Discuss the reasons for collapse of liberal democracy in Italy after the First World War?

Modern Italy became a nation-state belatedly, following centuries of existence as a collection of smaller kingdoms and city-states; on March 17, 1861, when most of the states of the peninsula were united under king Victor Emmanuel II of the Savoy dynasty, which ruled over Piedmont. The architects of Italian unification were Count Camillo Benso di Cavour, the Chief Minister of Victor Emmanuel, Giuseppe Garibaldi, a general and national hero, and Giuseppe Mazzini, a political visionary and leader of the radical democratic faction in the movement for Italian unificatication (Risorgimento).With the annexation of Venetia (1866) and Rome (1870), the Italian unification was complete. However, the crucial role played by French and Prussian armies had resulted in a sense of national shame. The unification of Italy symbolized the realization of Cavour’s programme of the expansion of Piedmontese power which was accompanied by jubilation along with a sense of betrayal. Many people felt that unification didn’t live up to the hopes of Risorgimento. Moreover, the making of Italy was not followed by the making of Italians. Many inhabitants were indifferent to the unification or alienated by the new state. Italy was also beset by deep seated regionalism and provincialism born out of centuries of division and subordination. North-south divide was the hallmark of unified Italy. The myth of the fertile south had weakened national feeling. Once reality was observed, it was assumed that South would take north downhill along with it. The south, with its poverty stricken, illiterate agrarian population, deep sense of parochialism, had a tradition of peasant insurrection and deep antagonism towards all forms of centralizing authority or state, which was manifested in the tradition of private justice (mafia, camorra). South felt north was favoured. The southerners had a deep sense of hostility and often felt a sense of exploitation by the north, which was industrialized and had relatively flourishing agrarian society because of favourable climate. The imposition of Piedmontese administration on south was detested and as a result many revolts had also broken out in 1860s. The liberal government because of financial constraints and political reasons was apathetic to bridge the north-south divide and thus was unable to integrate the masses with the state. The church did not acknowledge the newly created state. The pope had issued a ban on participation in polities. Many Italians, particularly the peasants, for whom religion was an integral part of their life, often suffered form conflict of consciousness as far as participation in polities and political activities, was concerned. Adrian Lyttelton points out that further demobilization of the electorate was a result of the limitations on the electorate (uptill 1846), corruption and apathy of large number of voters. According to him Italy only had an artificial democracy. It was the government which made the elections, not the election the government. Clearly, the Italians were glad to sacrifice electoral freedom for some order, discipline, and deeper “sense of the state” which they felt themselves to lack. The base of liberal government was quite narrow until the introduction of universal manhood suffrage under Giolitti which increased the number of voters to eight million from half a million and initiated a trend of mass politics.

Unification was a result of the efforts of a minority (elites) and hence the political system that emerged was essentially elitist in nature; based on an alliance between the northern industrialist and the southern landowners. The new centralized Italian state based on the statute of 1848 granted a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature. The ministers were responsible to the king, and not to the parliament, and there was no sense of collective responsibility. 1848 statute could be stretched to cover monarchy, paternalism, enlightened liberalism, parliamentary dictatorship and mass democracy. There was no solid tradition of liberal government. R.Bonghi says Italy lacked essential prerequisite of English parliamentary government like widespread political education, a sense of social responsibility and a strong middle class. The special character of parliament was that diverse groups were held together by lose ties. In 1861 convention had settled that the ministers should normally be an expression of the majority in house. This was to give birth to ‘transformism’ according to which parliamentary managers were to create majorities in the parliament by shifting political alliances. System of coalition depended on the popular “circulation of elites”. Each prime minister depended on coalition of various elements; the difference lay almost solely in emphasis. The results of these coalition-based polities were that it inhibited growth of a clear cut party system and an organized opposition. Every government was coalition, for no group was ever powerful enough on its own. This usually meant that when any real division or clash of principle emerged, it was driven underground in order to prevent the breaking up of majority like the way in which half a dozen successive cabinets after 1919 avoided the whole issue of fascism. This was possible due to the existence of extreme views, ultraconservative or republican, communist or fascist, which wanted to alter the whole politics, and against which the group of the center had to try to combine. Italian politicians, it was argued, were too individualistic, perhaps too sensitive to criticism, to form parties of any size or durability. This led to a pattern of parliamentary dictatorship and which was different only in degree whether under Cavour, Cripi, Giolitti, or even under Mussolini. The deputies themselves were grateful when a man of action cut through their interminable debates, arbitrated their conflicting views and relieved them of responsibility for unpopular measures.

One interesting constitutional custom was that a prime minister would not normally wait for defeat in either house before resigning. The decade 1891-1900, ministries invariably resigned with waiting for a parliamentary vote against them. The king was thereby at least left more freedom in choosing a successor, “unhampered” by a parliamentary decision. Ever since 1860 the centralization of government had proceeded apace, without a parallel development in representative institution to ensure the essential freedom and enough public criticism. The senate rarely showed independence, and subserviently came to heel at the mere threat of nomination and infornata or “overfull” of new senators, in the lower house a skillful premier could usually build a majority by the patronage emanating form the ministries of the interior and public works.

The reputation of parliament naturally suffered when the process of government could be thought of as a succession of administrative edicts, and the function of deputies as mainly to talk and hinder. Parliamentary prestige also suffered when the bank scandals revealed how much government had been connected with the Banca Romana and so were presumably the mouth-pieces of corrupt financial interests. So far removed were these so-called representative form productive life of the nation that in 1900 only eight of them called themselves agriculturist and a dozen declared themselves engaged in the industry. Hence, the reputation of the house was that of a parasite community.

As late as the 19th century, Italian society was agrarian. Italy lagged far behind the advanced nations in terms of railway networks, coal production, industries and had a weak financial structure. It lacked even the necessary mineral sources for industrialization. Conjoined with a backward economy which was a major cause of extreme poverty was the scandalous level of illiteracy. There was a continued lack of a widely diffused culture. In science, letters, industry, commerce and education Italy was lagging behind other civilized powers but still thought she was better than them. This was another fundamental problem – that of gaining respect among the nations.

In 1881 France seized the north African territory of Tunisia from Italy which was an Italian zone of influence. Italy as a result joined the Austro-German alliance. This undermined the issue of Trentino and Trieste which were Italy’s principle Terre Irredente (unredeemed lands) and were the prime object of Italian patriotic passion. Crispi to turn away attention from internal problems launched a colonial attack on Abyssinia in 1896 for which she was unprepared and led to the humiliation of Adowa. This greatly aggravated national shame.

In 1898-1900-conservative groups with an authoritarian stamp undertook a campaign to reverse the trend towards parliamentary sovereignty as a result of clear failures of the parliamentary regime. The heart of the effort was “exceptional laws” proposed by general Pelloux who proposed an alternative of a strong executive, above corruption, and the law, to suppress unrest at home and assert Italy on the international scene. The constitutional crisis appears to benefit Italy as it was thought to be a new beginning for the new and improved parliament. After 1900 there was a return of prosperity -wages rose, tariff war with France ended, use of electricity increased but concentration of industry in north became more pronounced. The turn of the century, brought Giolitti to power, who was to dominate Italian politics till the war and introduced many progressive reforms. Some scholars however, point out that these were too less and self serving. He ignored the problem of south and used it as a power base as the law of 1912 was to control the vote of southern peasantry. So he basically perpetuated the old, trained methods which after expectation for something new, disappointed the people.

Meanwhile Italian national association was found in 1910 and it aspired to conquer Libya which led to Italo-Turkish war of 1911-12 ended in victory for Italy. But nationalist demanded extension of war and criticized the peace treaty which gave Libya to Italy. Moreover, criticism against the inadequacy of the liberal politicians increased. Questions such as what do, they know of national honor who are so mercenary in their business and debate all day but take no swift action, were raised.

With the out break of the First World War the liberal government decided Italy’s neutrality because Austria had broken the terms of the alliance by declaring war on Serbia without first informing Italy. The nationalist believed that the war would offer Italy an opportunity to grab more land and make its mark as a great power. While the national socialist (syndycalist) believed war would hasten revolution. The interventionist set up the Fasci Di Azione Rivoluzionaria, organized many street demonstration and demanded Italian involvement in the war. Syndicalist socialist interpreted the ww1 as an ideological, was between the right (Germany) and left (Anglo-French). Moreover, fight for nation would integrate Italian workers into the state. An amalgamation of factors such as king’s favor for Italy’s entry in war, Fasci demonstration, the selfish interest of some industrialist, and of politicians like Salandra who calculated that the war would by short, will lead to Italy’s transformation and most importantly will create a national consensus around his party which would help to defeat the liberals, finally led to Italy’s entry in war. In addition, the treaty of London (1915) which was negotiated at the king’s behest, had bound Italy to the Anglo- French block.

But Italy was not prepared for the war. War shortages, restrictions affected the morale of the people and caused a lot of misery. The defeat at Caporetto in October 1917 was to cause further disgrace. And though the war saw some genuine idealism, patriotism and united the country like never before, Italy emerged form the war economically, politically and internationally weaker. War was anyway not popular among the people and caused tremendous financial drain (industrial effort, multiplied state expenditure, inflation, wages lagging behind the raising price index, unemployment) and widened social disparities because of profiteering by some people in the course of war and intensification of north-south dichotomy.

During the war D’Annunzio had distinguished himself in the most improbable fashion. In September 1919, when the Peace Settlement awarded Dalmatia to the new Yugoslavia, D’Annunzio along with his troops occupied Fiume and established himself there for fifteen months. He was applauded as a hero by the nationalists. However in the elections of 1919 there was still not much support for the nationalists as the socialist emerged the biggest party and catholic popolari as the second largest. But D’Annunzio kept the nationalist grievances in the forefront and exposed the futility of the government in foreign matters. The nationalist fashioned the myth of “mutilated victory”. In reality, Italy received most of what it wanted with exception (Fiume and Dalmatian) and was territorially richer by 9000 square miles. But they still accused the liberal government of allowing Italy to be deceived and talked of allied betrayal.

The general frustration among all classes due to post was depression led to a wave of strikes in 1919 and 1920 (Bienno Rosso or the Two Red Years) that sank the government’s prestige even lower. In many areas especially in the north, the Socialists took control of the local government. The industrialist and landowner, and the middle class in general began to anticipate a communist revolution and favored tough repression. The government headed by Giolitti working on the premise that the worker was less dangerous in the factories than they would be on the streets and that their militancy would soon decline, urged employers and landowner to make some concessions. He also set up food committees to control distribution and prices in view of food riots. The threat of bolshevism was felt throughout the country and government inaction had failed to provide any sense of security to the upper classes.

A.Cassels points out that the threat of revolution in Italy was illusionary. There was no master plan for revolution, peasants and workers acted without premeditation and on local basis; there was no real cooperation between the strikers in one town with other. PSI failed to give national organization and fought among themselves. Lenin even said Italian proletariat movement was too immature for a revolution. Moreover revolutionary sentiment and disorder waxed and waned in accord with the fluctuations of the Italian economy and so by the last quarter of 1921 the worst post war depression was over and so was the worst of the proletarian unrest. But the myth of the threat of revolution was to be exploited by the fascist to come to power.

This was a period of dark reactions against liberalism all over Europe, of Marxist calls for revolution, of imperialist claims and of rising nationalism. Frailty in domestic policy and foreign affairs left a power vacuum at the heart of Italian politics that gave Mussolini his opportunity. The twin myths of mutilated victory and threat of red revolution pushed Italy into the embrace of fascism. And thus in the early part of the 20th century, that E. J. Hobsbawn calls the ‘Age of Catastrophe’, witnessed the shocking collapse of the liberal order and emergence of new forces in Italy-nationalism and fascism. The history of fascism remains a bitterly contested area. A number of scholars do try to subsume the history of
fascism in the biography of Mussolini, while others consider fascism as a direct outgrowth of Italian history. However, as Cassels puts it, the truth lies between the two extremes. Also it is very rare that any two theorists, even if they belong to a single school actually agree completely.

Mussolini was born in Romagna, a place renowned for its tradition of rebellion against constituted authority. He was an ardent socialist from a young age and worked as the editor of the socialist journal Avanti! However, when Mussolini switched from anti-war to pro-war in November 1914, the other Socialist Party leaders immediately claimed that he had been bought off by the bourgeoisie. But any notion that Mussolini sold out is more far-fetched than the theory that Lenin seized power because he was paid by the German government to take Russia out of the war. As one of the paramount figures of the Italian left, Mussolini had it made. He was taking a career gamble at very long odds by provoking his own expulsion from the Socialist Party, in addition to risking his life as a front-line soldier. There were various reasons for Mussolini turning into an interventionist. The socialist party stuck to the principles of revolutionary internationalism, condemned the world war as an inter-imperialist conflict and urged the workers and government to stay neutral. However, in 1914 Mussolini took a dramatic political u-turn as a result of the failure of socialist internationalism. Also continued inaction was to aid the central powers. But most importantly the war revealed the intimate ties, which bound the working class to the national bourgeois. Mussolini realized that men were mobilized into action not by class interests alone but by psychological and moral considerations transcending them. The proletariat identified with the nation. Mussolini had finally discovered the most portentous reality of the twentieth century-the nation (Gregor).

Many historians claim that the March 23, 1919 meeting at the Piazza San Sepolcro was the historic “birthplace” of the fascist movement. However, this would imply that the Italian Fascists “came from nowhere” which is simply not true Etymologically, the use of the word Fascism in modern Italian political history stretches back to the 1890s in the form of fasci, which were radical left-wing political factions that proliferated in the decades before World War I.D’Annunzio in Fiume had already devised much of the ideology and inaugrated the whole ritual of nascent fascism. However in the elections of 1919 fascism did not even win a single seat.

In 1919, the fascists had developed a program that called for a democratic republic, separation of church and state, progressive taxation for inherited wealth, and development of co-operatives or guilds to replace labor unions, universal suffrage for both sexes and proportional representation, land for peasants, national syndicalism. and so on. From this programme the fascist seem close to the left. But they also glorified war and colonial expansion which linked them with the nationalists. Early fascists demonstrated a willingness to do whatever was necessary to achieve their ends, and easily shifted from left-wing to right-wing positions as suited their purposes. For this reason A.L.Lyttelton refuses to acknowledge that fascism had an ideology and argues that fascism resorted to mere opportunism. The early fascist did not possess a systematic doctrine of how to organize social and political relations. None the less it was marked by a particular mentality. Fascist ideology was composite and unstable functional synthesis of the needs of various social groups. The ideology did not make the movement but in course of the movement the ideology was formed. However the difference in action and doctrine does not make ideology redundant. Fascism, in many respects, is an ideology of negativism: anti-liberal, anti-socialist, anti-Communist, anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian, etc., and in some of its forms anti-religion. As a political and economic system in Italy, it combined elements of corporatism, totalitarianism, nationalism, and anti-communism. But fascism as a doctrine is a product of many hands unlike the assertion of some scholars who give Mussolini the sole credit for the formation of fascist ideology.

From his earliest years as a Marxist revolutionary, Mussolini had been sympathetic to syndicalism, and then an actual Syndicalist. From 1902 to 1914, Italian revolutionary syndicalism underwent a rapid evolution. Always opposed to parliamentary democracy, Italian syndicalists, under Sorel’s influence, became more committed to extra-constitutional violence and the necessity for the revolutionary vanguard elite to ignite a conflagration. Many syndicalists lost faith in the revolutionary potential of the working class. Seeking an alternative revolutionary recipe, the most “advanced” of these syndicalists began to ally themselves with the nationalists and to favor war. Tasks of Italy were largely bourgeosie in the senses that national integration had to be completed and its masses had to be mobilized for nation building. For the revolution to begin it was important that capitalism reaches its full stage. Two avant-garde artistic movements which contributed to the Fascist worldview were Futurism and Vorticism. Futurism was the brainchild of Filippo Marinetti, who eventually lost his life in the service of Mussolini’s regime. It lauded the esthetic value of speed, intensity, modern machinery, and modern war (cult of violence). Vorticism was a somewhat milder variant of Futurism.

A general trend throughout revolutionary socialism from 1890 to 1914 was that the most revolutionary elements laid an increasing stress upon leadership, and downplayed the autonomous role of the toiling masses. This elitism was a natural outcome of the revolutionaries’ ardent wish to have revolution and the stubborn disinclination of the working class to become revolutionary (influence of ideas of Mosca and Pareto and Marx). The fascist moral ideal, upheld by writers from Sorel to Gentile, is something like an inversion of the caricature of a Benthamite liberal. The fascist ideal man is not cautious but brave, not calculating but resolute, not sentimental but ruthless, not preoccupied with personal advantage but fighting for ideals, not seeking comfort but experiencing life intensely. The early Fascists did not know how they would install the social order which would create this “new man,” but they were convinced that they had to destroy the bourgeois liberal order which had created his opposite. The nation was the myth which could unite the productive classes behind a drive to expand output. Fascist ideology, largely the work of the neo-idealist philosopher Giovanni GENTILE, emphasized the subordination of the individual to a “totalitarian” state that was to control all aspects of national life. Social Darwism with its emphasis on the survival of the fittest also justified aggressive features of fascism. Influence of Henri Bergson (rejected the scientism, mechanical evolution and materialism of Marxist ideology) can also be discerned. The fascist concept of corporatism and particularly its theories of class collaboration and economic and social relations are very similar to the model laid out by Pope Leo XIII’s 1892 encyclical Rerum Novarum. The document criticized capitalism, complaining of the exploitation of the masses in industry. However, it also sharply criticized the socialist concept of class struggle, and the proposed socialist solution to exploitation (the elimination, or at least the limitation, of private property). G.Sorel believed in the application of myth to galvanize masses into action and in his Reflections on Violence introduce Italy to the cult of violence. Violence as a creative force was an important aspect of the Fascist philosophy. G. Pappini emphasized the role of myths in electrifying masses. Nietzsche elaborated on the idea of the “superman” who symbolized man at his most creative and highest intellectual capacity. Hegel justified war to unify the state. E. Corradini stressed on the necessity to borrow elements of socialism and the importance of irrational politics which believes in nationalism as a religion.

Fascism was undoubtedly a product of the neo-romantic movement and appealed is to emotions rather than ideas. It relies on hymn-singing, flag-waving, and many other forms of anti-rationalism proliferated throughout the nineteenth century. According to fascist, humans are not solely or even chiefly motivated by rational calculation but more by intuitive “myths” (practical anti-rationalism). Mussolini was adaptable enough to embody in himself many of these diverse elements, and this was why he remained head of the party. The fascist leader might be republican or monarchist, socialist or conservative, catholic or Masonic, Anarchical. Mussolini was above all a realist and adapted himself to the political realities of the time. Fascist nationalism was also different from the liberal conservative nationalism of the elites. It was revolutionary as based on political sovereignty (everything was done in the name of the people), aggressive as wanted expansionism and cultural as aimed to form a national Italian identity. The statement “Everything in the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state” sums up their view towards the state. The advent fascist culture was important as to unite all Italians in the new faith. Therefore, so many cultural movements were made a part of fascist culture-whatever it took to allure the people. Fascist convinced that politics required principal responses to particular problems. There ideology was also developmental as they aimed at comprehensive socio-economic change.

Generally fascism was popular amongst the lower class but by the time fascism came to power it was supported by various classes for different reasons. Many moderate men had psychological and economic reasons for welcoming a movement of revolt and adventure which was directed against anarchic socialism. Ardity (demobilized soldiers) who found it hard to return to office life discovered in squadristi outlet for the same discipline. Fascism for them meant that desired thing, a uniform, as it also often polled a job in either the well-stocked party hierarchy or the squads. Many of the white-collar unemployed also therefore joined the nationalist, the futurists, the violence-loving sydicalists, and those malcontents with a grudge to settle. Many peasants had a permanent grudge against the liberals who in sixty years power had done so little for their welfare. There were landlords who wanted strikes broken and their tenants and laborers kept in order, and there were shopkeeper who would have liked to end the competition form socialist co-operative.

Fascism was to have a large following among men of property. Industrialist in general wanted as strong government to force through a new strike law, to keep wages low, and to raise tariffs for protection against the postwar slump, while others had private information that the existing government monopolies in railroads, telephone, and insurance would be released by fascism to private enterprises. Mussolini’s first speech in parliament in June 1921 tried to wheedle these people by saying that “the history of capitalism is only just beginning.”

Support also came to him from the poorer middle classes whose fixed income was rapidly depreciating due to the economic inflation and who thus became an important revolutionary force. There were those patriots of every class who had been humiliated by socialist opposition to the war and liberal “renunciation” of the peace, many Catholics looked upon Mussolini as a defense against red atheism, and the popularity had been won over to the idea of collaboration by 1922. Other groups were moved by their irritation at an incompetent and corrupt parliament where people merely of jockeyed for place and let issues slide. To such people fascism represented an efficient administration which would act more.

Fascist made use of the crisis of the two red years. The unrest of the two red years had reached unprecedented levels and Mussolini offered to send in Squadre d’azione (action squads) to put an end to factory and land occupations. The elites frustrated and angered by the liberal government’s stance of concessions and inaction were only too pleased to give money to Mussolini’s group in return for the squadristi violence against the left’s strike and occupations. The success of Socialists, in the local election increased the fear of revolution for the elites. The same fear united the parliament in a manner nothing had in the past. Benito Mussolini exploited the threat of communism (which in a way was created by his own movement). The fascist squadristi proved effective in suppressing mass unrest and Squadristi violence continued and went unchecked even though the threat of revolution has passed by 1921. With the treaty of Rapallo Mussolini’s political rival, D’Annunzio took a back seat, while the communists seceded from the socialist party, weakening its position. As soon as there was a sign of stability the fascist created unrest as there opportunity lay in the crisis.

The opportunism of Mussolini was seen when he signed a pact of pacification with the socialist in August 1921. But Mussolini proved not to be strong enough to swing his followers. The ras rebelled against making a pact with the very people they had lately had been hired to massacre. Their rebellion against the leader was apparently backed by the landowner and businessman who had the purse strings. Mussolini momentarily had to resign from the executive of his fascist movement and some regional meetings passed resolution to renounce his leadership altogether. He was, however, too skillful a tactician not to be able to eat his word almost at once, and at the fascist congress in Rome during November 1921 he capitulated and buried this stillborn pact with socialism. Mussolini allowed the movement to be transformed into the Fascist Party, and the squadristi or Action Squads began to be incorporated as the Party Militia with special uniforms (blackshirts), a process which was gradually completed by 1924.

There was government inaction and the liberals were moving closer to fascism as there traditional enemies socialists and Catholics threatened there power. This was a failure of perception and leadership on their part. The aristocratic nationals provided an entry of fascist in the court circles. Fascist assault on basic rights was justified as the only alternative to anarchy. But D.M.Smith states that post war problems were everywhere but in Italy the ruling class was so bewildered that they lost both control over events and confidence in themselves.

Giolitti created a National Bloc in the election campaign of May 1921. The national Bloc United the Liberals, Nationalists and fascists, using the symbol of the Fascio, the lictors’rods; the other competitors were the socialists, the Popolari and the Communists. The elections gave the nationalists ten seats in the Chamber and the Fascists thirty-five. The largest majority was that of the socialists. The Third international called for a violent revolution because of which the socialist party split into reformist and radical communist and this paved way for counter revolution from the right. The Vatican pressed popolari to break from giolitti and protect assets of Religious Corporation as a result of Giolitti’s tax reforms. Giolitti was accused as a dictator and all turn against him .He asked for full powers but was refused because of rivalries, class interest and regional influences and so he resigned. Giolitti’s dissolution of the parliament 1921 proved to be a disastrous error as it favoured the collusion with fascist and also alienated the popolari along with strengthening the anti- parliamentary forces of the right. The popolari and socialist were not reduced in numbers so the net result was to weaken the democratic and liberal centre. With the resignation of Giolitti the parliament lost a skilful leader. The government under Bonomi and Facta was hopelessly divided and ineffective. The Bonomi government tried to restore peace but he wasn’t the man of the situation .He was succeeded by the facta government which attempted to appease the fascists and gain stability. However, the government under Facta lacked authority and was unable to control the situation. There now existed a power vacuum.

In the meantime, Mussolini was a deputy who hoped to achieve real power and was determined to make full use of the opportunity. He now realized that he had to convince the industrialists, landowners, and the middle classed of three things, that the liberals were finished as an effective political force, that there was a real threat of socialist revolution and that only the fascists were strongly enough and determined enough to take the necessary action and restore order and dignity to Italy. Mussolini was still enigma which everyone interpreted as they say.

At this moment (August 1922) of all moments a general strike was declared, a last fatal example of the strike myth which had deluded Italian socialism for twenty years. Mussolini launched an ultimatum that the fascists themselves would break the strike if the government did not immediately intervene to stop it. This enabled his gangs to pose as defenders of law and order and at the same time offered an excellent chance to seize some of the important towns not yet captured for fascism. Of these was Milan, the biggest prize of all, the brain center of Italian socialism. To the satisfaction of the Corriere and many main industrialists, Farinacci then ejected the socialist civic administration. The commercial classes of Milan especially detested any transportation strike and were therefore duly appreciative when the fascists took over trains and stations and operated a reduced service for the public. Their gratitude undoubtedly took a concrete monetary form. Among such people the fatal illusion was spreading that Italy was on the edge of economic collapse and needed a savior. On 20th September Mussolini grudgingly accepted monarchy this made the king feel more secure towards the fascists.

 
The failure of Facta government led to the search of new ministry. October 24, 1922 Mussolini issued the call: “either they will give us the government or we shall seize it by descending on Rome”. The “March on Rome” was entrusted to the quadrumvirate which reflected the diverse elements of leadership as it included an extremist, nationalist, ultra conservative and syndicalist socialist. Throughout October Mussolini negotiated with everyone in sight-Giolitti, Facta, Orlando, Salandra and each was made to feel that fascist desired and needed them for the new combinazione. As the coup unfolded on 28th October it was now clear that fascist wanted a upper hand in the government. They didn’t just want to enter into office but wanted to control the office as well. Facta government was taken by surprise at the first signs of fascist mobilization on 26th October and wanted to proclaim the martial law to protect Rome but the king refuse to sign the proclamation and in this he was acting against ministerial advice. A.lyttelton feels that although the process of crisis narrowed the choices, fascist victory was not inevitable even now. In the final stage a lot depended on the individual decision and temperament of the king. But when all objective elements, the indecisiveness of the government, partial success of the fascist tactics, fear of the Duke of Aosta are added up along with considering temperament of the Victor Emmannuel (he was a pessimist) the king decision to invite Mussolini to become the premiere on October 30th can be justified; even though the king still wielded the loyalty of the army which was enough to crush the fascists and the senate.

As much as the fascist latter portrayed the coming fascist to power as a coup d’état, it can hardly be said that they took over the state by a violent revolution. They received the backing of Giolitti, Bonami, Salandra. Before any of the fascist squadristi reached Rome Mussolini had become the premier and thus the transfer of power was very much within the legal framework. Mussolini was now at the head of a wide coalition.

Although Italy’s Prime Minister was a Fascist, Italy was not yet a Fascist state. Mussolini’s coalition government had only four Fascist in the cabinet and the government was essentially, a nationalist – Italian popular party (P.P.I.) liberal coalition. Mussolini took several measures to consolidate his authority. The parliament gave him emergency powers for one year on his cause of creating a untied and strong Italy. In order to increase his support among the conservative elites he appointed the liberal Alberto de Stefani as finance minister who reduced government controls on industry and trade and cut taxation. In December 1922, in an attempt to tighten his grip over the party he established a Fascist grand council which was declared as the Supreme decision making body. He insisted on sole power over appointment to the council and was successful in persuading the council to convert the fascist action squads into a national fascist militia funded by government money. This step considerably reduced the power of the provincial ras. Between April–June 1923, he worked to gain support from the Catholic hierarchy and announced several measures including renouncing atheism. In February 1923 he fused the Fascist Party with the Nationalist who were proving competitive, particularly in the south. In the same year Giovanni Gentile’s educational reform became law; it was pleasing to the new Pope, Pius XI because it made religious instruction compulsory in all the elementary state schools. The Vatican thought fascism to be less dangerous than socialism. In the early 1920s, the Catholic party in Italy (Partito Popolare) was in the process of forming a coalition with the Reform Party that could have stabilized Italian politics and thwarted Mussolini’s projected coup. On October 2, 1922, Pope Pius XI circulated a letter ordering clergy not to identify themselves with the Partito Popolare, but to remain neutral, an act that undercut the party and its alliance against Mussolini.

Old order still not overthrown and the ras were impatient. There was Considerable tension within fascism for two years between the extremists and the moderates. Meanwhile, Mussolini was successful in getting the Acerbo law passed which was intended to give the fascists total control of Italian politics. According to the law the party which was to get maximum votes (minimum 25%) was to be automatically given 2/3rd of the seats of the Chamber of Deputies. The elections of April 1924 witnessed systematic use of terror by the fascists who managed to secure 65% of the votes.

In June Matteotti, a socialist leader was murdered. Matteotti’s death precipitated a crisis so acute that the king was almost obliged to dismiss Mussolini who was indirectly responsible for the murder. Although administrative power was in his hands Mussolini lost his confidence for months. By the end of the year he recovered it partly because of the hopeless divisions among his enemies and the industrialists were also opposed to another fresh beginning.

The Fascist extremists had been threatening of second Fascist revolution, and on 31st December, as part of their threat, thirty three Consuls of the Fascists Militia went to Mussolini demanding all or nothing, it is said. Three days later on 3rd January 1925. Mussolini accordingly made his famous speech in the Chamber in which he assumed personal responsibility for all that had happened. From this time onwards the other parties were suppressed, and his regime became one of permanent dictatorship or, more simply of tyranny.

Rise of fascism has been perceived differently by the Marxist and the liberals. Marxist ascribe generally to the theory of crisis of socialism. Marxism had survived into a world which Marx had believed could not possibly exist. The workers were becoming richer, the working class was fragmented into sections with different interests, technological advance was accelerating rather than meeting a roadblock, the “rate of profit” was not falling, the number of wealthy investors (“magnates of capital”) was not falling but increasing, industrial concentration was not increasing, and in all countries the workers were putting their country above their class. It was thus, the lack of the revolutionary capacity on the part of the proletariat which permitted the political development of fascism.

A.James Gregor has argued that Fascism is a Marxist heresy, a claim that has to be handled with care. Marxism is a doctrine whose main tenets can be listed precisely: class struggle, historical materialism, surplus-value, nationalization of the means of production, and so forth. Nearly all of those tenets were explicitly repudiated by the founders of Fascism, and these repudiations of Marxism largely define Fascism. Yet however paradoxical it may seem, there is a close ideological relationship between Marxism and Fascism. Mussolini remained a radical and saw himself as a revolutionary. Fascism in its belief, in a revolutionary elite leading the masses, with its own particular vision of revolution, was a close kin of the Jacobins of the French revolution of for that matter the Bolsheviks. In power, the actual institutions of Fascism and Communism tended to converge. Intellectually, ►Fascists differed from Communists in that they had to a large extent thought out what they would do, and they then proceeded to do it, whereas Communists were like hypnotic subjects, doing one thing and rationalizing it in terms of a completely different and altogether impossible thing. ► Fascists preached the accelerated development of a backward country. Communists continued to employ the Marxist rhetoric of world socialist revolution in the most advanced countries, but this was all a ritual incantation to consecrate their attempt to accelerate the development of a backward country. ►Fascists deliberately turned to nationalism as a potent myth. Communists defended Russian nationalism and imperialism while protesting that their sacred motherland was an internationalist workers’ state. ►Fascists proclaimed the end of democracy. Communists abolished democracy and called their dictatorship democracy. ►Fascists argued that equality was impossible and hierarchy ineluctable. Communists imposed a new hierarchy, shot anyone who advocated actual equality, but never ceased to babble on about the equalitarian future they were “building”. ►Fascists did with their eyes open what Communists did with their eyes shut. This is the truth concealed in the conventional formula that ►Communists were well-intentioned and Fascists evil-intentioned. The chief contrast lay in the economic absolutism of the soviet Russian state, which had replaced the entrepreneurs and the big landowners of Russia. (Wiskemann). But if one characterizes fascism’s first phase as libralist and the second a thermidorian phase then this would apply to Bolshevism as well.

Another Marxist theory of rise of fascism is a reaction to the crisis of capitalism. The general crisis of capitalism, which emerged after World War I as the unavoidable result of the sharpening of imperialist contradictions, was a crisis of the entire capitalist social system. Fascism is capitalism with the mask off. It’s a tool of Big Business, which rules through democracy until it feels mortally threatened, then unleashes fascism. Mussolini and Hitler were put into power by Big Business, because Big Business was challenged by the revolutionary working class. The explanation is that Fascism deceived the masses by fiendishly clever use of ritual and symbol. Hilferding wrote: “Finance capital does not want freedom, but dominance; But in order to achieve this, to preserve its overwhelming power and expand it further, it needs the state, which ensures its command of the domestic market by way of import duties and tariff policies, a powerful state which can promote its financial interests abroad, a state which can intervene everywhere in the world in order to transform the entire world into an investment sphere and finally, a state which is powerful enough to pursue expansionary policies.”

The backbone of Gregor’s analysis of fascism is his concept of “reactive developmental nationalism,” In brief, reactive developmental nationalism represents, according to Gregor, a tendency which emerges when a “nation” sees the need to forge ahead economically in order to assert its national identity and place in the sun, and when the progress toward this place in the sun seems stymied by some foreign catastrophe or national embarrassment. The result is a “reactive” authoritarianism, an attempt to develop the nation from the top down and to adopt something like the “reactionary modernism”. This view obviously sees fascism clearly as a reactionary movement- a reaction to the backward condition of Italy.

Renzo de Felicia in his work Universal fascism has shown that Italian fascism was both right wing and revolutionary. He has distinguished between “Fascism – Movement” and “Fascism regime” and has argued that while Mussolini’s regime was authoritarian and reactionary, within the “Fascism movement” there were many who were animated by “a desire to renew and wanted something more revolutionary by sweeping away the old ruling class to make way to newer and dynamic elements – capable of fundamental changes.” Though “Fascism – movement” was overcome and eventually suppressed by “fascism regime” it did constitute a political revolution in Italy since for the first time there was an attempt to mobilize masses and to involve them in the political life of the country. He however concedes that Mussolini’s was a “failed revolution”. He further adds that fascism rose in a period of crisis which according to him Mussolini personified .Thus, for him Mussolini was the “symbol of crisis”. However, since there is no final authority on what constitutes a true revolution (E. Weber) the issue that Fascism was revolutionary or not, remains an open ended one.

The question of whether fascism was rooted in the left or epitomized the right is again quite debated. While historians such as Gregor point of that fascism was a movement largely rooted in the left. Its leaders and initiators were secular-minded, highly progressive intellectuals, hard-headed haters of existing society and especially of its most bourgeois aspects. However, others don’t agree. A.Gramsci writes that fascism was not just a body guard of the bourgeoisie but also a social movement. The recruitment resources of Fascism lay essentially in the urban petite bourgeoisie and new agrarian bourgeoisie but a variety of circumstances had provided Fascism with an ideological unity that permitted the movement to oppose the traditional political leaders with an ideological system essentially anti liberal and potentially totalitarian. Walter Laqueur takes a middle of the road position and states,”But historical fascism was always a coalition between radical, populist (‘fascist’) elements and others gravitating toward the extreme Right. While opposing communism and social democracy, fascism was influenced by the theories of Gabriele D’Annunzio (a former anarchist), Alceste de Ambris (influenced by anarcho-syndicalism), and Benito Mussolini(former socialist). Also it maybe concluded that Fascism represented the force of new (extreme) nationalism which in political terms lies somewhere between communism and capitalism; in other words a political ‘third force’.

In conclusion, fascism was a result of the crisis of confidence of the liberal regime.The loss of government authority aggravated the economic crisis and along with the crisis of public order and of parliament made solution more difficult and fascist seemed to offer an answer. The elites in power failed to realize that fascism was as much a threat to them as the socialist. Fascism could not have come to power without the help of the elites. Fascist power rested on the weakness of their opponents. If only the liberals could have united and acted could the fascist be stoped but since they didn’t fascism attained power practically without any hindrance. Mussolinni above all was a realist and craved for power. And the liberals, socialists and democratic Catholics all played into his hands. Mussolini was aware of the similarities between Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy and indeed he fancied himself as the Lenin of Italy. Fascism changed dramatically between 1919 and 1922, and again changed dramatically after 1922. This is what we expect of any ideological movement which comes close to power and then attains it. Bolshevism also changed dramatically, several times over. Fascist also should be credited for a brilliant propaganda through mass media to mobilize the masses and in being able to portray themselves as solution to Italy’s problems. Fascism however remained a movement of minority committed to mobilize the inert masses. The ‘One Party State’ was a paradoxical novelty borrowed by Fascism from Soviet Russia. A political group, misusing the liberal conception of a free party, was able to extend its power to be equivalent to that of an absolute monarch by destroying all rivals instead of debating with them. The phraseology gave the new absolutism the appearance of popular support. Also fascist ideology was a product of the neo romantic movement and appealed to the basic instincts of man.

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