Do you agree that the early medieval period is associated with the decline in trade, urbanism and demonetization?

Ans: Feudalism is a term that is generally applied to European society from the fifth to the fifteenth century. The political essence lay in the organisation of the whole administrative structure on the basis of land, its economic essence lay in the institution of serfdom in which peasants were attached to the soil held by landed intermediaries placed between the king and the actual tillers, who had to pay rent in kind and labour to them. It is on these broad terms that the system or near system of feudalism in India is to be examined. Indian feudalism is not earmarked by overt typical features, rather is an event characterized by the assimilation of land grants, transfer of lands to intermediaries, transfer of administrative and fiscal rights of lands, decentralization of certain polities etc over a period of a few hundred years. While Marxist historians like R. S. Sharma, D. N. Jha, B. D. Chattopadhyaya support the parallels and derive their views on Indian Feudalism from the European standards, historians like D. C. Sircar and Harman Mukhia are no very pro the comparisons. But before the idea to label this period as ‘feudal’ came into being, the early medieval period was viewed as a degeneration period where increased ruralisation, and self-sufficient village economies was the foci of economic production.

Feudal characters of administrative and political nature were noticed in the post- Maurya, Gupta period. The most striking feature was the practice of ‘making land grants’ to the Brahmans. The early Pali texts of pre- Mauryan periods refer to the granting of villages by the Kosala and Magadha rulers to the villagers. But administrative rights on the villages granted came into being in the 2nd century AD when Gautamaputra Satakarni made grants to the Buddhist monks in which the government officials and the district police could not enter. But it was from the time of Pravarasena II Vakataka onwards (5th century) that the ruler gave up his control over almost all sources of revenue. The donor abandons not just the revenue, but also the right to govern the inhabitants of the village. Of the seven organs of the state, taxation system and coercive power based on the army are rightly regarded as two vital elements without which the state power disintegrates. The widespread practice of making land grants in the Gupta period paved the way for the rise of Brahman feudatories, who performed administrative functions almost independently. The functions of the collection of taxes, levy of forced labour, regulation of mines, agriculture, etc., together with those of the maintenance of law and order, and defense which were hitherto performed by the state officials, were now step by step abandoned, first to the priestly class, and later to the warrior class.

B.D Chattopadhyaya argues that urbanism in many places actually coincides or even precedes the period where land grants become popular. Therefore it is unlikely that the land grant economy might actually serve a cause for the disruption of urban centers. Records from Hsuan Tsang’s work have stated that the maximum decayed urban centers were around the Ganga valley. But he also stated about decay of ‘peopled villages’. In other words, it was not exclusively that the urban centers were decaying; it was a general phenomenon incorporating even the rural areas. Moreover, in his work we find him conspicuously defining a ‘village’ and a ‘town’.

The Kali Age hypothesis formulated by R. S. Sharma states that the migration of people, especially the peasants and the artisans on account of the unbearable taxes played a part in the decline of the urban centers in the Northern India and the Deccan. Reference to migrations, due to royal oppressions has been found in the Jatakas. He believes that the fleeing of the taxpaying peasants, artisans and traders became more common in the third and fourth centuries during which the Kali age is ascribed. Speculations on the increase of taxes pertain to few factors like the increase in the need for foreign luxury goods by the rulers led to a flourishing foreign trade which adversely affected the revenue and taxation pattern. He also believes the reduction of the fertility of land on certain areas played a part in the decline. The brief period of social instability marked the sudden slump in the spheres of artisanal and commercial activities attested by epigraphic and archaeological evidence. Sharma argues that the Kali Age is an indication in the crisis in the mode of production. D.N. Jha and B.N.S. Yadav have accepted this theory. D.N. Jha however, has some reservations about the chronology of the Kali Age.

Sharma and Kosambi visualized a society that was self sufficient; they rejected the Asiatic society (unchanging) theory of Indian feudal society. They refused to look at a society as unchanging or static. Emphasis was on the external factors influencing the society. B.D. Chattopadhyaya studied numismatics. He questioned Sharma’s ‘paucity of coins theory’.

THE level of monetisation has been an important link in the chain of arguments about the emergence of the feudal order in early medieval India by Sharma. Beginning with the thrust on “paucity” of metal money and its links with the relative decline in trade and urbanisation between circa A.D. 600 and 1200, the construct of Indian Feudalism has negotiated some alternative paradigms that have questioned the aforesaid early formulations. John S. Deyell sought to demolish the paradigm of Indian Feudalism by quantifying coin data to debunk the notion of “paucity”. Sircar too points out to the hoards that were discovered. Andre Wink, on the other hand, is convinced about the relative absence of an indigenous coinage tradition. But he locates the pivot and driving force of early medieval economy and trade in the “world embracing exchange circuit with a unified monetary constituent,” for which no empirical evidence was adduced.

Deyell’s impressionistic quantification to make a case for the theory that coins were manufactured in “large quantities” in early medieval India and the attempt to show that these quantities were in no way inferior to those of pre-Gupta coinage have been refuted by Sharma. He has tabulated the coin holdings of 11 important museums in India and those abroad.

These data show that the number of coins between circa A.D. 500 and 1000 should not exceed 20,000. The same tables show that the total number of coins for the 500 years preceding the rise of the Guptas (that is, circa 200 B.C. to A.D. 300) is around 97,000. Thus, the coins of AD 500-1000 seem to be not more than a fourth of the coins from 200 B.C. to A.D. 300. There is also an indication that the per capita availability of coins in the post-500 period shrank substantially, for agrarian expansion and the multiplication of states in both old and newly settled areas suggest an increase in population.

If dents in the varna order occasioned the regime of land charters and acted as a catalyst for the feudalisation of Indian society, the consolidation and proliferation of rajashasanas in its turn also changed the complexion of the social structure. The transformation of sudras into cultivators (often as a result cent of the incorporation of tribal people) and the relegation of vaishyas to the position of sudras are significant pointers of the new social order. The exponential proliferation of sudras and Brahmins, the emergence of “Rajputs” and “Kayasthas” (professional scribes engaged in writing and maintaining land records) and their competition with the Brahmins were such new developments in society that were directly related to the land-based order.

The early medieval socio-economic formation was marked by grossly unequal rights in the matter of distribution of land and agricultural produce. Embedded in this exploitative system were the seeds of popular protests. Several instances of violent conflicts between landlords, who were Brahmins, and the peasants in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu between the 11th and the 13th centuries are on record. There are a few instances of tribal peasants rising in revolt against the landed powers. In Bengal, the protracted revolt of the Kaivartas, who were absorbed into brahminical society as a low mixed caste, was in some measure a spontaneous expression against the oppression of the Palas and their landed beneficiaries, leading to the supplanting of Pala rule for a brief period.

The decline of the demand for silk in Byzantium adversely affected the Indian trade along with that of the Chinese around the middle of the sixth century CE. Though it affected the internal trade very insignificantly, but the overall decline weakened the economic links between the coastal and inland towns and between towns and villages. In the phase of the decline of the Roman Empire the development of the seigniorial estate divided the city from the country side. The estates (oikos) of the late empire tended to become close units with natural economy as the dominant feature. Decline of trade has quite often been attributed to this factor. Brajadulal Chattopadhyaya though insists that India lost its primary source of metal just before the beginning of the Christian era. If the chronology of the hoards of coins were an indication, then trade with the outside world had been on a decline long before the collapse of the Romans. So foreign trade cannot be an indication of decline. Accepting this as a plausible truth, it can also therefore be concluded that a reduced volume of trade may hardly be relevant in the decline during the pose-Kusana and the post-Gupta period.

Hsuan Tsang’s account also talks about a decline in trade and urban centers in Central Asia, where we can understand that India’s long distance trade might have been confined to Iran and Iraq, where we see a continuous series of coinage in the flourishing period of the Abbasids from the middle of eighth to ninth centuries. The practice of payments by grants of revenue or land was intimately linked up with the decline of trade and absence of metallic money has been illustrated successfully by R.S Sharma with reference to Afganisthan, the North-West Frontier, Punjab, Haryana and Kashmir. There is a complete lack of land grant during the early medieval period, and it is during this period that there is coin series of the Shahi rulers of Punjab and Afganisthan to be found. The decline of urban centers like Mithila which was central to multiple trade networks implied the decay of the trade as well as the towns associated with it. From the records of Hsuan Tsang, we come to know that Sindh abounds in metals like gold, silver and copper and a great variety of salts- white, black and rock salt. It is evident that the country was engaged in trade. These exceptions prove the validity of the general thesis that the practice of land grants was linked to the decline of trade and towns and with the paucity of metallic money in the major part of the Indian subcontinent. There were evidences of debasements and the counter argument that debasement in the quantity of coins might not be an overt indicator of a reduced economic value. John Deyell suggested lack of foreign trade due to debased coins and the sealing of the frontiers to the emigration of local money.

The decline of trade and commerce stopped the movement of artisans and traders from one area to the other. Urban centers demanding service of the artisan declined as well. Traders and artisans were increasingly tied to the land and had to serve their beneficiaries. The Nalanda charter ascribing to Samudra Gupta asks tax-paying artisans and peasants to remain in their villages and not to settle in tax-free villages. There are evidences from Deccan from 6th-8th centuries which do not permit merchants to congregate in the same markets in the city. This eliminates competition and points towards localization of traders. There are instances of sharecroppers and peasants attached to the land specifically asked to stick to their soil in Orissa and Deccan (6th century onward). All these fostered a closed economy and a strong sense of localism. Peasants and artisans could not move around, even the movement of troops did not prove to be helpful towards commerce. The shastric literature around this period also substantiates this rigid immobility. The Kalivarjyas in Dharmashastra limited the movement of the brahmanas. Anushasana Smriti had severe regulations regarding sea voyage, asserting that anyone embarking on a voyage had fallen from their castes and were unfit to attend the funeral feasts (shradhha).

Chattopadhyaya traces the fully developed urban centers to 9th century. Stating examples from Andhra, Chola, Kalachuris and others he propounds the absence of any decay in the medieval phase by establishing the relation between the rural and the urban, and the fact that activities continued in the urban centers without any marked disruption. The primary source for this theory are the two inscriptions dated around tenth century belonging to urban centers. Firstly to the region of Kalachuris around the Jabalpur area of Madhya Prdesh, and the second from Bilhari during the period of Yuvaraja II.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  • Sharma, Ram Sharan: Early Medieval Indian Society: A study in Feudalisation, Paucity of Metallic Coinage (c. 500 – c. 1000), pp. 119-153.
  • Sharma, Ram Sharan : Early Medieval Indian Society: A study in Feudalisation, Changes in social structure, Orient Longman,pp. 186-190.
  • Jha, D.N (ed) : The Feudal Order, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2000, pp. 61-79.
  • Chattopadhyaya, Brajadulal : The Making of Early Medieval India, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 130-183.
  • Early Medieval Indian Society by R.S. Sharma, reviewed by K.M. Shrimali.