1. JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

     

    1. Examine the stages of Japanese imperialism with special reference to its policies in Korea and Manchuria between 1894 and 1945.

     

    Nationalism was the defining feature of the Meiji period in Japan. In the second half of the 19th century, Japan had embarked on a process of modernization. A modern military establishment and a solid industrial base were considered necessary to give Japan the power to survive. The pattern of the relations of Japan, which had been relatively isolated from the rest of the worlds in the Tokugawa period, was conditioned first and foremost by the context of western imperialism which generated a sense of crisis.

     

    In fact EH Norman sees modern Japanese nationalism as ‘reactive nationalism’, a consciousness of nation and of the urgent necessity to build a modern state generated at all levels of Japanese society by fear of western physical domination or cultural colonization. Thus, imperialism was the product of a new international environment. Japanese expansion was concentrated in the Asian continent and directed especially against China and Korea. China was the obvious enemy and Korea was seen as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan which no third power should be allowed to possess.

     

    Theories on Japanese Imperialism

    The reasons for Japanese imperialism can be explained in various ways. Some have attributed it to the persistence of feudal militaristic values, while others have seen political and nationalist factors. In order to understand this issue we need to look into the various theories of imperialism and analyze them in the Japanese context.

     

    Many scholars have examined the nature of imperialism. In 1902 J. Hobson argued that countries such as Britain had excess manufacturing capacity and surplus capital, which could not be invested in the country. Therefore they were forced to seek new areas for investment. Lenin too argued that imperialism was a product of monopoly capitalism, in which capitalists sought colonies or spheres of influence that would serve as politically protected markets. In 1953 Gallagher and Robinson in their article “The Imperialism of Free Trade” elaborated this argument and identified an intermediate stage between mercantilist imperialism and the one identified by Hobson. This was the imperialism of Free Trade where the security to trade was of the greatest importance the imperialist country was willing to limit its formal empire. In this case protectorates and spheres of influence could be established such as in China and Latin America. It was during this period that the greatest expansion of the empire took place.

     

    Scholars have also looked at non-economic factors to explain imperialism. John Schumpeter has also argued that capitalism was a rational economic system and therefore, expansion had nothing to do with capitalism, but rather represented pre-capitalist forces. Carlton Hayes has argued that nations expand because they desire to increase their national prestige.

     

    The specific case of Japanese expansion has been examined by O. Tanin and E. Yohan who argued that Japan first expanded her territories after 1894 because of the samurai desire to establish control on the Chinese mainland and fight ‘white imperialism’. Till the Russo-Japanese war, Japan was attempting ‘primitive capitalist accumulation’ to increase her economic power and her expansion was not the product of ‘finance capitalism’. After the war Japan became more of a capitalist society but the social basis of her expansionist policies was the alliance of the military with the rising bourgeoisie. However, the persistence of feudal relations, particularly in agriculture, acted as a constraint on the domestic economy, forcing industry to seek markets outside. Japanese imperialism was thus primarily concerned with trade and raw materials rather than with the export of capital.

     

    The Japanese Marxist historian, Inoue Kiyoshi has stressed that the Meiji government was ‘absolutist’ and therefore, an alliance of the bureaucracy, the landowners and the rising bourgeoisie exercised control over the masses by using the Emperor System ideology. This structure of domination within the country was responsible for extending the domination outside. The Russo-Japanese war marked a turning point when Japan entered a modern capitalist stage. From that point Japan emerged as a partner of the other imperialist powers. Japanese expansionist policies were supported by the military and the business houses or zaibatsu often benefited from this.

     

    Akira Iriye argues that economic and military compulsions were inextricably linked in the early phase of Japanese imperialism. After World War I Japanese industry began to compete with Western firms and economic reasons became important factors in Japan’s expansion. However, it was only in 1929-30, with the disruption in trade and economy, that Japan rejected the idea of cooperating with the Western powers and began to fear that it would be excluded from markets and sources of raw materials. This fear pushed Japan to build a Co-prosperity Sphere that inevitably led her to war. The Co-prosperity Sphere was studied by FC Jones and he argued that its formation was caused as much by imperialist policies as by the desire for Asian solidarity.

     

    Marius Jansen has argued that in the 19th century imperialism was a norm and the Japanese accepted the Darwinist idea that a constant struggle for survival was an inevitable process and Japan must strive to expand her borders to ensure her survival. John K. Maki has suggested that war was the natural expression of an aggressive people organized in a military state.

     

    Hyman Kublin sees the increased aggression in terms of Japanese concern for defence. In his opinion, before 1895 Japan’s best means of defence seemed to lie in limited expansion coupled with a strong military establishment. After 1895 it appeared to depend upon entry into the ranks of world powers.

     

    Andrew Gordon has identified the actors and forces behind Japanese expansionism in terms of three developments. Firstly, indigenous intellectual traditions rejected both Sino-centric and Western models of international relations. They claimed a special place for Japan as a divine realm that ‘constitutes the head and shoulders of the world and controls all nations.” The new rulers of Meiji Japan drew on such attitudes as they looked to secure Japan’s position in Asia. Secondly, the Meiji rulers accepted a geopolitical logic that led inexorably towards either empire or subordination, with no middle ground possible. They decided that Japan had no choice but to secure its independence by emulating the imperialists. Thus, Yamagata Aritomo developed the strategic vision of zones of sovereignty ringed by zones of advantage. Thirdly, influential Japanese also developed substantial overseas business interests, especially in Korea. The leading Japanese businessmen active in Korea were also politically influential figures in Japan. Military and economic domination were two sides of a single coin. All of Japan’s elites saw Korea and Asia as a frontier for Japan’s expanding power and prestige. The move to empire was thus “over-determined” i.e. it was propelled by connected logic of military power, competitive geopolitics, expanding trade and investment, as well as nativist ideals of Japanese supremacy.

     

    Therefore, Japanese motives for imperial expansion cannot be seen simply in terms of their quest for prestige. Imperialism was probably also prompted by other factors such as the need to redirect the suppressed energies of the discontented Samurai class, as well as the avoidance of class conflicts within the country. The Japanese government tried to divert attention outwards and tried to foster a new kind of nationalism, which would also act as a binding force. Concern for security in the face of increased western encroachments in Asia also gave urgency to Japanese expansion. Finally we can also see the roots of Japan’s imperial policy in the context of rapid modernization in Meiji Japan, which necessitated a search for sources of raw materials and markets outside Japan.

     

    Nature of Japanese Imperialism

    Japanese colonial policy had points of similarity as well as differences with European colonial ideas. Japan did not start with a fully articulated view of what approach should be adopted for its colonies. These views in fact, developed over time. One assumption that they shared with European views was that different people had different capabilities and these were inherent qualities. European powers controlled very different cultural regions and hence such views developed to justify their rule. The Japanese too saw their colonization process as a mission in which they would civilize their neighbours who were not developed. This view was widely accepted by intellectuals and administrators like Nitobe Inazo and Goto Shimpei.

     

    Japan itself had only narrowly escaped colonial subjugation in the 19th century and had been saved from that largely due to the pull of other Asian opportunities on aggressive western energies. Also, the limited political, military, and economic resources of the developing government did not allow an assertion of Japanese national power in distant lands. To maximize its strength, therefore the effort to assert its presence in Asia would have to begin with the domination over neighbouring areas close to home.

     

    The regional dimensions of the empire created their own singularities. Japan’s colonial empire extended over people who shared cultural and racial affinities and this was particularly so with Taiwan and Korea. Thus there grew a view that these regions would be assimilated (doka) into the home country, Japan. This view saw these countries as sharing a common cultural heritage specifically composed of Confucian values. Ideas related to this were often vague and ambiguous and could be used to justify a range of positions. Japanese policy tried to ‘Japanize’ the people and forced them to learn Japanese and live and dress like Japanese. The liberal face of Japanese colonial policy was represented by Hara Takeshi who as Prime Minister advocated assimilation through education and spread of civil liberties. However in the 1930s this very gradual assimilation was transformed into a strict policy that sought to regiment the people under Japanese authority.

     

    The late entry of Japan in the race for colonies meant that it encountered unique difficulties and opportunities in establishing its rule. Most of the objects of Japan’s imperial ambitions were controlled by other nations or were in their spheres of influence. Thus, Japan was obliged to gain these territories from other powers by force. In each case, the successful outcome for Japan was determined by two factors. The first was its proximity to the theatre of combat. The second was the availability of military and police power to secure Japanese rule after the occupation of the territory.

     

    The circumscribed location and dimensions of the empire were also the result of Japan’s overriding concern for security. Indeed, no colonial empire of modern times was as clearly shaped by strategic considerations as Japan. With the exception of Taiwan, each of Japan’s colonies was obtained after a deliberate decision at the highest levels that the territory would meet the strategic interests of Japan. For this reason, Marius Jansen points out that Japanese imperialism was reactive, in the sense that Japan’s expansion on the continent was largely undertaken to guarantee the nation’s strategic frontiers. As early as the 1880s Japan’s strategic concerns were perceived in concentric circles radiating from the home islands: the ‘cordon of sovereignty’ encompassing territory vital to the nation’s survival and under formal occupation and the ‘cordon of advantage’, which was an outer limit of informal Japanese dominion, seen as necessary to protect and guarantee the inner line. Yamagata Aritomo perceived the role of Korea as a buffer ‘zone of advantage’ protecting Japan’s home-island ‘zone of sovereignty’.

     

    Japanese imperialism was also characterized by a level of idealism. The political and social reformism of the Meiji liberals found an outlet for on the Asian continent and fired some Meiji activists with dreams of transforming ‘corrupted’ and ‘decaying’ Asian civilizations through reform, a vision which they sought to realize through their own efforts. More influential were matters of pride and prestige, which involved the nation as a whole. Starting late in the race for colonies, Edward Chen has pointed out, that Japan viewed its victory over China in 1894-95 and its consequent acquisition of Taiwan as the shortest route to a place in the sun.

     

    The origins of Japanese imperialism cannot be seen in mono-causal terms. William Rockwood has noted that, “The quest for empire in East Asia was impelled by no single motive, except that most Japanese were indoctrinated in varying degrees with a mystical faith in the Imperial destiny. It drew support from various interest groups and for different reasons. Its momentum and direction reflected a political struggle at home as well as the resistance it met abroad.”

     

    The military that had seemed to be losing its importance in the 1920s also reasserted itself. In this it was helped by the prevalence of feudal attitudes as well as the fact that the military could function without a check by the Diet. The social turmoil caused by industrialization, particularly in the rural areas was also crucial in generating discontent and a desire for a ‘Showa Restoration’. These desires enabled the young officers and patriotic societies to extend and deepen their influence to push Japan towards expansion and war.

     

    Japanese imperialism was inspired, justified and moulded by ideologies, which have been described as ‘ultra-nationalistic’ and ‘fascist’. Common to these ideas was a belief that Japan needed to defend her traditions and culture together with the countries of Asia, in particular the East Asian countries. Various political societies at different times propagated such ideas. For example, the supporters of Saigo Takamori formed the Genyosha (Dark Green Society), which advocated an expansionist policy. The Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) formed in 1901 propagated liberation of Asian countries under Japanese leadership. Other societies included the Koku Suikai (Japanese National Essence Society) formed in 1919 and the Kokuhonsha (National Foundation Society) formed in 1924. One of the main objectives of these societies was to save Japan from socialism. Yozonsha was another society that espoused military expansion abroad and military takeover at home.

     

    In 1871, Japan signed the Treaty of Amity with China, according to which both countriesagreed to unite their efforts against the west. This was extremely significant because Japan, which had hitherto been treated as a tributary state by China, now received equality of status. Conflict soon arose over the issue of control over Ryukyu Islands, located to the south of Kyushu. The Ryukyu Islands had been conquered by the Satsuma clan in the 17th century. In 1872, upon the abolition of the Han system, the islands were incorporated into the prefecture of Okinawa. China protested and demanded the intervention of the USA, but the latter refused. As a compromise, Japan offered the southernmost group of these islands in return for the extension of the Most Favoured Nation Status to Japan. In 1881 china proposed that both china and Japan relinquish their claims to the Ryukyu Islands. No agreement could be reached however, and Sino-Japanese relations were never cordial after this.

     

    The Korean question brought China and Japan into direct conflict. Japan had great commercial, political and strategic interests in Korea. Japan argued that being the first Asian country to modernize, it had a moral responsibility to guide less developed neighbours. According to Marius Jansen the Japanese rationale for giving help to neighbours was both internal and external. It was external in that Western imperialismthreatenedto deprive Asia of all self-determination, and Japan of any economic or political lebensraum. They were also internal; a conviction that Japan’s tested synthesis of the East and the West was the surest path of modernization blended imperceptibly with historic beliefs of divinity and destiny.

     

    Korea paid tribute to both China and Japan but was closer to China and hostile to Meiji Japan. In 1872, Japan attempted to enhance trade relations with Korea but was rebuffed. Samurai groups led by Saigo Takamori demanded an immediate expedition to Korea to uphold the honour of Japan. But the government chose internal reconstruction over external aggression at this point of time. This formed the background to the resignation of Saigo Takamori, the 1879 Satsuma rebellion and the expedition to Formosa in 1874-75, which served to appease the discontented Samurai.

     

    In 1876, acting on China’s advice, Korea agreed to diplomatic negotiation with Japan. The Treaty of Kanghwa (1876) was, Fairbank argues, an unequal treaty modeled on the pattern of the Western treaties with China and Japan. It opened three ports for Japanese trade – Pusan, Inson, and Wonsan – and declared Korea to be an ‘independent state’. Another treaty was signed in August 1882, which authorized the stationing of Japanese troops in Korea.

     

    The Seoul uprising took place in 1884, when the Independence Party attempted a coup, supported by the Japanese delegation. Yuan Shih-Kai was the Chinese resident in Korea and both China and Japan wanted to avoid war. The Tientsin Convention also known as the Li-Ito Convention was held in 1885. Both countries agreed to withdraw troops from Korea and to stop training the Korean army. They also agreed not to send troops back to Korea without informing each other, in the form of a written notification. James McClain suggests that the Convention did not bring lasting stability because from Japan’s perspective, Korea’s domestic policies remained impossibly chaotic.

     

    The last decade of the 19th century marks a very important period in the history of Japanese imperialism. O.Tanin and E.Yohan argued that Japan firstexpanded her territories after 1894 because of the Samurai desire to establish control on the Chinese mainland and fight ‘white imperialism’. John K. Maki suggested on the other hand, that war was the natural expression of an aggressive people organized in a military state. By the 1880s foreign intervention in Japan had virtually disappeared and the new structure was secure against internal opposition. In 1894, Japan had gained freedom from extra-territoriality. Imperialist wars, Maki argues were the logical expression in foreign affairs of the ideology of the authoritarian state. Hyman Kublin sees the increased aggression in terms of Japanese concern for defence. In his opinion, before 1895japna’s best menas of defence seemed to lie in limited expansion coupled with a strong military establishment. After 1895 it appeared to depend upon entry into the ranks of world powers.

     

    In 1894, King Kojong asked China for military assistance to quell the domestic unrest. As some 3000 Chinese troops were disembarking near Seoul in June, Japan’s policy makers convened to decide on a response. In their view China had clearly violated the tientsin Convention by dispatching forces without informing Tokyo, and the prospect of a weak Korea once again allied closely with a disintegrating China, resurrected the specter of Russian or British intervention in affairs on the peninsula. Japan officially declared war on China on 1stAugust 1894. Japanese forces overwhelmed the Chinese defenders at Pyongyangon 16thSeptember, won a decisive naval battle the following day against Chinese warships near the mouth of the Yalu river, seized Port Arthur on 21stNovember and on 12thFebruary 1895 destroyed the Chinese fleet at Weihaiwei.

     

    The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on 17th April 1895 marked the end of the First Sino-Japanese war. Japan demanded the affirmation of “the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea”;cession of the Manchurian province of Liaoning as well as Taiwan and the nearby Pescadore Islands; payment of war indemnity amounting to nearly 500 million yen; the opening of four new treaty ports; the granting of commercial privileges that included the right to navigate the upper reaches of the Yangtze river and to import machinery and operate manufacturing establishments in Chinese treaty ports. Ito Hirobumi eventually agreed to reduce the indemnity by one-third and to confine Japanese territorial claims in Manchuria to the Liaotung peninsula. The port of Weihaiwei was occupied till the indemnity was paid in full.

     

    The events of 1894-95 made Japan the world’s first non-Western imperial power. It introduced Japan to the modern world affairs. Japan acquired the beginnings of a colonial empire after vanquishing Chinain this war. At this time it was still an upcoming power. With the victory over China, Japan’s military wing also got a boost.

     

    On 5th May 1895, Japan, under pressure from the Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany, had to restore the Liaotung peninsula to Chinese control. Outraged by this retreat, on 8th October, the Japanese contingent in Seoul broke into the palace and stabbed Queen Min to death and then set fire to her corpse. The king of Korea sought protection from Russia and got closer to her. Japan came away from this gruesome affair with the realization that victory over China had not guaranteed respect for Japan’s ‘line of advantage over the continent’.

     

    WG Beasley has stated that with the Sino-Japanese war, Japan became an active participant in the affairs of north-east Asia. She was no longer but – in China at least – a member of the club. As a result her concern was less with the defence than with the need to protect her interests overseas. This entailed a complete rethinking of her relations with the Powers, especially Russia and Great Britain, a process which was t lead to an Anglo-Japanese alliance and a Russo-Japanese war.

     

    The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 was the first time a ‘white’ western power had accorded equal status to a ‘non-white’ country, a development whose psychological impact for Japan and the Asian continent was very positive. According to Morinosuke Kajima, two courses were open to Japan to make her position in Korea and Manchuria invulnerable. She could either reach a compromise or understanding on basic principles with Russia, or seek British cooperation to stem any further Russian expansionism. Confronted by Russia’s “arrogant and aggressive policy” in the 1890s, Japan began to drift away from Russia and drew closer to Great Britain. Tanin and Yohan suggest that Japan lacked the strength to push a course of independent expansion and therefore enteredinto an unequal alliance with Britain. It was only after Japan realized the futility of compromising with Russia and Britain herself failed to either reach a settlement with Russia or to conclude an alliance with Germany that the two powers began to seriously consider an alliance. The military and even the emperor preferred an alliance with Great Britain which materialized in 1902.

     

    The Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) was another very important landmark in the history of Japanese imperialism. War was declared on 10thFebruary 1904. Japan’s naval superiority was established with the defeat of the Russian Baltic fleet, an event that brought Russia to the negotiating table. Japan asked the US President Theodore Roosevelt to mediate a settlement. After difficult negotiations, Japan signed the Treaty of Portsmouth with Russia on 5th September 1905. Russia agreed to recognize Japan’s preponderant interests in Korea and not oppose any measures that Japan might take there. Additional provisions granted Japan the Russian leasehold over the Liaotung peninsula, the Tsar’s railroad and mining rights in southern Manchuria, and sovereignty over the southern half of Sakhalin. By the Taft-Katsura Agreement, the USA also accepted Japan’s paramount interest.

     

    In 1905 itself, Ito Hirobumi, the Resident General of Korea, negotiated the Korean-Japanese Convention, which turned Korea into a Japanese protectorate. He engineered the abdication of Kojong in July 1907, and disbanded the Korean army in August, creating widespread discontent and violence. Ito Hirobumi was assassinated on 26th October 1909 just after he had relinquished his office. Outraged, Japan was determined to seize Korea outright. On 22nd August 1910, the Treaty of Annexation was signed. It renamed Korea Chosen, made it into a colony of Japan, and placed total authority over civil and military matters in the Governor-General of Korea.

     

    According to John K. Fairbank, Japan’s foreign policy from the Taiwan expedition of 1874 to the annexation of Korea in 1910 had been consistent; the objectives were security, autonomy and big power status. A second brief period in the history of Japanese imperialism was from the First World War to 1922. During this period, notions of ultra-nationalism and Pan-Asian liberation had a significant impact upon Japanese imperialism. As an ally of Britain, Japan declared war on Germany and took over the German position in Shantung. Japan presented the famous 21 demands to China on 18th January 1915. These demands were contained in five groups. Group I related to the disposition of German economic rights in Shantung. Group II was aimed at strengthening Japan’s position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Group III was intended to secure mining and railway concessions in Central China and transform the Han-Yeh-Ping Company into a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise. Group IV was designed to prevent China from ceding or leasing to any third power any harbour, bay or island along the Chinese coast. Group V consisting of seven articles termed as ‘wishes’ was drawn up to cover miscellaneous items like the employment of Japanese advisers by the Chinese government.

     

    The clear shift of priorities from defence to imperialist ambitions is obvious. Between 1918 and 1922, Japan sent its troops to eastern Siberia but had nothing to show for its efforts. In 1919, Shantung was handed over to Japan. The Washington Conference (November 1921-February 1922) protected a stable colonial order in the hands of the victors of the First World War, including Japan.

     

    In the late 1920s the conflict between the civilian and military wings of the Japanese government for supremacy had become quite serious. The militarists advocated the Positive China Policy i.e. expansion into and control over the Chinese mainland. The government had, however changed over to a foreign policy of internationalism, called Shidehara Diplomacy and was following what came to be known as the Soft China Policy. It was the new external influences after 1929 – the Great Depression, the rise of Chinese nationalism and the rise to power of Hitler and Mussolini – that brought about a change in policy.

     

    According to Yanaga, Japan’s attitude and policy were determined by political, economic, military, ideological and psychological factors. Firstly, Japan was facing an economic crisis due to demographic expansion, rising unemployment and decline of traditional economy. Secondly, socialist and democratic movements were threatening the supremacy of the military, and Pan-Asianism seemed to be the perfect answer to them.

     

    The Manchurian Crisis

    Manchuria was the most obvious area of focus for Japanese imperialism because of its strategic location, fertile agricultural economy, ice-free ports and harbours, and rich natural resources, especially minerals. Its fertile plains were also seen as a friendly destination for emigrant farmers, which would relieve the population pressures and agrarian poverty at home. It was also a testing ground for the army’s notion of a totalitarian, regimented socio-economic order.

     

    Following the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1894-95, Japan had received a number of privileges in Manchuria as well. In 1905, US President Roosevelt declared that Manchuria should be returned to the Chinese and converted to a neutral zone. After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan however decided to pursue exclusive interests in Manchuria and pressurized China into granting her economic benefits there. The prevalent view in Japan, which was favoured by militarists at this time, was to bring about complete control of Manchuria, ignoring the protests being made by Britain and USA. It was around this time that the relationship between Japan and China worsened.

     

    In July 1910, in order to counter western intervention, Russia and Japan, by a secret agreement divided Manchuria into a northern Russian sphere of influence and a Japanese southern sphere of influence. The instability in China after the 1911 Revolution, made the western powers ambiguous about any intervention, and this further emboldened Japan.

     

    Through the 1920s groups of young officers were becoming increasingly frustrated with Japan’s foreign and domestic policies. The cooperative diplomacy being pursued by the political parties came to be perceived as weakness. They began to fear the Chinese Nationalist Party’s challenge to Japanese hegemony in Manchuria and North China and responded with acts of rebellion. The Kwantung Army in Manchuria became one hotbed of such agitation and the leaders of the Kwantung Army decided to take bold action in Manchuria. On 18th September 1931, Colonel Ishiwara Kanji’s forces blew up some track of the Southern Manchurian railway and announced it as the work of Chinese military forces. This is also known as the Mukden Incident. The Kwantung Army used this as a pretext for a runaway attack on Chinese regional armies in the area. Within less than 48 hours, the whole of Manchuria was captured. Japanese frontiers now extended up to Russia and Japan had acquired territory three times its own size.

     

    Whether military leadership in Tokyo knew of the planning of these actions, and if so, whether it approved them, remains controversial to this day. Whatever its prior knowledge, the Tokyo government responded weakly. PM Inukai Tsuyoshi resisted military pressure to annex Manchuria as a formal colony but allowed the Kwantung Army to install friendly Chinese leaders in a puppet regime, known as the Manchukuo, founded in March 1932. It was nominally an independent nation. However in practice Japan retained full control of the conquered territory. The last emperor of China’s Qing dynasty, Puyi was declared the Manchurian emperor. Andrew Gordon opines that this decision to create an independent puppet state reflected the ideology of Pan-Asian liberation and anti-(West) imperialism.

     

    China appealed to the League of Nations and the Lytton Commission appointed by the League clearly rejected Japan’s claim that military intervention in Manchuria was a proper and necessary act of self-defense. The League accepted the Lytton Report censuring Japan by the vote of 42 to 1. On 27th March 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, while the military began to make simultaneous preparations for an onslaught in northern China. Many Japanese historians regard the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-32 as the start of what they call the Fifteen Year War – essentially the start of World War II in Asia. The failure of the League of Nations in controlling Japanese imperialism not only egged on Japan, but also encouraged radical Western powers in their aggressive policies.

     

    The reasons for Japanese expansion in Manchuria were many. Yanaga believes that the purpose was not simply to enhance Japanese status vis-à-vis the western powers. There were many political-economic, military, psychological, and ideological reasons behind it too. Militarists in Japan saw expansion in Manchuria as the only way to bring Japan out of her financial crisis. In ideological terms, established groups such as the militarists and zaibatsu spoke of notions of Pan-Asianism to counter the growing strength of democratic and socialist movements in Japan.

     

    Following the Manchurian episode, Japan acquired nearly 1 million square miles of territory. This victory represented the final triumph of the totalitarian, ultra-nationalist, military wing in Japan, and the Party system was ended. China was ousted from Manchuria

    China appealed to the League of Nations and the Lytton Commission appointed by the League clearly rejected Japan’s claim that military intervention in Manchuria was aproper and necessary act ofself-defence. The League accepted the Lytton Report censoring Japan by the vote of 42 to 1. On 27th March 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.

     

    The Second Sino-Japanese war began on 7thJuly 1937with a clash on the Marco Polo Bridge. Japan encountered bitter resistance from the Chinese communists, while the Kuomintang troops were more concerned with crushing the communists than fighting the Japanese invaders. Japan capturedimportant centres like Nanking, Peking, Canton, Hankow and Shanghai, and announced the union of Japan, China and Manchuko, based on economic cooperation, neighbourly amity and a joint front against communism.

     

    Japan entered the Second World War as an ally of the fascist Germany and Italy. Its imperialist designs were sought to be legitimized by the idea of Pan-Asianism. Japan, by virtue of being the first Asian country to modernize considered itself to be the leader of all other Asian nations. Japan advocated the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. FC Jones has argued that the formation of the Co-Prosperity Spherewas caused as much by imperialist policies as by the desire for Asian solidarity.

     

    Japan’s formal empire included Taiwan, Korea, Sakhalin, the Kwantung territory and the Pacific Islands. Japan had captured most of the south-east Asia and reached up toBurma when it was defeated. Japan’s surrender on 14th August 1945 and the occupation of the country by Allied forces till 1952 gave a death blow to Japanese imperialism, from which it never recovered.

     

    Thus, in less than 80 years, Japan emerged, from a semi-feudal state, as a modernized industrialized, an imperial power in its own right. Imperialism suffered an abrupt end in 1945. However Japan has continued on the path of modernization and remains an economic power to reckon with. Imperialism became an integral part of Japanese policy because of Japan’s preoccupation with its defence and sovereignty. However scholars like Robert Pollard and John K. Maki have argued that the Japanese had been an aggressive and expansionist people from the beginning of their recorded history, and war and imperialism were the natural expression of an aggressive people organized in a military state. Imperialist wars were the logical expression in foreign affairs of the ideology of the authoritarian state. As early as 1890, Prime Minister Yamagatahad outlined Japan’s foreign policy objectives as to “preserve our independence and enhance our national position. To this end, Japan must be prepared to defend both a ‘line of sovereignty’ and a ‘line of advantage’”. Outside the government, popular support for imperialist policies can be seen in the pronouncementsof the journalist Fukuzawa Yukichi and in the activities of political societies like Kokuryukai (1901), Koku Suikai (1919) and Kokuhonsha (1924) which advocated Japanese expansion and ‘liberation’ of Asian countries under Japanese leadership.

     

    Japanese imperialism was similar to western imperialism because both served the national interest of their respective countries by subjugating the interests of other countries. However, there was a substantial difference. Japanese imperialism was directed against people who shared cultural and racial affinities with Japan, particularly Taiwan and Korea. Japan’s concerns were Asian, not European. Also, capital investment was not the causative force behind Japanese as was the case of Britain. Expansion against other Asian peoples was rationalized by the doctrines of Social Darwinism, by notions of the superiority of Japan’s unique national polity, and by the idea of a Japanese national mission to bring progress and modernity to its backward neighbours. One view wanted to assimilatethese regions into the home country because it saw them as sharing a common cultural heritage. This liberal face of Japanese colonial policy was represented by Prime Minister Hara Tikeshi who advocated assimilation through education and the spread of civil liberties, however in the 1930s, this policy changed into one of strict regimentation and of Japnaizationof colonies i.e. imposition of Japanese language, customs, traditions and rules on the colonized areas. Japan’s development had been widely seen as the triumph of the East over the West, but eventually Japan also followed the same policy of exploiting these nations that it considered inferior, just as the West had.