1. The projects of Mohammad bin Tughlaq were correctly conceived, badly executed, and disastrously abandoned. Comment.

Mohammad bin Tughlaq (1324–1351) is one of the most enigmatic and fascinating personalities of the Delhi Sultanate. He was at the helm of affairs at a time when the Sultanate had reached its peak, politically and territorially. The decline of the Empire was also definitely underway, for it had overstretched its own limits; a stage, which the Sultanate burdened with its inherent contradictions could not sustain. At such a point of time, a strong personality like Mohammad bin Tughlaq at the throne was bound to lead to tensions. He followed an aggressive policy and undertook a number of novel measures. The extent to which Mohammad bin Tughlaq can be held responsible for the decline and weakening of the Sultanate is debatable. Similarly, it is difficult to appraise the projects he undertook. It has been famously said that his projects were ‘correctly conceived, badly executed, and disastrously abandoned.’(Habib and Nizami)

Our understanding and study of Mohammad bin Tughlaq and his policies have been influenced by his portrayal in the contemporary sources. He is one ruler against whom such accounts have been particularly biased and prejudiced, whether consciously or unconsciously. Coupled with changing historical perspectives, we find that Mohammad bin Tughlaq has come across as a very complex personality. Early writers like Srivastava, Majumdar and Smith saw him as a ‘mixture of opposites’. Others like Eliphinstone and Lanepoole have gone further and called him a ‘madman’. Clearly they used such a term for a person whose impulsive policies they could not understand. Later writers like Ishwari Prasad and Mahdi Hussain saw him as a learned genius. Another perception of Mohammad bin Tughlaq is that he is seen as being ahead of his times. The main sources for our study of Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s period are the chronicles of Barani (Tarikh-i-ferozshahi and Fatawa-i-jahandari), Isami (Futuhus Salatin), Ibn Batutta (Rehla), Afif (Tarikh-i-mubarakshahi) and Sufi literature. There is also believed to be an autobiography of Mohammad bin Tughlaq, but its authenticity is debated.

Barani seems to be confused in his portrayal of Mohammad bin Tughlaq. At times he praises him profoundly and at other criticizes him a great deal. Barani had been the nadim under Mohammad bin Tughlaq and had also been his confidant. After his death, Barani lost his privileges and became falsely implicated as a suspect in a conspiracy against Mohammad bin’s successor Ferozshah Tughlaq. He was imprisoned and it was at that point of time that he wrote the Tarikh-i-ferozshahi in an attempt to win back royal favour from Ferozshah Tughlaq. Barani therefore provides a uniquely inconsistent, but personal account of Mohammad bin Tughlaq. At one level he blamed Mohammad bin’s policies of encouraging people of ordinary birth for his own fall. Being a believer in moderation, Barani criticized most of his extreme policies. Hence, when we use Barani as a source we need to treat it with caution.

Another writer was Isami. Apparently, during the transfer of the capital from Delhi to Daulatabad, his grandfather died. Isami therefore held a personal grudge against the ruler and was most critical of his policies. Also, he lost his patronage in Daulatabad and had to live in poverty until the founder of the Bahamani kingdom, Alauddin Bahman Shah appointed him the court poet. The Bahamani kingdom had been formed by rebelling against Mohammad bin Tughlaq. Therefore, being in the position he was, Isami was bound to portray Mohammad bin Tughlaq in a negative light in order to justify his patron’s actions.

Ibn Batutta was a Moroccan traveler who had come to India during Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s tumultuous times. He gave a biased account of the times, it seems, primarily because by the time he was in Delhi there was an already air of resentment and discontent due to the cumulative and consecutive failures of Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s projects. It also seems he was mistakenly arrested by the authorities for being a part of some conspiracy. All this led him to portray Mohammad bin Tughlaq in an unfavourable manner. The biggest problem with this source is that it is a secondary source, which was based on accounts of other people. It should however be noted that the negative representation of Mohammad bin Tughlaq was not only a result of personal biases of the contemporary writers but also due to their inability to understand them.

According to Barani, the emperor undertook five projects. These were the making of Deogir or Daulatabad the capital, introduction of the token currency, the Khurasan expedition, the Qarachil expedition and the increased taxation in the Doab. We should however keep in mind that since Barani wrote his account largely from memory, the chronology of the various events was not clear in his mind. Hence, it is often wrong as Barani tends to arrange the events according to the kind of impact that they had.

The first of his projects was the establishment of an administrative centre at Deogir or Daulatabad. This is one of the most grossly misunderstood measures of the Sultan. Much of the misunderstanding has been due to the subjective statements made by contemporary chroniclers. The precise date and relative chronology of this project is debatable. It seems, from Isami’s account that he ordered the shift to Deogir prior to the introduction of the token currency. Isami’s account implies that the token currency was introduced as a measure of punishment for the noncompliant attitude of the people, who had been sent to Daulatabad. Numismatic evidence shows that the token currency was introduced in 1329-30. The change of capital may, therefore, be placed in 1328-29.

Different motives have been ascribed by various historians to Muhammad bin Tughluq for his Deccan experiment. Barani says that the Sultan made Deogir his darul mulk (or capital) because he thought that it was more centrally situated. Firstly, this statement is geographically inconsistent. Secondly, if Deogir could not be controlled from Delhi, Delhi could also not have been controlled from Deogir. Therefore, this explanation makes little sense. However, Barani’s observation is helpful in understanding the basic motive of the Sultan, which would have been effective administrative control of the South.

Ibn Battuta, came to India approximately five years after the shift of the capital. He ascribed the exodus to the fact that the residents of Delhi used to throw letters of abuses and scandals at the palace halls. However, he also mentions that later the Sultan bought houses and dwellings for all the inhabitants of Delhi. If this was indeed induced by such threats, it seems unlikely that Mohammad bin Tughlaq would have taken care to make such a fair bargain. The incident of throwing letters, if at all true, must have been the effect and not the cause of the exodus of the people to Deogir.

Isami says that since the Sultan was suspicious (badguman) of the people (khalq) of Delhi, he thought of driving them towards the Deccan in order to break their power base. Clearly, however Isami’s views were coloured by his prejudices and cannot be taken as serious historical statements.

Mohammad Habib said that, Muhammad bin Tughluq knew the Deccan better than any of his contemporaries. Habib believed that Muhammad bin Tughluq thought that the position of Daulatabad would never be secure so long as the kingdom of Warangal was allowed to exist. He annexed Warangal. Still the situation was not comfortable. Hence, he decided to shift his capital to Daulatabad itself to enable more direct control over these areas.

In his analysis, Gardener Brown pointed out that by the time of Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s accession to the throne the centre of gravity of the Empire had shifted from the north towards the south. The importance of Delhi had declined and Brown believed that Mohammad bin Tughlaq was simply acting as an agent of certain economic forces, which demanded the transfer of the capital to a region economically more prosperous in order to sustain the structure of the sub continental Empire. It wasn’t an impulsive decision, but the culmination of the ongoing expansion of the Sultanate into the Deccan.

Mahdi Hussain gave other factors as well. He believed that economic and administrative factors such as central location and communication difficulties prompted the shift. He also pointed to the diminishing fears of the Mongol campaigns now. This essentially implied that the Sultanate could turn its face towards the Deccan without having to constantly worry about its northwest frontier. For Habib and Nizami, the Deccan experiment was basically dictated by political exigencies.

The execution and implementation of the project has also been a subject of debate. When the Sultan embarked upon his Deccan project, he had already given considerable thought and attention to all aspects of the problem. It was neither an impulsive administrative experiment nor an eccentric craze for novelty, but a well-thought-out solution of a problem, which had troubled all the Sultans of Delhi with regard to administrative control and the military operations in the South. The Deccan scheme was implemented in stages and with due consideration for the convenience of the people. It appears that the idea was conceived at least two years before it was actually executed. Provisions for halting stations on the way, facilities of travel and conveyance, and free board and lodging were provided for the migrants.

The nature of the movement and its implications need to be studied by taking into account the various conflicting views of the contemporary chroniclers. Barani wrote in a manner which implied a mass exodus. According to him all of Delhi was depopulated and not even the animals were left behind. Clearly, this was an exaggeration, stemming from obvious biases of the author.

He had made careful and extensive arrangements to facilitate the transfer. In any case, not everybody living in Delhi was ordered to shift. Only some members of the nobility, the Ulema and some Sufis were asked to move. The transfer affected basically those whose centre of socio-economic activity revolved around these groups, and not the common man. Also, two inscriptions dating to 1327 and 1328 substantiate the fact that Delhi was not deserted and the city continued to be occupied peacefully by the Hindus all this time. Another account is that of an Arab traveler, Mohammad Bulaq, who wrote the Matlub-ul-talibi. He clearly mentions that only the buzurgan-i-dilli or the elite, and not everyone were asked to move from Delhi. Ibn Batutta talks of the depopulation of Delhi on the basis of rumours, but when he actually describes Delhi on his arrival, barely 4 or 5 years after the exodus, he talks of its splendor, prosperity and population as if no disaster had overtaken it. When we look at the accounts of Barani and Isami we also need to keep in mind their own social background. Since they too belonged to the elite class, this movement would have affected them closely and hence for them metaphorically speaking, the city would have been deserted. Isami’s own personal tragedy also prompted him to perceive the transfer in an emotional manner where he magnified and exaggerated not only the difficulties endured in transit but also the consequent ‘depopulation’ of Delhi.

An appraisal of this project of Mohammad bin Tughlaq would be incomplete without a mention of the reaction of various groups to the transfer. Particularly affected and rankled by this decision were the Sufis. This project elicited a strong response from the Sufis who saw this as an unwarranted interference in their khanqah life. Delhi had become a strong centre for mystics, with thousands of khanqahs and hospices, where huge crowds of people used to gather. The Sufis perceived themselves as part of a parallel organization of religious life, which was separate from and autonomous of the political sphere. They saw Mohammad bin Tughlaq as a despot. Perhaps no much measure brought so much unpopularity to the Sultan as the forced migration of the mystics to Daulatabad. It seems that Mohammad bin Tughlaq wanted to take with him the Sufi saints as he thought that they would help in the establishment of a cultural base in the Deccan. Adding to the woes of the migrants was the scorching heat of the summer sun, a factor which made the hardships seem tenfold.

Another issue in this project was whether Delhi ceased to be a political and administrative centre. Contrary to popular perception the capital of the Empire was not transferred altogether. More likely than not an additional power centre had been created at Daulatabad and both the cities functioned probably as twin capitals. In fact the Emperor himself apparently spent more time at Delhi than at his new ‘capital’. Numismatic evidence is indicative of twin capitals. On coins we find the inscription that coins were minted at takhtgah-i-dilli and takhtgah-i-daulatabad. (takhtgah referring to the seat of the crown). We also have the evidence of a 14th century Arab writer, Qalqashandi, who mentioned two capitals of the Sultanate in his account – Delhi and Devagiri or Qubbatul Islam.

Soon the project had to be abandoned and Daulatabad could not really emerge as a prominent administrative centre. However, in the long run, the Deccan experiment of Muhammad bin Tughluq also led to the breakdown of the barriers which had separated the North from the South.

Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s second major experiment was the introduction of the token currency. It seems that this measure was introduced some time around 1329-30 and was withdrawn after about three years. A token currency is essentially one in which the face value of the coin is greater than its intrinsic value. In medieval times, the prevalent currency was the silver tankha and the copper jittal. Token value was extended to the silver tankha, and instead of pure silver, the coin came to be made out of an alloy of various metals, though its face value remained the same as that of a pure silver coin. If we see the coins we’ll find on it the Quranic verse, ‘Obey God, obey the Prophet, and obey those in authority among you.’ It almost sounded like a religious appeal of the Sultan to his subjects to accept the new coins. Another inscription in Persian ran, ‘Muhr shud tanka, ra’ij dar ruzgar-i banda-i ummidwar Muhammad Tughluq’, which means ‘Minted tanka, current during the days of Muhammad (bin) Tughluq, who hopes for Divine favour’.

Once again it is clear that this wasn’t an impulsive scheme of the ruler. He had before him the precedents of the failure of the token currency in Iran under Ghaikhatu Khan (1293), and its success in China under Qublai Khan (1260-94). Mahdi Hussain in fact believes that the Chinese success may have encouraged the Sultan to take this step.

The reasons for the introduction of such currency are debatable and the contemporary writers give various explanations. Barani believed that the need to replenish the royal coffers prompted this step. A series of failed projects and ambitious military campaigns had apparently emptied the treasury. Hence, this measure was introduced in order to prop up the royal economy. We however cannot accept this picture of bankruptcy as has been painted by Barani because we see that when the token currency failed, the state had sufficient resources to be able to pay back the people in real silver. It is therefore unlikely that any such financial crisis necessitated the introduction of token currency. Isami gave a ridiculously biased opinion and said that the object of Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s plans was simply to harass the common people. He also accused Mohammad bin of dishonestly in his dealings during this project. Obviously this view is unacceptable.

The most likely reason for the introduction of the new coins is that there was a shortage of silver in the Empire. The expansion of the empire, high military expenditure and the opening of mints all over the Empire led to the heavy debasement of coins. It seems that this shortage of silver was a worldwide phenomenon. That is why we find a gradual decrease in the weight of the silver tanka and a corresponding increase in the weight of the gold coin during this period. More likely than not, the contemporary writers would have been unable to comprehend this phenomenon. The concept of a token currency was new to them and the fact that the nominal value of the coin was more than its real value was akin to deception for them. Hence, they criticized this policy and blamed its failure on Mohammad bin Tughlaq.

There are certain basic conditions for the success of the token currency. First of all, it must be accepted by the government in taxes and other payments by the people, otherwise, the token currency will have no value. Secondly, the process of manufacture of the token currency should be unique and should be kept a secret. Unless this is done, forging of the currency will be very easy. Thirdly, an effective system of policing and controls backing the introduction of such a scheme is essential in order to prevent unauthorized manufacture of coins. Only if these conditions are met can token currency be successful.

It appears however, that there were many loopholes in the fashion in which this scheme was introduced by Mohammad bin Tughlaq and forging of coins had become rampant. Barani went on to say that the house of every ‘Hindu’ (referring to the goldsmiths) had become a mint. This was obviously an exaggeration but clearly forged currency had entered circulation and token currency had failed.

There are many reasons for its failure. Edward Thomas suggested that this was because the royal mint worked with precisely the same tools as the ordinary workmen, and the metal used was universally available. There was nothing exclusive about the royal coins which would mark it as different from the handiwork of the moderately-skilled artisan. There was no check upon the authenticity of the copper token, and no limit on the power of production by the masses at large. Also, no effort seems to have been made to guard the process of manufacture. Mohammad Habib gave a different explanation. He believed that the public failed Mohammad bin Tughlaq. Many forged coins got mixed with the genuine treasury coins; and as the forged coins became current and the government was unable to prevent this, more and more coin were forged. People started hoarding silver and made all purchases in token currency. Foreign merchants also stopped bringing their wares to India, and imports received a serious setback. It needs to be kept in mind that during the time of Mohammad bin Tughlaq, token currency owed its value entirely to the personality of the Sultan. In the absence of any institutional backing, this project was bound to fail. According to Isami, the token currency was withdrawn three years after its introduction by around 1332 and all copper coins were exchanged for silver and gold coins by the state. Numismatic evidence corroborates this.

In today’s times we carry on our transactions in token currency and it is accepted worldwide as the prevalent mode of exchange. In those times, however token currency was an alien concept. Hence, the contemporary historians could not understand it and blamed Mohammad bin Tughlaq for its failure. In this case, Mohammad bin probably was ahead of his times, and undertook a measure, which his own times and people could not understand or sustain.

The next project of Mohammad bin Tughlaq was the Khurasan expedition (1330-1331). This was his ambitious plan to conquer the Khurasan region, and should be understood in the context of developments in Central Asia and Tarmasharin’s arrival in India. Barani wrote that after having extended his authority into the Deccan Mohammad bin Tughlaq wanted to move towards the northwest. He raised an army of 37,000 horsemen/soldiers for the conquest of Khurasan and Iraq. Barani saw this project as one of Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s misdeeds, and wrote that he lavishly squandered his resources. He could not conquer those lands, and he weakened his control over his own territory as well. This army was maintained for a period of one year. The salaries were paid both in cash and in the form of iqtas and it was thought that the ‘booty’ obtained would meet its expenditure in the following years. But the campaign could not be launched and there were no resources for maintaining it for a second year. The disbandment of the army had a major impact and a large number of soldiers were rendered unemployed, adding to the mounting dissent against the emperor.

There are various views on the reasons behind this project. Barani wrote that after having extended his authority into the Deccan, Mohammad bin Tughlaq wanted to move towards the northwest. Amir Khurd wrote that he was anxious to conquer Turkistan and Khurasan, and to overthrow the descendants of Chengiz Khan. Ferishta says that large number of princes and maliks, who had arrived in his court from Iraq and Khurasan, convinced him that the conquest of Iran and Turan would bean easy walk-over. However, the real question was the reason for its sudden abandonment after such elaborate preparations had been made. For this we need to take into account the political conditions of Central Asia. In the 13th century, the Mongol invaders had replaced the local authorities in this region and had set up their own states. Once they had consolidated their position they assimilated the local culture and established themselves. In Central Asia two states came into being. These were the Chagatai state, which was headed by Tarmasharin and the Ilkhani state, which was headed by Abu Said. These states were constantly in a state of conflict. Abu Said, due to his internal problems was in a weak position. In order to take advantage of his political weakness, Tarmasharin had sought the support of Mohammad bin Tughlaq and the ruler of Egypt. These developments had prompted Mohammad bin Tughlaq to pursue an aggressive policy in that region. However, certain developments led to a sudden change in the political power balance and Abu Said stabilized his own position, got the support of the Egyptian ruler, and defeated Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s ally Tarmasharin. This unexpected development caused him to abandon his ambitious plans even before they could be implemented.

The fourth project undertaken by Mohammad bin Tughlaq was also a military project. This was the Qarachil expedition, which can be dated to sometime around 1337-39. It was aimed at establishing military control over Qarachil. This region has now been identified with the mid-Himalayan tract of Kulu in the Kangra district in the Kumaon-Garhwal area. It seems that securing this region was part of a broader policy of the Sultan to complete the chain of fortifications in the North. Barani suggested that the Qarachil expedition was actually a part of the Khurasan project. This is however unlikely as geographically the Qarachil region was in another direction. Ferishta suggested that China was the ultimate objective of Muhammad bin Tughluq’s Qarachil expedition, but there is no corroborative evidence.

Ibn Battuta gave another reason. This was that Chinese encroachments on the independent Rajput kingdoms in the Himalayas had caused some concern to Muhammad bin Tughluq. They had built an idol temple at a strategic place and were planning extension of their authority in that area. Due to the Mongol threat, the northwest frontier had been consolidated. Similarly, Bengal in the east was also secure. It was only this frontier, which was not secure. In fact, the motive of the Sultan, it seems was simply to secure frontier areas and to consolidate his position in a region of strategic importance, by compelling the chiefs of the hilly area to recognize his over lordship. Hence, we can see the Qarachil expedition as a natural step towards extending authority and strengthening the frontiers of the empire.

For this purpose, he sent an army comprising of 10,000 soldiers under the command of his nephew Khusrau Malik. He gave elaborate instructions as to how far the operations were to be extended and where the army had to stop. According to his instructions, military posts had to be established all along the route to ensure regular supply of provisions and to serve as places of refuge in case of retreat or mishap. The Sultan warned the commander not to proceed beyond Jidya, but elated with his success, Khusrau Malik ignored the Sultan’s instructions, occupied Jidya, and marched ahead towards Tibet. Soon after, severe climatic conditions, difficult terrain, disease, and hostility of the local inhabitants of the region caused their defeat. The army was routed and they were forced to retreat. According to Barani, only ten persons survived and according to Ibn Battuta, only three soldiers returned to tell the tale of their misfortune. Isami wrote that there were 6000 survivors but they were all executed. It would be incorrect for Mohammad bin Tughlaq to be blamed for the catastrophe that came in the wake of Khusrau Malik’s misguided enthusiasm. However, he did eventually have to face the consequences. It led to tremendous waste of resources and immeasurable discontent among the people. Before the Qarachil experiment is dismissed completely as a failure, we should take into account what Ibn Batutta says. Apparently, after this expedition, Mohammad bin Tughlaq made peace with the hill inhabitants and got them to pay him a regular tribute. This is an aspect which has been ignored by both Isami and Barani. Ibn Battuta is corroborated by the author of Masalikul Absar.

The fifth experiment, which Mohammad bin Tughlaq is associated with is known as the Doab Experiment. This was launched some time around 1334-1337. The Doab experiment essentially refers to a sharp increase in taxation, which was implemented in the Ganga-Jamuna Doab region. It is one of his most misunderstood projects. Barani says that this ‘broke the back of the peasantry’.

In Barani’s account the Doab experiment was placed first, which is not accurate chronologically. Clearly, for him the impact of this project was so substantial that it preceded the others. There was a failure of crops and there was also a severe famine. All the rebellions, which occurred at this time in Sagar, Multan etc. were seen by Barani as reactions to this increased taxation. However, we do need to keep in mind that what Barani perceived as a severe reaction to the Doab experiment would have been the cumulative resentment of the people towards Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s other failed projects. Apart from these factors once again Barani’s bias colours this account in an unfavourable manner.

The Doab experiment should be seen in the context of Mohammad bin Tughlaq’s land revenue policy and not as an isolated, whimsical act of an impulsive ruler. It seems that this policy was motivated by three factors. These were firstly, the need to enhance his resources, secondly, to curtail the power of the local chieftains and thirdly, to establish greater central control in administration.

The entire Sultanate, including far off areas like Gujarat, Malwa, the Deccan and Bengal were brought under a rigorous system of taxation. Barani also tells us that under Mohammad bin Tughlaq, the system of measurement for land revenue collection or the bar-hukm-i-masahat was revived. This system had been introduced by Alauddin Khilji, but had been given up by Mohammad bin’s predecessor, Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq. A standard yield of the crop was fixed instead of the actual yield and on the basis of this the state would collect its share. Also, a standard price rate was fixed in order to convert the revenue which was collected in kind. This kind of a system in fact formed the basis for the revenue structure, which developed later under the Mughal rulers.

He said that this step was taken in the Doab region because it was a very fertile area, which could bear the burden of increased taxation with relative ease. However, Barani becomes vague when talking about details. He wrote that the revenue was increased ‘from one to ten and one to twenty’ (“yak ba deh wah yak be kisi”). This is a very ambiguous statement because if we infer that the revenue was increased by ten to twenty times, then it would be an unimaginable increase. However, if we take this statement to mean that the rate of revenue was made 1/10th or 1/20th, it would still make no sense for it would be too low a proportion, especially to have caused such widespread reaction. Moreland suggested that this statement should not be understood arithmetically but should be seen as a rhetorical and metaphorical statement.

The question then is that if the enhancement in revenue was not so high, why did it elicit such a strong response, especially since the peasants had borne the burden of 50% taxation under Alauddin Khilji just a few years ago. In fact the Doab being an extremely fertile region should ideally have been able to absorb this increase without too much difficulty. Barani, it appears confused the effect with the cause. He said that the increase in the land tax of the Doab led to failure of monsoon for several years. In fact it seems that it was the coincidental occurrence of the famine and the failure of crops at the time of this price increase, which made the situation much worse than it was.

It has also been suggested that the change in the political situation in the northwest and the abating of the Mongol threat made the peasant less compliant to the orders of the Sultan. When such a threat was real, the peasants were willing to make sacrifices for defence purposes. Writers like Moreland have given another explanation. He says that shift of the capital from Delhi to Deogir reduced the importance of Delhi, which affected the productivity around Delhi and its hinterland. However, this argument is flawed since it has been proved clearly that in spite of the creation of an alternate power centre, Delhi continued to flourish.

After the failure of his project, Mohammad bin Tughlaq undertook a series of reformative measures in terms of agrarian policy. Barani tells us that during 1340-43, the Sultan’s main attempt was to restore agriculture to normal conditions. The Sultan made regulations (asalib) for the improvement of agriculture. Ibn Batutta says that there was some sort of an experiment in state-farming as well. Barani informs u that a department called the diwan-i amir-i koh, was organized to promote agriculture, and officers to it were appointed. He also gave our agricultural loans (sondhar). The country was divided into imaginary rectangles (daira) About a 100 shiqdars were to be appointed (to these imaginary rectangles). To the groups which undertook to cultivate barren land, various awards were given, including horses and cash.

In conclusion we can say that Mohammad bin Tughlaq was an extremely innovative and sharp ruler, who wanted to introduce certain basic reforms in his state. These were in fact well thought out ideas, with noble and often novel intentions behind them. Habib and Nizami write that his ingenious mind was as quick in formulating new plans as it was slow in understanding the psychology of the people. He could never establish that rapport and mutual understanding with his subjects, which was so necessary for the successful implementation of his schemes. He doubted the intentions of the people, and the people in turn suspected his motives. Combined with a curious conjuncture of events and bad timing, his projects failed. His death only started the inevitable process of the decline of the Sultanate, which would meet its ultimate demise at the hands of Babar.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  • Mohammad Habib and KA Nizami (ed.) – A Comprehensive History of India (Volume V, Part 1)
  • Mahdi Hussain – Tughlaq Dynasty
  • Peter Jackson – The Delhi Sultanate: A Political And Military History
  • WH Moreland – The Agrarian System of Moslem India
  • Satish Chandra – Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals, Part One: Delhi Sultanat (1206-1526 A.D.)
  • RP Tripathi – Some Aspects of Muslim Administration
  • Class Notes