How Universal and Inevitable was the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism?
In writing this tutorial, my purpose is to assess the importance of the transition to capitalism. What to the current view taken of history, is seen as a watershed development between the medieval and the modern periods. The initial ‘marxist’ interpretation of the debate, as expressed by Dobb, Sweazy and others, is limited to just a quest for the ‘prime mover’ while the transition itself is seen as inevitable, universal, and universally parallel. Brenner in his later study, while in the main targeting the ‘neo malthusian’ interpretation of the same process, shows up the fact that the transition to feudalism was not necessarily universal, and its form, success, or even the end result of what may be called, the ‘prime mover’ in the earlier debates, is determined by very variable forces, which though, they can be studied, cannot be generalised. And even in geographically close, or politically similar societies can have very different results. The linear progression of Feudalism to capitalism is questioned by Anderson, and Wallerstein, they see the transition as beng made possible by in the first place, the earlier social formation of slavery, the expansion of Europe, within Europe, and later into the new world, and the bullion, food, and feul, the exchange brought into European markets.
The anti-eurocentric historians, disagree with the supposed uniqueness of Europe, and the manner in which European history is studies, as a moral success story. They compare Europe with other parts of the world, specially China, and India or Japan, and bring out similar trends in Technology and population in these regions, implying that Europe was not all that unique, nor was is predestined to be capitalist.
Another important note might be made about the geographic area of this shift to capitalism. While Dobb and Sweazy seem to examine the phenomenon as a pan European process, with differences, or as Sweazy calls the re-enserfment in the East, temporary aberrations, the later writers deal with geography very differently. Brenner realises that the transition was made by a very small part of what is now England. While in, in most of Western Europe, which is usually seen in completeness, as the ground for the development of capitalism, many counter trends; even in places such as Paris, he sees re-enserfment. Wallerstein deals with Western Europe as a false construct, and nation states as an inadequate means of comparison, he uses what he calls world economic systems, and argues that feudal Europe because of its extreme insular nature, may be called a civilisation but not an economic system. Which is why he places the change to an economic system after the colonial expansion and the inflow of bullion from the new world. Pomeranz for his analysis disregards nation states, because as economic units he finds them misleading. He rather compares areas like Southern England to the yangste Valley and Gujrat, based on the similar economic and demographic as well as technological development in these areas.
Though Dobb and Sweazy play an important role in establishing the prime mover of the transition in either trade(Sweazy) or the internal conflicts of the feudal system(Dobb), they are both blinded to the variety in which the process ocurrs. A reading of their work implies an almost unilinear shift from feudalism to capitalism, occurring across Europe. However it is interesting, that they too mention certain trends counter to this universal understanding. Sweazy believes that trade plays an important role in the freedom of serfs, for two reasons. Firstly trade provides the lords with a reason to exploit the serfs (to engage in conspicuous consumption) and gave the serfs an alternative in terms of fleeing to the towns. Dobb counters with examples of NW england’s serfs being free before those of the south, and the second serfdom in east Europe both regions more involved in trade. He somehow it seems believes that the later shift to capitalism is due to tensions of the class system itself. The serfdom of eastern Europe did not really dissolve till late in the 18th century, and in Russia only in 1861. Though its true these areas do not come under the region we are studying, because of the feudal nature of the political system it makes an interesting contrast to the idea of feudalism itself bringing about its end. Though of course in the long run, serfdom came to an end in Russia too, it should be asked whether the process was the same as that in England. I.e. was it the same transition to capitalism that is seen in England. Most writers of Russian History see it differently, though undeniably the forces in conflict are the same. A final remark on the agency of trade in the transition is given by Hobson, who says that when the markets are traded in by the lord, enserfment ensues, and when the serf trades the result is his freedom. This observation is a good one, but merely makes the question of why the lords, or the serfs would trade. The fact that there was no one definite class that traded but depending on certain factors either could.
The question of why a in a particular society one of the two classes traded, and why these differences in the response to markets existed is an important one. Because the reasons for these differences in response to essentially the same social stimulant is what Brenner in his study uses to show up the fact that the transition to capitalism does not occur en bloc.
Brenner is studying the response that societies show to demographic change in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The demographic or neo-Malthusian interpretation of the situation leads one to believe that the Malthusian cycle of first growing population and then later a check on overpopulation in the form of famines, or disease. Postan and Ladurie, try to explain the shift to capitalism as the result of demographic change, and the change in the demand and supply of labour and produce after such decline. They argue that during the growing phase of the cycle, wages go down and price of land goes up, this favours the Land lord who would then choose to commute his labour rent to money. In the later declining stage, the peasants would have more power over the lord because of the scarcity of labour. Here is where the concept breaks up as a universal law.
Brenner tackles this concept simply by showing up the difference responses that different places had to the same population growth and depression, which occurred on a pan European scale. In England during the declining stage, the Lords managed to gain control of the plots left vacant by depopulation and managed to consolidate their holdings, these comparatively huge holdings were leased out to tenant farmers, or wage labourers, which were free peasants, who had gained their freedom, as a consequence of the earlier flight(Dobb) or because of conflict. This system was essentially controlled by the market. In the sense that rents were decided and profit for the tenant farmer were decided on the market. This lead to greater opportunities for investment, because of the incentive of profit, and also a greater co-operation between the tenant and Lord.
This situation is in contrast with France, where as Ladurie says the land was not consolidated, but in fact divided, into small peasant free holdings. The same process of growth of labour, and conflict, followed by depopulation, lead to the peasants, not the lords gaining access to the land. This is because in Brenner’s view of the state aligning itself with the peasants. At this time in France, and in fact in Western Europe we see the rise, and assertion of the state, and centralisation develops. In England the state had sided with the Lords, in France it took the side of the peasants. Thus the peasants were able to gain free holdings on the land. These small holdings, were inefficient and lead to an actual retardation of the process of transition to capitalism. I would in fact say that when capitalism did emerge in France it did so independent of the agricultural system, which hadn’t changed much till very recently, if its reasons for not allowing the slashing of tariffs on grain imports are to be read as experts in the UN did. So then the transition to capitalism in France is not the direct result of a change in the land holding patterns, or the disintegration of feudalism.
The same has been argued for the difference in evolutions of west and east Germany. Brenner argues that the difference between the evolutions of these two regions, the east being literally a colony of the west, merely was the more established and stable rights of the peasants in the west, which lead them to have better, and more popular peasant institutions which managed to overturn the control of the Lord on the land, in the periods of depopulation and consolidate peasant free holding at a time when the population scarcity gave more power. In the east on the other hand because the colonisation of the region had been done largely by Lords, peasants were not as sure of their footing, in regard to each other, and the Lord to try such extreme measures.
The role of trade, emphasised by both Sweazy and Postan, to some degree, is shown to have conflicting results, in the first case of western Germany, the peasants manage to gain enough from trade, and control of it, to make their position more certain, while in the East, because of the pre-dominant position of the Lord, the market gave the lord the incentive to impose himself to a greater extent on the serfs.
In these four examples of Brenner, the conflicting response of a society to essentially the same stimulus is seen. While as Brenner argues, it may be that the reasons for this conflicting response lies in the socio-political institutions of the place. His allusions to things such as peasant holding surety, differences in the ideas of land ownership itself etc. would suggest that perhaps the reasons for these differences in social institutions can yet be found, and the very idea of socio-political institutions, or their existence, is, as Brenner loves to say, to beg the question.
The ideas outlined above, are those of historians, trying to study Feudalism in Western Europe as a stand alone concept. Without questioning the assumption that Western Europe is uniform, feudal and the cradle of capitalism, they study the emergence of capitalism. Marxist historiography, as I have stated sees the progression as inevitable, in fact it is a basic tenant of Marxism itself. While Brenner, has succeeded in breaking the concept of the simple, universal transition to capitalism in Europe, it is imperative that the study be widened. Places such as India, Japan or China which during periods have been termed feudal, witnessed the disintegration of the feudal system, but definitely not the ‘rise of capitalism.’
The Japanese transition, entirely lacks the class struggle so central to the European change, in fact, Takahashi says that the transition to capitalism occurred with the help of, and in fact, by strengthening the Feudal structure, before the Feudal lord became the oligarchic capitalist. China remained pre-bundel, until it entered into conflict with Britain, and then slowly became more and more localised, till we come to period of war-lords, this then leads to the current period of communism. Indian feudalism lead to foreign domination. If the focus was removed from Europe, or if Marx had been from Asia, it may be argued, the telos of the shift to Capitalism would never have been conceived.
Other scholars too have questioned this interpretation of history, with the capitalism being inevitable.
Perry Anderson sees the emergence of capitalism only possible because of the earlier contact with slavery as a social formation. He sees the rise of capitalism as beginning in antiquity. In his opinion capitalism contains in it parts both of feudalism and capitalism. It might therefore be argued that in places such as India, capitalism would never emerge because slavery was never the dominant system in India.
Wallerstein attributes the transition almost completely to the inflow of bullion and fuel and food from expansion, first within Europe and later into the new world. He sees the world in terms of economic systems. To him the feudal world was not a economic world system, it was too isolated, though he does, because of the overriding similarities, call it a civilisation. To him in the period before the expansion feudal Europe was unimportant. And in fact the world systems of the Mediterranean and Russia, or the insipient one in the Baltic was far more important. The generation of the surplus in the feudal system to him is marginal, because it is left unused.
He explains the crisis as being the result of rise in population casing a drop in wages, and increase in rents, the 100 years war further complicated matters and caused a liquidity crisis which resulted in a further slowing down of the economy, and rents being made labour rents and hoarding in response to debasement. These cause a spiral which finally leads to stagnation.
According to him the stagnation was not really the expected out come of the situation, because in an agricultural economy, with depopulation, only the better plots would remain in cultivation, and so productivity would in fact increase, and since population would be going down, demand would decrease, and surplus could be used for trade. But demand did not decrease, and even as the system was approaching stability, the inflow of bullion, to trade with dried up.
This period was also one of considerable change in political structures and military structures. Because of the slow down of the economy, knights were becoming too expensive (because the knight had to maintain himself, or had be to given new land) and a cheaper infantry force was favoured, but this entailed a standing army, something to muster which, only the king or the state as a whole had the resources. With the slow down of the economy, and these changes the state was gaining more power. Through the bureaucracy and taxation the power base of the lord was eroded. The state finally was in a position to intercede in the conflict between the lord and the peasant, which is the situation Brenner refers to. Wallerstein pays great attention to the fact that states emerge here, not empires, despite the ambitions of a dynasty, the logistics did not allow states too large for effective centralisation.
He sees three things as prerequisites for the coming transition to capitalism. The expansion of the world, first in the form land reclamation measures and control of new territories in the Mediterranean, what he calls internal Americas, and later into the new world; different methods of labour control for different products in different parts of the world, and lastly a strong state system in the core capitalist states.
He explains Portugal’s expansion as a function of Italian City States’ ambition, as it was financed by Genoaese, who were competing with the Venetians. Italy, for him, was at the time the only truly colonial power. He sees the need for expansion, immediately being one primarily for bullion. The trade in the Mediterranean depended on a flow of gold into asia and one of goods into Europe. However he attributes the sustained growth of trade to Europe’s need of fuel and food. The need arose out of the manner in which European agriculture developed. It became more and more land extensive over time, with a bias toward animal rearing and with the growth in population and succeeding price rises, the consumption of meat should have reduced, it grew, because of the elites’ demand. This resulted in the amount of land dedicated to meat remaining the same and a growing population being fed on insufficient land. The only manner in which this system could maintained was by growing grain outside Europe, and importing it. Which is exactly what the new world presented an opportunity to do.
In his construct therefore, Europe is seen as being lucky, in that it had the resources of the new world to exploit, and the energy resources of England’s coal, which furthered the industrialisation of the economy. But the impetus according to him for this growth came from the market which became a factor because of the system of agriculture which required the import of grain. To him then the transition was largely due to the colonial expansions of market, and the demand for bullion in Asia. He does not see the change to capitalism being inevitable, in fact, he calls it a matter of luck, a view I subscribe to.
Carrying his argument further, he compares Europe to the Chinese system. China too expanded, or tried to, Cheng Ho, being a notable explorer, who found territories comparable to the new world for china. But the policy was abandoned. The reasons could have been the cost of the expansion, and the dislike of the bureaucracy. The political scenario of the time was not too favourable either according to Hudson, with the capital being shifted to Peking because of the Mongol threat and the attacks of the Japanese pirates.
China it can be argued made much better use of the land it possessed, compared to it European agriculture wasted space, though in terms of labour saving techniques Europe was more advanced. The greatest disadvantage though for China was the fact that it was an empire. This implied a pre-bundel society, which was centralised enough for capitalism to foster, nor was it decentralised to a significant degree to allow the necessary destructive conflict. The bureaucracy which was roughly analogus to the feudal lord, drew his legitimacy from the crown, and at the same time was a centre of decentralisation, therefore the state was not powerful enough, nor was he. Its empire status also caused more direct problems, while the Portuguese did not have to stop their expansion for the sake of the Italians being attacked by the Huns, China had to stop its expansions to combat Japanese pirates. And it also had to deal with the mongol threat. It may also be argued that an empire cannot allow the existence of economies outside its orbit, it must itself be the economy. Another important problem with an empire, is the economics of extraction in taxation, ends up levying more than the cost of the reciprocal provision of protection costs, the inefficiency of the system is very great in an empire such as China. Something that gets eliminated in Europe with states, in wallersteins view being limited to providing and guarding monopolies.
Scholars like Pomeranz and Hobson have criticised the study of European history as being a moral success story. In fact Pomeranz argues that the history of Europe has been fabricated to indicate that Europe itself was a more co-hesive unit, by making institutions like markets and factories common and pushing them further back in time. The motives for expansion are pushed back too, and the expansion into the new world is treated as ‘normal’ by Eurocentric scholars like O’ Brien and Jones. Pomeranz claims that the study seeks to reduce the difference between the modern west and the feudal west, while greatening the differences between feudal west and the rest of the world. Market dynamics are seen as the causative factors of all of European history, because of their current importance, ignoring the different policies of governments, with the marginalisation of things such as legislation, it is only natural to have everything else suppressed as well.
He sees expansion as central to the transition, because in his opinion European markets were not developed enough for the kind of trade that industrialisation brought. It was only because of the colonies, with restricted economies that industrialisation flourished, because they could compete with the domestic markets of the mother country, while serving as a market to them.
Industrialisation is itself treated as a European trend. Pomeranz disagrees, he says that in fact it was limited to Britain only, and in a manner of speaking, unique, and an aberration, he seems to imply.
Jones has tried to show that European superiority was established far back in history, because of a society with declining fertility, because of a later date of marriage. This created a different system of demographic growth, and prevented the existence of a pre-modern-fertility regime. Pomeranz counters all these arguments, by referring to new evidence etc.
He believes that there are many fallacies about Asia, specially its downfall, in ecological terms from misuse of land, that are used to foster European difference, and superiority, he believes that most of the Asia, in the parts that are comparable with Europe, was similar to a very great degree, in fact he asserts that there were places in the Yangste valley more productive than Europe, and the European miracle, of the agricultural revolution, is only parallel to, and not superior to the Asian miracle, of feeding the vast populations of these regions, more so because of the extremely labour intensive methods used in Asia.
He argues convincingly for a comparative similarity between China and Europe in particular, however, despite the immense utility of his arguments, I see a problem with what he does. He argues that China could just have easily become Capitalist, actually he claims it was insipiently capitalist already, and had it not been for the new world’s resources, China may have maintained its lead. However he remains adamant that the development of China was inevitably to lead to a capitalist system.
It is this basic premise that I have a problem with. Why should any form of development, be, in the first place, accepted as the only one, or as it is seen today and the best one. While it is fair to argue that perhaps Europe may not have turned capitalist, is it fair to argue that the rest of the world may then have? The inevitability of capitalism, I believe stems from the fact that capitalist nations took political control of the world. However even among them there was a great difference between capitalist systems as in the case of Brit and French agriculture etc. Had Europe not turned capitalist, or had China continued its expansion, or India become a world power in the 18th century, what then would the world have been? I think this question in the study of the transition is usually left un asked. What kind of economies would have been the norm?
A study must not focus only on proving that the world outside Europe, is not Europe, but also on finding out what it may have been. And what may have happened had Europe found the America a little too early, or not discovered that coal burns. I feel as historians we need to stop treating capitalism as the only means of development, but one of many, that agreeably proved to the best, but may not necessarily have been. To understand that there were alternatives to capitalism, may allow us to think of the world as a whole, not as an extension of Europe, that is always playing catch up with it. Because in many ways, the world did not actually want to catch to Europe and at all, and found it inferior. The idea of capitalism is portrayed as synonymous with development, or a step forward. Because of the political domination of capitalist nations, it is held up as an ideal. But what is the competition it has? This is a question I would like to see answered.
And more importantly, capitalism is also seen as a perfect system, for the same reason, this is an assumption that needs to be questioned. Its inherent superiority to other forms of economy, which as I have said, remain either undiscovered to denounced is something that needs to problematised. Perhaps the communist worker in Russia had a lot more common with the early industrial worker in capitalist England. Or may be, the Chinese system of work, which much better organised than capitalism would have bean better suited to the world in general, to answer these questions, it is important to see the emergence of capitalism as a historical development, as important as the development of slavery in ancient Greece, which though important to the Greek economy isn’t seen to be the greatest innovation of the period.
China was no more India, than it was Europe, and Europe was no more the centre of the world that China claimed to be.
Eduard Fanthome
II History