed with the treasury coins, which the government was unable to prevent. Some suggest that it was an idea ahead of its time. Also, the coins depended on the power of the Sultan for their value, and there was no institutional backing to protect token currency. And this is where it failed. Soon, the whole operation got beyond the control of the government; too many forged coins got into circulation; and there was havoc in the market. People started hoarding silver and made all purchases in token currency, keeping considerable silver out of circulation. However, they refused to accept payments in token currency. Foreign merchants stopped bringing their wares to India, and there may have been a general decline in foreign trade as a result of the debasement. Possibly Muhammad’s monetary policy had affected the balance of trade between India and Central Asia. Thus, in the face of such problems, he realized that the project had failed. The token currency was withdrawn after three years and the government offered to exchange all copper coins, genuine or spurious, by genuine gold and silver coins.

Another project of Muhammad bin Tughluq was the controversial Khurasan expedition. This was probably undertaken in 1330-31. Barani says that the Sultan was keen to conquer Khurasan. It must be kept in mind, however, that the word ‘Khurasan’ is often very loosely used. It vaguely denoted the territories west of the Indus. Ishwari Prasad and Mahdi Husain therefore conclude that Muhammad planned to attack the Ilkhanate. But Peter Jackson points out that ‘Khurasan’ also designated the regions that today comprise northern Afghanistan and were at that time subject to the Chagadayid khans. It is very difficult, therefore, to determine exactly the geographical area which Muhammad bin Tughluq had in mind

For this expedition, he specially raised a huge army of 37,000 horsemen, over and above the usual total for the military establishment. The salaries were paid both in cash and in the form of iqtas. Its maintenance and expenses incurred for its equipment caused a heavy outlay of money. This army was paid in for one year, and it was thought that the ‘booty’ obtained from the campaign would meet its expenditure in the following years. But the campaign could not be undertaken and there were no resources for maintaining it for the second year. Moreover, this army could not be kept busy in any military operation. Thus, it was then disbanded.

There is a debate over the reasons for launching this project, and the causes that led to its abandonment. Barani does not mention the motives of the Sultan in planning this military venture. Ferishta says that large number of princes and maliks, who had arrived in his court from Iraq and Khurasan, convinced him that the conquest would be an easy walk-over. The Khurasan expedition was, however, closely connected to the political developments in Central and West Asia. After the death of Chengiz Khan, one of the branch of his descendants, the Chaghatais led by Tarmashirin, had dominated Turkistan and Transoxiana; while another branch, the Ilkhanis led by Abu Said, had captured Persia, Afghanistan etc. Both were in constant conflict with one another for control of the Central Asian lands. It was in this situation that Tarmashirin had sought the support of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Such a political vacuum may have encouraged Muhammad to follow an aggressive policy and expand his influence in the region.

Professor Siddiqui has suggested that one reason for the abandonment of Muhammad’s plans was the onset of friendly relations between the Sultan and Tarmashirin, although Barani makes no mention of this. However, a change in the political conditions came when Abu Said got the support of Egypt and defeated Tarmashirin. This forced Muhammad to give up his project and led to disposal of the army. It created frustration, and discontentment among the now unemployed soldiers. This resentment was fomented by the ulema, the sayyids, and the chief Sufis, who had personal differences with the emperor. Barani counts the project among the Sultan’s misdeeds, and remarks that he lavishly squandered his resources, and weakened his control over his own territory. 

The next project that the Sultan undertook was the Qarachil project, begun in 1337-39. It aimed at establishing military control over the Qarachil region. This has been identified as the mid-Himalayan tract of Kulu in the Kangra district in the Kumaon-Garhwal area. Once again, various motives have been suggested by contemporary writers for this expedition. Barani has shown it as a part of the Khurasan expedition, as Qarachil was on the way to Khurasan. But this statement cannot be accepted, since geographically speaking, the Himalayas did not obstruct the way to Khurasan. Ferishta said that Muhammad bin Tughluq’s ultimate objective was to acquire access to China and Tibet, but no earlier authority supports his view. The reason for the expedition has been provided by Ibn Battuta. It appears that Chinese encroachments on the independent Rajput kingdoms in the Himalayas had caused some concern to Muhammad bin Tughluq. They had built an idol temple at a strategic place and were planning extension of their authority in that area. Another cause for the expedition, suggests Mahdi Husain, lay in the need for securing the north-eastern frontier and consolidating his position in a region of strategic importance. The emperor had rounded off all other frontiers of his empire. Multan was an important frontier outpost in the north-west; in the north-east Bengal had been secured; and in the south, Deogir had been established as a second capital. Thus, the Qarachil expedition was “to complete the chain of fortifications in the north”.

For this purpose, he sent an army comprising of 10,000 soldiers, from the army raised for the Khurasan expedition, under the command of his nephew Khusrau Malik, though he is not mentioned by Barani. He gave elaborate instructions as to how far the operations were to be extended and where the army had to stop. The army succeeded in occupying Jidya. The Sultan warned the commander not to proceed beyond this, but elated with his success, Khusrau Malik ignored the Sultan’s instructions and marched ahead towards Tibet. Soon afterwards the rains set in and the army was overtaken by disease and panic. The difficulties of the hilly region, together with the hostility of the local people, completely routed the forces of Delhi. Only ten persons survived according to Barani; 3 according to Ibn Battuta; and according to Isami, about 6000 escaped, but the emperor had them all executed.

This was yet another project of the Sultan that failed in its execution with catastrophic results, though the Sultan himself could not be blamed for it. It led to tremendous waste of resources and immeasurable discontent among the people. Military failure also increased the resentment among the soldiers against state policy. It would, however, be unfair to think that the Qarachil expedition did not yield any positive results at all. Muhammad bin Tughluq did mange to compel the chiefs of the region to recognize his overlordship, an aspect which has been ignored by both Isami and Barani. It has been mentioned by Ibn Battuta and is corroborated by the author of Masalikul Absar.

The last project of Muhammad bin Tughluq was the Doab Experiment, although Barani mentions it as the first. However, Barani’s history is not a strict chronological account of the period as a large part of his works is written from memory. Also, the arrangement of the events is often according to their importance The reaction against all other experiments of Muhammad bin Tughluq had already built up by this time, and so the impact of this project was huge. Thus, it struck his imagination most.

Around 1335-36, Muhammad bin Tughluq decided to enhance the revenue of the Doab region, since it was already very fertile and so had the capacity to pay higher taxes. The failure of Muhammad bin Tughluq’s other projects forms the background to this measure. The enhancement has been described by Barani as “yaki ba dah wa yaki ba bist” (‘one to ten and one to twenty’). Ishwari Prasad rightly objects to Dowson’s interpretation that the revenue was increased by “ten or five per cent more” as it does not explain the results that followed. He also observes that the alternative rendering, “ten or twenty times”, is impossible if taken literally. Moreland argues that the phrase is rhetorical and not arithmetic. It was only to convey a sense of considerable increase. Perhaps the state increased its share in land revenue by 5-10%.

The project had ruinous effects and the peasants were impoverished. Barani says that it “broke the back of the peasantry”. It led to failure of the crops and a situation of famine in the region. Yet the peasantry was compelled to pay and this provoked a widespread revolt among the cultivators in Doab, who burned their crops, drove off their cattle and took refuge in the jungles. However, its importance has been exaggerated. A number of rebellions had already broken out in the empire by this time. So it was probably the result of the cumulative impact of Muhammad bin Tughluq’s policies. Moreover, monsoon failure could not have been a result of this policy. In normal circumstances, the burden of the increase would have been absorbed but it seems the famine began in 1334-35 and lasted for 7 years. It is very likely that this left the Sultan with no alternative but to demand that the peasant pay the state-share in grain or its money equivalent in cash. Thus, it was the cause, not the effect of the enhancement as mentioned by Barani, and worsened the already existing situation. And while Alauddin Khalji had justified an increase in land revenue citing the Mongol threat, this was not applicable under Muhammad bin Tughluq.

Moreland argues that the transfer of capital to Deogir led to Delhi being evacuated by practically the entire population. Delhi was a large market for the surplus produce of the country, and since it declined, the demand for agrarian commodities also came down. Also, when that market was summarily abolished, there was no object in raising produce which could not be sold. Thus, cultivation was curtailed and revenue correspondingly reduced. However, it has been shown above that Delhi did not decline in importance.

 

After its failure, a series of agrarian reforms were undertaken. The land revenue policy of Muhammad bin Tughluq was influenced by 3 factors – the need to enhance resources; the need to curtail the power of the local chieftains; and the need to establish a centralized system. Several measures (asalib) were introduced by him during 1340-43 to restore agriculture to normal conditions. One of the earliest measures was an attempt to assimilate the administration of the outlying provinces to that of Delhi, directly under the revenue ministry. Barani tells us of detailed accounts being submitted from the most distant provinces. But this lasted for only a few years. He also re-introduced the system of measurement (bar hukm-i-masahat), earlier introduced by Alauddin Khalji. New taxes were levied, and the old taxes, such as gharai (house tax) and charai (grazing tax), were collected in rigorous manner. Also, when assessing the yield of a field, not the actual produce, but the standard yield was taken into account. Further, when commuting the state’s share into cash, not the actual but the officially assumed prices were used. The accounts of iqtadars were regularly checked and even minor discrepancies were not overlooked. In addition, the fiscal and military functions of the iqtadar were separated.

Things such as seed, cattle, plow etc. were provided to the cultivators. Muhammad bin Tughluq extended irrigation facilities and had wells dug in the vicinity of Delhi. He advanced financial assistance through loans (taqavi and sondhar) to peasants. There was also an attempt to introduce revenue-farming (ijara), in which revenue was auctioned off to the highest bidder. But this was not a widespread practice. Moreover, it was resented by the local chieftains. Also, the Sultan was ill-advised in entrusting this work to contractors, instead of persons in his permanent service. There was also an attempt at state-farming. A department, called diwan-i-kohi, was organized to promote agriculture, under a superintendent (amir-i koh). The country was divided into imaginary circles or squares (dairas) of 30 karohs by 30 karohs. About a 100 shiqdars were to be appointed to ensure that not a handful of land was left uncultivated. Various awards were given to them, including horses and cash. The intention was to bring barren (banjar) land under cultivation, not uncultivable (usar) land, as Barani asserts. Simultaneously, whatever was being cultivated would be improved. But, though the underlying idea was sound, the execution broke down. The officials chosen for the purpose were incompetent. They undertook to complete the task in 3 years, but much of the money was embezzled and much of the wasteland proved unfit for cultivation. But the scheme cannot be called a total failure – the idea of extending and improving cultivation with the help of agricultural loans became a standard practice with later Sultans, and became a part of the agricultural policy of the Mughals.

Thus, after a survey of Muhammad bin Tughluq’s projects, we see that many of his ideas were innovative solutions to several long-standing problems. However, they were often ill-considered. Habib and Nizami point out, “his ingenious mind was as quick in formulating new plans as it was slow in understanding the psychology of the people.” He could never establish a mutual understanding with his subjects, which was so necessary for the successful implementation of his schemes. The nobility too did not provide him support. Had he allowed them a fair share in the administration and sought their advice perhaps his schemes would have been executed in a better way. However, all his projects led to an atmosphere of resentment and frequent revolts. Thus, it has rightly been said that “his reign of 26 years is a fascinating but tragic story of schemes and projects correctly conceived, badly executed and disastrously abandoned” (Habib and Nizami).

 

Bibliography

 

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