Dias Mario Antony

B.A (Hons.) History-III

Modern India Assignment

Q.What are the elements of continuity and change in the polity and economy of 18th century India?

Ans: There are two different lines of thought that dominate any study of the 18th century. On one hand we have the traditional historiography which tells us that the century was one of decline and stagnation while the other searches for possible elements of continuity and change that characterized the century. This essay shall attempt an examination of the elements of continuity and change in the 18th century which was a witness to the breakdown of Mughal rule, emergence of regional powers and the establishment of colonial rule in India.

The political climate of 18th century India was volatile. Declining Mughal power was accompanied by a gradual rise in power and autonomy of the territories that had been under its hold. Having reached its culmination by the late Seventeenth century, Mughal power, following the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, weakened under the control of weak rulers who were undermined in their exercise of power by the rise of powerful nobles. Nurul Hasan, in his discussion of Zamindars points out that the decline of the Mughals was facilitated by an internal contradiction that lay in the relationship between the centralizing powers of the state and the parochial tendencies of the Zamindars. Early twentieth century Historians like Jadunath Sarkar interpreted the powerful resistance of the Maratha, Sikh and Jats as reflective of ‘Hindu resistance’ to Aurangzeb’s (alleged) bigotry.

Irfan Habib however chose to explain the cause of Mughal decline in fiscal terms. He argues that the revolts, which took the shape of peasant uprisings, were products of economic oppression caused by the proliferation of Mansabdars and exorbitant Mughal revenue exactions. However, the occurrence of these revolts in relatively prosperous regions, and the Zamindar leadership that propelled them, makes Habib’s exploitation-poverty-resistance causal chain flimsy. Athar Ali attributed Mughal decline to the administrative and economic crisis caused by the shortage of Jagirs with the political expansion into less fertile regions like the Deccan. Other explanations view Mughal decline as a result of a ‘cultural failure’ that made the empire politically and economically vulnerable. 

These internal imbalances, coupled with external factors like the series of destructive invasions by Nadir Shah in 1739 followed by Ahmad Shah Abdali, and increasingly frequent disruptions in bullion flows from Europe, over which the Mughal financial system had grown increasingly dependent, resulted in the steady decline of Mughal power and also sometimes seen as an overall period of decline in the traditional historiography.

The decline of the Mughal Empire is an irrefutable fact, but, to confuse this with a general collapse of political authority, endemic warfare and uncontrollable anarchy would be a mistake. It is now argued that the British rule was built, not on Indian collapse, but on the emergence of a new order in 18th century India based on stable regional authorities. The 18th century saw an increasing decentralization of power to lower levels of sovereignty – regional rulers, small potentates and even little rajas of villages.

Mughal successor states assumed three forms, firstly, independent kingdoms where provincial governors had asserted autonomy such as Bengal, Awadh, Hyderabad, and Arcot. These states were dependent on merchant bankers such as the Jagat Seths of Bengal. Secondly; the warrior states of the Sikhs, Jats and Marathas that were distinguished by their non-Muslim religious-symbolism and adoption of military fiscalism; and lastly compact local kingdoms whose sovereignty had acquired teeth in the 18th century such as the Rajput states, Telugu speaking warrior clans and Afghan Sultanates. These states resorted to military fiscalism within compact domains, achieving varying degrees of success in extracting revenues from trade and production.

That there occurred a dispersal of political power from the centre to regions is undeniable. But it is important to question whether the rise of new states marked the rise of a new radical political and structural order? The emergent regional powers developed in a milieu peculiar to their local conditions, and its influence in their state systems cannot be doubted. But was there a change at the fundamental level is the bigger question. An examination of the administrative systems of these successor states will reveal some undeniable strands of continuity.

Many of these states continued with the methods of Mughal administration and revenue collection. The continuation of such administrative and revenue structures was much stronger in the successor states like Hyderabad, Bengal and Awadh, which had experienced the transition from Mughal suba to autonomous powers. Regionally based state systems retained elements of Mughal administration and the Muslim service gentry and Hindu scribes learned in Persian continued to be the mainstay of the administrative apparatus in these states.

Christopher Bayly is one of the foremost proponents of the idea of continuity. According to him these successor states maintained the outward forms of Mughal rule since the Mughal Emperor continued to be the highest manifestation of ‘sovereignty’, but simultaneously developed more effective techniques to extract resources from agriculture and trade. This led to the emergence of new, more centralized state formations that had greater control over resources within their territories. Some instances such as that of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah of Hyderabad, who waged wars, concluded peace and conferred titles without reference to Delhi but never explicitly declared his independence. Similarly, Murshid Quli Khan even after exercising effective power of Bengal sent large tributes to the Mughal emperor. Muslim nawabs such as those of Carnatic and the Sikhs took part in ceremonial acknowledgements of Mughal power. 

A survey of the dominant trends reveals that neither change, nor continuity singularly overwhelmed the politico – economic and cultural life in the 18th century. The issue of change and continuity becomes more pertinent and contentious in a discussion on the onset of British colonialism in the subcontinent. Was the battle of Plassey in 1757 an event that marked a massive break in Indian history which led to the insertion of an abstraction called colonialism in the 18th century Indian milieu?

Historians like Irfan Habib assert that colonialism was a disruptive force. The British conquest of Bengal was not any usual conquest; Bengal served as a springboard for further British expansionism. Plassey was an event that led to the full-blown development of colonialism in the subcontinent. The colonialism that emerged was not only inherently ‘alien’ in character but was also a product of capitalism. Habib, discussing the economic changes British rule initiated, argues that the grant of Diwani in 1765 reduced the bullion flows into India, caused inflation, intensified the drain of wealth from Bengal and, after 1813, large-scale deindustrialization; these were developments that constituted a major break or change with the past.

Countering this assertion are the revisionist historians like Bayly, Subramanyam, Marshall and Stein among others who perceive the onset of colonialism as a gradual historical process. The focus here is on the pre-existing ‘indigenous roots’ of colonialism in pre-colonial India. They attribute the success of colonial rule to the manner in which it grafted itself over the indigenous networks of power and infrastructure. The rise of the Company State is seen as the culmination of the processes of revenue farming and military fiscalism that characterized the political economies of the regions in eighteenth century India. Transition and collaboration are the key words in this sort of argument, and the categories of portfolio capitalists and indigenous origins of colonialism become significant. Thus they give us an idea of continuity which is existent during the period.

Stein disputes the notion that the nature of the British regime in India violently departed from that of previous Indian states by stating that ‘early colonial regimes’ were ‘continuations of prior indigenous regimes’. The period from the 1750 to 1850 was one of transition from extant old regimes to new colonial ones. There existed a structural contradiction in the pre – British state formations between the ‘centralizing militaristic’ regimes and the numerous local lordships. The colonial state, Stein says, resolved this contradiction in favour of the centralizing tendency of ‘military fiscalism’ inherited from the previous regimes, indicating a sign on continuity.

PJ Marshall continues on this theme by stating that the initial exercise of power by the colonial state did not mark any break with the Indian pattern of rule. The British, he says, maintained an outward respect for the existing Mughal forms and entered into partnerships with Indian tax administrators and bankers. Further, it was the buoyancy of the economy that made possible the high yields of British taxation. A dramatically distinct colonial order consisting of peculiar British modes of government and a new pattern of economic relations was to come at a stage much later.

Elaborating this point, Stein argues that it is only in the second half of the 19th century that the colonial state departs from the ‘Sultanate forms’, characterized by a patrimonial order based on personal loyalty and servility to the ruler, and establishes a regime based on modern European principles, thus marking a disjuncture from both – old indigenous and the early colonial regimes.

The revisionists, in stronger tone, argue that the Europeans in the late 18th and early 19th centuries achieved ‘on a larger and more ominous scale what Indian local rulers had been doing for the last century’. But the revisionists add that the Indians responded to this conquering thrust by turning into ‘active agents’ and not ‘passive victims’ in the creation of colonial India.

Others argue that British rule was nurtured by Indian wealth and built on the foundations laid by regional states. The rise of viable regional states may in fact have been a necessary prerequisite for the rise of the British. The military and fiscal needs of regional rulers allowed the British to gain a political foothold as military commanders and bankers. Using this as leverage, the British gradually usurped political dominance and control, taking over the administrative structures created for the regional states and making them work for their own purposes. Thus the early colonial state was a continuation of the earlier system and also took Indian revenue collectors and bankers into partnership.

Frank Perlin makes a much more subtle and nuanced argument. He points out that the centralisation characteristic of colonial rule had its roots in the earlier period. But in accelerating this process, colonial rule gave it a new, more powerful form. This produced a fundamental break between early colonial polity and its predecessors, despite the colonial use of “old order institutions and its social underpinnings”. Thus according to Perlin, the state had been fundamentally changed beneath the paint of old terms and institutions.

In short the revisionists argue that the early colonial regime may be seen as an extension and continuation of processes with distinctly indigenous origins. Bayly writes that this new perspective treats the Indian people as subjects of history and not mere objects of colonial rule: Indian responded to this conquering thrust, not as mere passive victims but as active collaborators in the creation of colonial India.

It is perhaps premature to make unqualified statements on historical trends given the complexity of Indian society, but it appears that the 18th century was more than simply a new presentation of old social relationships. The emergence of local and regional regimes gave some groups significant social advancement, particularly the organizations of Indian traders and bankers: lineages of administrative and military personnel and networks of religious organizations. Bayly writes that in the 18th century, firstly the monetization of agrarian relations and the emergence of the free market were modifying old dominance’s based on force or caste rank. Secondly cash-strapped traditional elites were forced to admit men of commerce to a small share of political power. This was a gradual change from the traditional distribution of power.

Although the political influence of merchant-bankers in the late 18th century regimes is recognized there are people who argue that there was no substantial change as the political role of merchants was limited by their dharma and they remained of low social status. Cities, it is alleged, were dominated by patrimonial and bureaucratic elites which precluded the emergence of civic liberties.

This view is countered by Bayly who points out that evidence from parts of India suggests that not only had the economic and political importance of merchants enhanced in the period of successor states, but that corporations of merchants, townsmen and religious specialists had developed an autonomy that even amounted to civic self-government in some cases. Above all credit-worthiness over-rode caste distinctions in the world of commerce. Bayly asserts that the commercialisation of politics and rise of corporations were by origin intrinsic changes within the economy and culture, though enhanced by the growing presence of the Europeans in India.

Contrary to traditional notions of the absolute separation of state and commercial spheres in pre-colonial India, Christopher Bayly and S. Subramaniyam have suggested that there were some substantial entrepreneurs who commanded sizeable resources and were able simultaneously handle the worlds of commerce and political participation. It is these men who were dubbed the ‘portfolio capitalists’. The authors point out that a portfolio capitalist was not necessarily a merchant, but could be from a military or administrative background. According Burton Stein and Washbrook, in the attempt to increase their control over resources, states became increasingly dependent on merchants to implement mercantilist policies such as revenue-farming and state commercial systems. This in turn led to a thorough penetration of the state by merchant interests, which was reflected in the greater ability of merchant capital to subordinate labour.

Both these views have been critiqued by Prasannan Parthasarthi who has an alternative viewpoint to offer. Merchants in 18th century South Asia were according to him involved in three main activities: banking, trading and financing production. On the basis of this distinction, Parthasarthi suggests that the political power of banking interests may have increased in the 18th century successor states, but this did not imply greater power for merchants per se. The disenfranchised merchants and other powerful indigenous social groups who were excluded from the south Indian political order, according to Parthasarthi, were incorporated by the Company who backed them in their conflicts with both producers and centralizing state formations. The financiers of production in their turn became crucial supporters of the Company and its emerging state in South India.

Thus having seen the commercialization of state power in pre-colonial India we was a change from the traditional systems, we may now turn to an analysis of economic conditions in the 18th century. The generally accepted view that the prosperity of the 17th century drifted into penury in the 18th century has been questioned. Muzaffar Alam argues that the first half of the 18th century was a period of continuing economic expansion in parts of northern India. Similarly C.A. Bayly writes that there is evidence of a buoyant economy in certain areas right through the century.

‘Backward’ or even ‘stagnant’ are not very accurate descriptions of the Indian economy in the 18th century whether we look at agriculture, inland trade or even urbanization. The yield per acre of Indian agriculture was quite high and could favourably compare with the average yield of wheat under scientific cultivation in the UK according to Raychaudhuri. It is worth noting that the period between 1704 and 1770 was remarkably free of famine. Overall, a favourable land-labour ratio enabled highly mobile peasant and tribal labour to negotiate reasonable terms with controllers of land. While some village notables managed to transform revenue farms into hereditary estates, others felt the pinch from powerful regional states like Tipu’s Mysore, which employed military fiscalism within a territorially compact kingdom to successfully extract resources. Pockets of agricultural decline, often because of inter-state warfare as in Punjab and parts of North India, were more than counterbalanced by wider expanses of growth. On the whole population, production, wages and prices tended to be on a gentle upswing in the 18th century.

Besides a highly productive agriculture, there was a large commercialized sector with a highly sophisticated market and credit structure, manned by a skilful and in instances, very wealthy commercial class. It drew upon a wide range of manufactures and commercial crops to supply a domestic as well as overseas market. India’s textile exports met the cloth requirements in several parts of South-east Asia and the Middle East. That this trade was extremely competitive, being based on very low costs of production, is evident in the imposition of protective tariffs by the British textile industry. Overall the commercialized sector of the Indian economy was expanding in the 17th and 18th centuries, there were signs of market integration and of increasing involvement of agricultural and rural manufacturers with exchange and a money economy, credit had become common in rural India and in some parts the two-way traffic between two and country had assumed significant proportions by the late 18th century. The tendency towards localization of manufacture, its organization on the basis of labour under centralized control, the adoption of the ‘joint-stock’ principle by sections of the commercial class and the entrepreneurial efforts at developing European-style shipping – all these indicated a degree of dynamism and responsiveness to market forces according to Raychaudhuri.

Although the old commercial centres of Surat, Maslipatnam and Dhaka decline, colonial port cities like Bombay, Calcutta and Madras arose in their place. Similarly the decline of Mughal capitals, Delhi and Agra, was compensated by the rise of regional capitals, including Lucknow, Hyderabad, various Maratha cities, and Seringapatam. Thus Jalal and Bose argue that the level of urbanization was clearly higher in 1800 than a century before.

On the whole the Indian economy in the 18th century remained a traditional agrarian one with dominant subsistence sectors coexisting and partly interacting with a complex and sophisticated world of commerce, manufactures and credit. India’s economic situation was not comparable to Western Europe on the eve of the Industrial Revolution: an agricultural revolution was absent while her technology had been stagnant and unchanging for centuries

To conclude then, from the issues discussed above, it is evident that the predominant 19th century view of the 18th century as a period of political anarchy, economic decline and social decay, between the Mughal and British empires, is in urgent need of revision. Recent research and fresh evidence have come up with new explanations and debates. What emerges is a mixed scenario of shadow and light, with high points and low points, and of continuity as well as change in 18th century India.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  • Bayly, C.A. – Rulers, Townsmen and Bazars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870.
  • Chaudhury, S. – From Prosperity to Decline, Eighteenth Century Bengal
  • Marshall, P.J. – The Eighteenth Century
  • Subramanyam, S. – Merchants, Markets and the Colonial State in Early Modern India
  • Seema Alavi (article)
  • Class Notes- Dr. Rohit Wanchoo