- Examine the stages of Japanese imperialism with special reference to its policies in Korea and Manchuria between 1894 and 1945.
Nationalism was the defining feature of the Meiji period in Japan. In the second half of the 19th century, Japan had embarked on a process of modernization. A modern military establishment and a solid industrial base were considered necessary to give Japan the power to survive. The pattern of the relations of Japan, which had been relatively isolated from the rest of the worlds in the Tokugawa period, was conditioned first and foremost by the context of western imperialism which generated a sense of crisis.
In fact EH Norman sees modern Japanese nationalism as ‘reactive nationalism’, a consciousness of nation and of the urgent necessity to build a modern state generated at all levels of Japanese society by fear of western physical domination or cultural colonization. Thus, imperialism was the product of a new international environment. Japanese expansion was concentrated in the Asian continent and directed especially against China and Korea. China was the obvious enemy and Korea was seen as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan which no third power should be allowed to possess.
In 1871, Japan signed the Treaty of Amity with China, according to which both countries agreed to unite their efforts against the west. This was extremely significant because Japan, which had hitherto been treated as a tributary state by China, now received equality of status. Conflict soon arose over the issue of control over Ryukyu Islands, located to the south of Kyushu. The Ryukyu Islands had been conquered by the Satsuma clan in the 17th century. In 1872, upon the abolition of the Han system, the islands were incorporated into the prefecture of Okinawa. China protested and demanded the intervention of the USA, but the latter refused. As a compromise, Japan offered the southernmost group of these islands in return for the extension of the Most Favoured Nation Status to Japan. In 1881 china proposed that both china and Japan relinquish their claims to the Ryukyu Islands. No agreement could be reached however, and Sino-Japanese relations were never cordial after this.
The Korean question brought China and Japan into direct conflict. Japan had great commercial, political and strategic interests in Korea. Japan argued that being the first Asian country to modernize, it had a moral responsibility to guide less developed neighbours. According to Marius Jansen the Japanese rationale for giving help to neighbours was both internal and external. It was external in that Western imperialism threatened to deprive Asia of all self-determination, and Japan of any economic or political lebensraum. They were also internal; a conviction that Japan’s tested synthesis of the East and the West was the surest path of modernization blended imperceptibly with historic beliefs of divinity and destiny.
Korea paid tribute to both China and Japan but was closer to China and hostile to Meiji Japan. In 1872, Japan attempted to enhance trade relations with Korea but was rebuffed. Samurai groups led by Saigo Takamori demanded an immediate expedition to Korea to uphold the honour of Japan. But the government chose internal reconstruction over external aggression at this point of time. This formed the background to the resignation of Saigo Takamori, the 1879 Satsuma rebellion and the expedition to Formosa in 1874-75, which served to appease the discontented Samurai.
In 1876, acting on China’s advice, Korea agreed to diplomatic negotiation with Japan. The Treaty of Kanghwa (1876) was, Fairbank argues, an unequal treaty modeled on the pattern of the Western treaties with China and Japan. It opened three ports for Japanese trade – Pusan, Inson, and Wonsan – and declared Korea to be an ‘independent state’. Another treaty was signed in August 1882, which authorized the stationing of Japanese troops in Korea.
The Seoul uprising took place in 1884, when the Independence Party attempted a coup, supported by the Japanese delegation. Yuan Shih-Kai was the Chinese resident in Korea and both China and Japan wanted to avoid war. The Tientsin Convention also known as the Li-Ito Convention was held in 1885. Both countries agreed to withdraw troops from Korea and to stop training the Korean army. They also agreed not to send troops back to Korea without informing each other, in the form of a written notification. James McClain suggests that the Convention did not bring lasting stability because from Japan’s perspective, Korea’s domestic policies remained impossibly chaotic.
The last decade of the 19th century marks a very important period in the history of Japanese imperialism. O.Tanin and E.Yohan argued that Japan first expanded her territories after 1894 because of the Samurai desire to establish control on the Chinese mainland and fight ‘white imperialism’. John K. Maki suggested on the other hand, that war was the natural expression of an aggressive people organized in a military state. By the 1880s foreign intervention in Japan had virtually disappeared and the new structure was secure against internal opposition. In 1894, Japan had gained freedom from extra-territoriality. Imperialist wars, Maki argues were the logical expression in foreign affairs of the ideology of the authoritarian state. Hyman Kublin sees the increased aggression in terms of Japanese concern for defence. In his opinion, before 1895 Japan’s best means of defence seemed to lie in limited expansion coupled with a strong military establishment. After 1895 it appeared to depend upon entry into the ranks of world powers.
In 1894, King Kojong asked China for military assistance to quell the domestic unrest. As some 3000 Chinese troops were disembarking near Seoul in June, Japan’s policy makers convened to decide on a response. In their view China had clearly violated the Tientsin Convention by dispatching forces without informing Tokyo, and the prospect of a weak Korea once again allied closely with a disintegrating China, resurrected the specter of Russian or British intervention in affairs on the peninsula. Japan officially declared war on China on 1st August 1894. Japanese forces overwhelmed the Chinese defenders at Pyongyang on 16th September, won a decisive naval battle the following day against Chinese warships near the mouth of the Yalu river, seized Port Arthur on 21st November and on 12th February 1895 destroyed the Chinese fleet at Weihaiwei.
The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on 17th April 1895 marked the end of the First Sino-Japanese war. Japan demanded the affirmation of “the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea”; cession of the Manchurian province of Liaoning as well as Taiwan and the nearby Pescadore Islands; payment of war indemnity amounting to nearly 500 million yen; the opening of four new treaty ports; the granting of commercial privileges that included the right to navigate the upper reaches of the Yangtze river and to import machinery and operate manufacturing establishments in Chinese treaty ports. Ito Hirobumi eventually agreed to reduce the indemnity by one-third and to confine Japanese territorial claims in Manchuria to the Liaotung peninsula. The port of Weihaiwei was occupied till the indemnity was paid in full.
The events of 1894-95 made Japan the world’s first non-Western imperial power. It introduced Japan to the modern world affairs. Japan acquired the beginnings of a colonial empire after vanquishing China in this war. At this time it was still an upcoming power. With the victory over China, Japan’s military wing also got a boost.
On 5th May 1895, Japan, under pressure from the Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany, had to restore the Liaotung peninsula to Chinese control. Outraged by this retreat, on 8th October, the Japanese contingent in Seoul broke into the palace and stabbed Queen Min to death and then set fire to her corpse. The king of Korea sought protection from Russia and got closer to her. Japan came away from this gruesome affair with the realization that victory over China had not guaranteed respect for Japan’s ‘line of advantage over the continent’.
WG Beasley has stated that with the Sino-Japanese war, Japan became an active participant in the affairs of north-east Asia. She was no longer but – in China at least – a member of the club. As a result her concern was less with the defence than with the need to protect her interests overseas. This entailed a complete rethinking of her relations with the Powers, especially Russia and Great Britain, a process which was to lead to an Anglo-Japanese alliance and a Russo-Japanese war.
The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 was the first time a ‘white’ western power had accorded equal status to a ‘non-white’ country, a development whose psychological impact for Japan and the Asian continent was very positive. According to Morinosuke Kajima, two courses were open to Japan to make her position in Korea and Manchuria invulnerable. She could either reach a compromise or understanding on basic principles with Russia, or seek British cooperation to stem any further Russian expansionism. Confronted by Russia’s “arrogant and aggressive policy” in the 1890s, Japan began to drift away from Russia and drew closer to Great Britain. Tanin and Yohan suggest that Japan lacked the strength to push a course of independent expansion and therefore entered into an unequal alliance with Britain. It was only after Japan realized the futility of compromising with Russia and Britain herself failed to either reach a settlement with Russia or to conclude an alliance with Germany that the two powers began to seriously consider an alliance. The military and even the emperor preferred an alliance with Great Britain which materialized in 1902.
The Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) was another very important landmark in the history of Japanese imperialism. War was declared on 10th February 1904. Japan’s naval superiority was established with the defeat of the Russian Baltic fleet, an event that brought Russia to the negotiating table. Japan asked the US President Theodore Roosevelt to mediate a settlement. After difficult negotiations, Japan signed the Treaty of Portsmouth with Russia on 5th September 1905. Russia agreed to recognize Japan’s preponderant interests in Korea and not oppose any measures that Japan might take there. Additional provisions granted Japan the Russian leasehold over the Liaotung peninsula, the Tsar’s railroad and mining rights in southern Manchuria, and sovereignty over the southern half of Sakhalin. By the Taft-Katsura Agreement, the USA also accepted Japan’s paramount interest.
In 1905 itself, Ito Hirobumi, the Resident General of Korea, negotiated the Korean-Japanese Convention, which turned Korea into a Japanese protectorate. He engineered the abdication of Kojong in July 1907, and disbanded the Korean army in August, creating widespread discontent and violence. Ito Hirobumi was assassinated on 26th October 1909 just after he had relinquished his office. Outraged, Japan was determined to seize Korea outright. On 22nd August 1910, the Treaty of Annexation was signed. It renamed Korea Chosen, made it into a colony of Japan, and placed total authority over civil and military matters in the Governor-General of Korea.
According to John K. Fairbank, Japan’s foreign policy from the Taiwan expedition of 1874 to the annexation of Korea in 1910 had been consistent; the objectives were security, autonomy and big power status. A second brief period in the history of Japanese imperialism was from the First World War to 1922. During this period, notions of ultra-nationalism and Pan-Asian liberation had a significant impact upon Japanese imperialism. As an ally of Britain, Japan declared war on Germany and took over the German position in Shantung. Japan presented the famous 21 demands to China on 18th January 1915. These demands were contained in five groups. Group I related to the disposition of German economic rights in Shantung. Group II was aimed at strengthening Japan’s position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Group III was intended to secure mining and railway concessions in Central China and transform the Han-Yeh-Ping Company into a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise. Group IV was designed to prevent China from ceding or leasing to any third power any harbour, bay or island along the Chinese coast. Group V consisting of seven articles termed as ‘wishes’ was drawn up to cover miscellaneous items like the employment of Japanese advisers by the Chinese government.
The clear shift of priorities from defence to imperialist ambitions is obvious. Between 1918 and 1922, Japan sent its troops to eastern Siberia but had nothing to show for its efforts. In 1919, Shantung was handed over to Japan. The Washington Conference (November 1921-February 1922) protected a stable colonial order in the hands of the victors of the First World War, including Japan.
In the late 1920s the conflict between the civilian and military wings of the Japanese government for supremacy had become quite serious. The militarists advocated the Positive China Policy i.e. expansion into and control over the Chinese mainland. The government had, however changed over to a foreign policy of internationalism, called Shidehara Diplomacy and was following what came to be known as the Soft China Policy. It was the new external influences after 1929 – the Great Depression, the rise of Chinese nationalism and the rise to power of Hitler and Mussolini – that brought about a change in policy.
According to Yanaga, Japan’s attitude and policy were determined by political, economic, military, ideological and psychological factors. Firstly, Japan was facing an economic crisis due to demographic expansion, rising unemployment and decline of traditional economy. Secondly, socialist and democratic movements were threatening the supremacy of the military, and Pan-Asianism seemed to be the perfect answer to them.
Manchuria was the most obvious area of focus because of its strategic location, fertile agricultural economy, ice-free ports and harbours, and rich natural resources. It was also a testing ground for the army’s notion of a totalitarian, regimented socio-economic order. Fighting erupted in Manchuria in 1931. On the pretext of defending Japan’s railway interests, the Kwantung Army went on the offensive in September. The civilian government faced with outbursts of popular patriotism had no choice but to approve the actions of the military. By 20th September, the Kwantung Army had overrun Manchuria and taken control of the capital Mukden. On 18th February 1932, the Manchuko government was put into place.
China appealed to the League of Nations and the Lytton Commission appointed by the League clearly rejected Japan’s claim that military intervention in Manchuria was a proper and necessary act of self-defence. The League accepted the Lytton Report censoring Japan by the vote of 42 to 1. On 27th March 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.
The Second Sino-Japanese war began on 7th July 1937 with a clash on the Marco Polo Bridge. Japan encountered bitter resistance from the Chinese communists, while the Kuomintang troops were more concerned with crushing the communists than fighting the Japanese invaders. Japan captured important centres like Nanking, Peking, Canton, Hankow and Shanghai, and announced the union of Japan, China and Manchuko, based on economic cooperation, neighbourly amity and a joint front against communism.
Japan entered the Second World War as an ally of the fascist Germany and Italy. Its imperialist designs were sought to be legitimized by the idea of Pan-Asianism. Japan, by virtue of being the first Asian country to modernize considered itself to be the leader of all other Asian nations. Japan advocated the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. FC Jones has argued that the formation of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was caused as much by imperialist policies as by the desire for Asian solidarity.
Japan’s formal empire included Taiwan, Korea, Sakhalin, the Kwantung territory and the Pacific Islands. Japan had captured most of the south-east Asia and reached up to Burma when it was defeated. Japan’s surrender on 14th August 1945 and the occupation of the country by Allied forces till 1952 gave a death blow to Japanese imperialism, from which it never recovered.
Thus, in less than 80 years, Japan emerged, from a semi-feudal state, as a modernized industrialized, an imperial power in its own right. Imperialism suffered an abrupt end in 1945. However Japan has continued on the path of modernization and remains an economic power to reckon with. Imperialism became an integral part of Japanese policy because of Japan’s preoccupation with its defence and sovereignty. However scholars like Robert Pollard and John K. Maki have argued that the Japanese had been an aggressive and expansionist people from the beginning of their recorded history, and war and imperialism were the natural expression of an aggressive people organized in a military state. Imperialist wars were the logical expression in foreign affairs of the ideology of the authoritarian state. As early as 1890, Prime Minister Yamagata had outlined Japan’s foreign policy objectives as to “preserve our independence and enhance our national position. To this end, Japan must be prepared to defend both a ‘line of sovereignty’ and a ‘line of advantage’”. Outside the government, popular support for imperialist policies can be seen in the pronouncements of the journalist Fukuzawa Yukichi and in the activities of political societies like Kokuryukai (1901), Koku Suikai (1919) and Kokuhonsha (1924) which advocated Japanese expansion and ‘liberation’ of Asian countries under Japanese leadership.
Japanese imperialism was similar to western imperialism because both served the national interest of their respective countries by subjugating the interests of other countries. However, there was a substantial difference. Japanese imperialism was directed against people who shared cultural and racial affinities with Japan, particularly Taiwan and Korea. Japan’s concerns were Asian, not European. Also, capital investment was not the causative force behind Japanese as was the case of Britain. Expansion against other Asian peoples was rationalized by the doctrines of Social Darwinism, by notions of the superiority of Japan’s unique national polity, and by the idea of a Japanese national mission to bring progress and modernity to its backward neighbours. One view wanted to assimilate these regions into the home country because it saw them as sharing a common cultural heritage. This liberal face of Japanese colonial policy was represented by Prime Minister Hara Tikeshi who advocated assimilation through education and the spread of civil liberties, however in the 1930s, this policy changed into one of strict regimentation and of Japanization of colonies i.e. imposition of Japanese language, customs, traditions and rules on the colonized areas. Japan’s development had been widely seen as the triumph of the East over the West, but eventually Japan also followed the same policy of exploiting these nations that it considered inferior, just as the West had.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- James L. McClain – Japan: A Modern History
- JK Fairbank – East Asia
- Morinosuke Kajima – The Emergence of Japan as a World Power 1895 – 1925
- Marlene J. Mayo – The Emergence of Imperial Japan
Marked by – Sangeeta Luthra-Sharma – 7/10