1. Did the Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean alter the character of trade and community networks that existed prior to the 16th century?

The origins of the Indian Ocean trade can be traced back to the Hellenistic period and even to that of the Roman Empire. But it acquired a distinct character with the rise of Islam in the Arabian region and that of the Sung dynasty in China. The extent of the trade at the entry of the Portuguese in the region was from South East China in the East to East Africa in the West including the island of Mozambique to the south and the Indonesian archipelago in the South East.

Two distinct patterns of voyages have been discovered: one between the commercial cities of a fairly homogenous area such as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and the second was the long trans-regional trip to India, the Indonesian islands, and China. The first typology incorporated shorter voyages and distances with flows of commodities going in the direction of regional markets. The latter, being a long line of trans-continental traffic was not only separated by vast distances but was also very dissimilar in their social and political values. The early period saw almost equal importance to the twin channels of trans-continental trade of Asia: the sea borne traffic through the Red Sea and the combined sea, river and overland journey across the Persian Gulf, Iraq and the Syrian Desert. This is what was essentially what was altered by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century. The Portuguese writers describe the trans-continental trade as segmented which can be explained by the wind system in the Indian Ocean and the seasonal nature of sailings. The basic difference in trade lies in the motives of the activity. Before the Industrial Revolution the composition of long-distance trade was determined by eating and drinking habits clothing, and housing. But the later period needed a compelled continuity of uninterrupted flow of fuel, raw material and food stuff. Also, the nature of organization of trade played an important role. The mixture of goods traded in the re-modern period was very random as opposed to the later times.

With reference to the reconstruction of the history of the period, we are faced with the primary problem of interpretation of sources. As it has been pointed out by Pearson there is a heavy dependence on Portuguese sources which has two important disadvantages – an overemphasis on Portuguese victories and ignorance of defeats and detailed description of Portuguese ports and towns but much less on Indian areas. Also, there is more information about West India than for the Bay of Bengal.

Central to the control of the Portuguese of the India Ocean trade route were the aims of increasing profit, monopoly of spice trade in the Mediterranean by superseding the Venetian merchants, to deprive the Muslims a share in the trade of the region as they were considered anti-religious and to an extent family or legal business. After the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492, the Portugal crown felt left behind. However, in 1498 Vasco da Gama, with his small fleet, piloted across the open sea from East Africa and dropped anchor before Calicut, the Malabar emporium. The voyage was, and others in the future for a long time were organized by the crown and not by indigenous merchants of Lisbon. This factor also affected the relation shared by the crown with the private Portuguese traders whose trading activities were seen more as a hindrance than as beneficial to the crown.

The Cape of Good Hope route looked as an exciting prospect as it would liberate the trans-oceanic trade form Muslim political control. The interests of both the merchants of India, Aden, Cairo and Alexandria and those of Venice, the maritime leader in the Mediterranean were at stake. This was due to the efforts of the Portuguese to interrupt the Red Sea trade and the Persian Gulf trade route. Besides inaugurating symbolically long term movements in the European economy, the Iberian voyages created a profound impression on the contemporaneous European and Asian world.

According to K. N. Chaudhari, the chronological divisions of the Lusitanian presence in the Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century can be grouped into three frames. The years from 1500 to 1515 were the times of heroic deeds as sea when the Asian rulers, who were participants in the long distance sea borne trade, were taken by surprise by the determination of Lisbon in seizing the most profitable ports in East Africa, the Malabar, Konkan, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca. Political troubles in the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt had led to a drastic reduction in the supply of spices available for sale in Cairo, Alexandria, and Beirut, the three traditional export markets in the Levant. This was aggravated by a state of war with the Turks in 1499 – 1502 which is significant as it brought to notice the real intentions of the Portuguese, which lied in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese resorted also to policy of origin of the scarcity and the dislocation of the regular commercial voyages between Malabar and the Red Sea. The bombarding of Calicut in 1500 demonstrated to all the Muslim owners and to the local rulers that the period of unarmed trading was over in the Indian Ocean. The commission brought to the prince of Calicut, Samudri had contained a clause stating that the king would have to expel all Muslims from his kingdom, as they were enemies of the Holy Faith. Next up in the policy of the Portuguese was the capture of important ports in strategic locations like Goa (captured in 1510), Malacca (1511) and Hormuz (1515). During the first twenty years of the sixteenth century there were two main strands in Portuguese imperial policy in Asia: the claim to an exclusive sovereignty in the Indian Ocean which was expressed through the efforts to eliminate Muslim trade to the Red Sea and East Africa and to compel Indian merchants to buy “cartazes”, or naval passes, from Portuguese officials. The financial needs of individual officials in Goa and their natural inclination to use Asian commercial intermediaries created the basis of a partnership between the Portuguese and indigenous merchants. At another level was the effort to divert pepper and spice trade from Alexandria and Venice to Lisbon and Antwerp. The growth of Portuguese inter-port or emporia trade in Asia was made possible by their control over the formerly free maritime commercial cities. Modern historians agree with the view that the oceanic expansion was motivated by an economic ideology that did not see long distance trade as contemporary merchants would have seen it but rather as a legitimate medium for extracting political tribute through the exercise of military means. It is agreeable that the aggressiveness of the Portuguese was a fixation that did not take in to account that co-existence or peaceful trading might be more profitable than war. But the extent to which Portuguese officials, merchants resident in the Indies, and private individuals became involved in Indian Ocean commerce should not be underplayed.

Before, and even after the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean there had been no organized attempt by any political power to control the sea-lanes and the long-distance trade of Asia. Even the private trading activities were carried out without the attempt to monopolize the routes. Apart from the political elite were the non-governmental people in India like the Moklah Kunjalis who were actually engaged in sea trade. The Iberians and their north European followers imported a Mediterranean style of warfare by land and sea into an area that had hitherto had quite a different tradition. From the memoirs of Hindus and Muslims we get a sense of bewilderment on the arrival of Portuguese in the Indian Ocean as they believed that the great sea was still a no-man’s territory, not in the power of any particular state or prince. It is also important to note that the traders often united to form merchant groups to oppose carious Portuguese demands eg in Malacca, Calicut, etc. on a less combative level, merchant leaders were consulted y the Portuguese over certain issues and various Gujaratis cooperated with the Portuguese in trading activities.

The second phase from 1515 to 1560 signified the high point of the Portuguese in Goa where the Viceroyalty was able to enforce a semi-monopoly in the pepper and spice trade. Raiding expeditions were sent out at frequent intervals to terrorize the prosperous commercial towns of Gujarat and to inflict heavy losses on the profitable trade of the Indian merchants with the Near East. The right of the Portuguese to control the sea lanes of Asia was never formally challenged by any local political power in the India Ocean though it was contested occasionally by Gujarati warships owned by great merchants. In order to control the commercial competition of the Gujarati merchants based on the northern ports of Diu and Cambay, the Portuguese adopted a two-fold strategy: to organize a naval blockade of Bab al-Mandeb every year during the trading season and to try and capture Diu itself which happened only in 1538. The final naval control for the Gulf of Cambay was completed in 1559 when the small town of Daman, on the opposite side of Diu in the Gulf, was acquired. The Estado da India tried to create a territorial presence in the Gulf of Cambay which indicates the desire to control the pattern of Konkan and Malabar trade. This is significant as political over trading ports was a new pre requisite for traders. A number of raids to the north reaffirmed the Portuguese determination to tax the Gujarati trade and shipping through the system of cartazes.

Here it should be remembered that the viceroyalty of Goa was not generally on a perpetual war footing with the Gujarati rulers, (unlike with the Arab and Ottoman rulers in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf). Even from 1509 there is evidence of inter-marriage between Portuguese traders and the local women. Even in the late sixteenth century a large number of commercial families still lived in Cambay, in spite of the conquest of Gujarat by Akbar in 1572.

The third phase, during 1560 and 1600 is essentially the period of gradual decline of Portugal influence due to a number of reasons. The pepper trade began to revive through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, largely as a result of the Portuguese failure to curb the formidable maritime power of the North Sumatran sultanate in Acheh combined with the ineffectiveness of the naval blockade in Bab al – Mandeb. Also, we see the growing interest of the Portuguese in new areas of Bengal and the East. The Goa government became involved in creating a Far Eastern branch of commercial voyages based on the ports of Macao, Nagasaki and the Philippines which was perhaps more profitable than the monopoly over the spice trade. C. R. Boxer points out that the success of the Macau-Nagasaki trading voyages was due to the fact that the rupture of relations between China and Japan had given the Portuguese the opportunity to build up their most profitable part of Asian trade business. Apart from favorable political conditions, Goa’s participation in this trade was made possible due to certain monetary features. China was the meeting ground for silver and cheap gold and the Japanese rulers preferred silk for ceremonial clothing. The Portuguese traders were able to export silver from Japan in return for supplying silk. In this eastward expansion, the Portuguese were perhaps more influenced by direct commercial considerations than in the west, though the element of armed trading even in these areas was formally upheld. This emphasis on the East can also explain the relaxation of Portuguese hold on Indian Ocean trade. Further, the inability of the Portuguese to monopolize the supply of finer spices was matched by a similar development even in the trans-continental movement of black pepper. Another reason why the Portuguese were content to finally leave the Indian Ocean might be the fact that the regional and trans-oceanic flows of trade adjusted and redirected themselves. The supply of commodities and the goods demanded by the Asian aristocracy and the ruling elites was not really interrupted by the Portuguese.

With regard to religious fervor, the Portuguese-Japanese relations did not jell well as the presence and the activities of Christian missionaries on the island were not entertained by the court in spite of the cultural influence of the Portuguese over certain classes of Japanese society. The appearance of the Dutch in Japan in the early seventeenth century made it possible or the Japanese court to sideline the intermediary role of Macau.

The naval success of the Portuguese has been explained by C. R. Boxer as the following “The admitted superiority of the relatively well armed Portuguese ships over the unarmed Muslim merchant-vessels of the Indian Ocean was reinforced by a tenacity of purpose on the part of the European intruders which was largely lacking in their Asian opponents.” As they were cut off from their geography from taking any significant part in the military affairs of continental Europe, the Portuguese fidalgos found natural opportunities for acquiring a military reputation in Asian and African coastal kingdoms. Their naval victories were due to the fact that the land-based Asian empires and strong political kingdoms were not able to put sea effective fighting ships. It is also significant to remember that no land power in history has wholly succeeded in containing sea-raiders. So, whether or not Asia political rulers had the necessary will to resist the Portuguese, it was impossible to practice to offer compete protection to merchant shipping crossing long sea –routes and thus the character of trade. To conclude, the success of the Portuguese against places such as these must be viewed in the light of her failure or incapacity to establish a real territorial empire in Asia.

The administrative structure set up in Goa and in other important regions in exercising a quasi political control over the Indian Ocean traders to the west of the Malacca Strait was innovative and commendable. Politics was a characteristic that was newly introduced in the region, the credit for which goes entirely to the Portuguese. Portuguese policy was entirely new and consisted of two aspects, one of which, the safe conduct pass (cartaz) has already been discussed. Further, they insisted that Hindus and Muslims had no claim to right of passage in Asian waters because before the arrival of the Portuguese no one had claimed the sea as hereditary or conquered property. The military scaffolding designed to enforce these claims was erected early in the sixteenth century. The conquests of the Portuguese provided them with means to control the trade system. However, its policy changed during the sixteenth century, though these changes were more positional than structural. Very early in the century inter-Asian trade via the Cape of Good Hope to Europe as the profit made on the latter route was only twenty per cent of the total. The difference between the two strands was that the Crown routes were meant to be sailed on a monopoly basis but the private trade was completely subsumed in, and part of, the traditional trade of the Indian Ocean. Around the mid-century the official Portuguese trade became more indigenous in practice. But there were problems in making effective this system. The Portuguese failed crucially to control the mouth of the Red Sea, its military efforts constituted a drain on the Crown’s resources etc. the basic fault of the Portuguese system, according to Pearson was that it was ethnocentrically overambitious. They achieved moderate control over the rather unimportant trade of east Africa; the Red Sea was nearly always open; while the coast between Aden and Hormuz was little affected. With reference to India, their control over the Bay of Bengal coastal trade was minimal.

The private Portuguese traders and medicos who were called casados conformed to the narrow description of an essentially sterile and close ambit of a Diaspora with respect to the attitude of local population especially that of the higher class towards these was regulated by a number of maritime taboos that had taken form in the seventh – eighth centuries. Caste prohibitions against trans-oceanic travel and trade, the problem of accepting food from impure hands and the pollution resulting from contact with mlecchas often created diplomatic difficulties for the Portuguese. In the Asian context the Portuguese private traders were not really remarkable and fitted into the complex framework of coastal Asian trade. Many married Asian women or maintained female slaves who served as concubines. J. B. Harrison quoted the observation of a Dutch governor “Most of the Portuguese in India looked upon this region as their fatherland, and think no more about Portugal . . .” Pearson thus speculates that there was much more cooperation and intermingling than Portuguese dominance. The matter of communal composition is an area where we can see some changes occurring during the sixteenth century and these changes were caused largely by the Portuguese. They were concerned not only to take over trade in certain products but also to oppose Muslims. Their attacks in Malabar and on the Aden o Gujarat route led to Muslims migrating to regions where the Portuguese were not very strong. Important routes were those from Aden to Malacca, via either Gujarat or Malabar, from East Africa to India (dominated by Gujaratis), from the Hadramaut, and the Persian Gulf via Hormuz to the Indian sub-continent. There were minor changes in some of these routes during the 16th century and some of these changes were either directly or indirectly the result of the Portuguese and their policies.

There is no evidence of any religious animosity towards Muslims either in India or China before the arrival of the Portuguese. With the coming of the Portuguese religion and political expansion had become much intermingled. With respect to the Muslims in India we have evidence for the view that The Tamil Hindu rulers supported their Muslim clients against the Portuguese onslaught. Muslims did control the bulk of the trade and manned most of the ships, but this does not mean that they owned all the cargo on board these ships. The Chettyars of Coromandal were the main seafaring Hindu Indian group in 1500. The Navayats of Rander, in Gujarat were praised by the early Portuguese for their navigational skills.

In spite of the considerable changes there were continuities in the pattern of trade in the sixteenth century and that in the seventh-eight centuries. M N Pearson argues that the role of the Portuguese in altering the Indian maritime history is exaggerated and thus untrue. There was a large gap between Portuguese policy and practice. An impression of continuity in the structure of trade is found by him from the 12th – 13th to the 16th century and he argues that most Portuguese of the time fitted into it, at times modifying, but never radically changing its basic nature. Certain port cities and commodities of trade continued to remain important from the early to the later emporia of trade. Important cities included Aden, Hormuz and Malacca. Also, the residence of foreign merchants was an essential part of emporia trading, both old and new. It would seem that under pre-modern conditions, of long-distance trade characterized by uncertainty and lack of reliable information, merchants tended to gravitate towards a central-place which had the physical resources for reducing these limitations. A continuation of the idea of a central-place in scattered islands and regions where sources of export goods were small, like the Indonesian archipelago is seen in the Portuguese times as well.

REFERENCES:

  1. Ashin Das Gupta ad M. N. Pearson; India and the Indian Ocean
  2. Andre Wink; Al Hind, Volume II.
  3. N. Chaudhari;